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Abstract 
Thinking Beyond Modernism: Peripheral Realism and the Ethics of Truth-Telling 
explores how various forms of peripheral realism—an aesthetic that is hugely 
underappreciated not just in the Western academy but also in postcolonial studies—
envision a new cultural analysis that allows us to understand and surpass the limits of  
modernism. First, I probe how modernist taste, with its ahistorical emphasis on aesthetic 
form and subjectivity, had far-reaching global influence at the expense of what it 
systematically jettisoned—that is, various realist attempts to reimagine the social value of 
literature. I analyze the demands of Western modernist aesthetics and its influence in the 
making of world literature and cinema to show how peripheral forms of art resist the 
modernist imperative. Second, I discuss recent instances in which realism re-appears as a 
problem—its status after the affective turn in literary cultural theory, its advent in the 
peripheral vision of the metropolitan writer J. M. Coetzee’s Australian Trilogy, and its 
emergence as a peculiar from of “neo-realism” in literary and cinematic works from 
South America and South Korea—to demonstrate how authors reclaim an entirely new 
type of realism. De-emphasizing modernist delight in the wiles of language and 
skepticism about representations’ correspondence to the real, neo-realists rediscover 
historical agents’ ability to express their subjectivity in literary form without neglecting 
their own place in history. Finally, in addition to its broad geographical and political 
remit, the dissertation is, importantly, a study of genre. By investigating how peripheral 
neo-realists defend truthfulness and achieve a sober realism that understands the ethical 
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dimension of political life as essentially collective, I argue that realism’s “fidelity to 
truth” is not merely an epistemological claim but an ethical attitude toward the world.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
I.1. World Literature Now and the Literary World System 
 On the 16th of May 2016, the South Korean author Han Kang’s novel, The 
Vegetarian (2007), won the Man Booker International Prize, the first time a South 
Korean novel had ever done so. Soon after the news of this award, the novel which had 
only been read within small circles of the South Korean literati, suddenly became a 
national best-seller, and a flood of interviews with the author likewise followed. It did not 
take long, however, for the congratulatory mood of the Korean reading public to turn to 
general confusion, leading them to wonder: is there anything “Korean” about the novel 
except the ostensible fact that it was written by a Korean author about a Korean woman? 
The important inquiry reignited the long-held, uncomfortable debate on the national 
desire to be recognized by the West; the self-mocking Korean jokes, “Do you know 
Kimchi?” and “Do you know Ji-Sung Park?”—which used to be asked of foreigners from 
Europe and North America, in particular—evinced both how earnest South Koreans have 
been about promoting themselves to gain cultural visibility, and how exhausted they were 
with the struggle for recognition at the same time. While most think the jokes are now 
chiefly uttered with irony, to indicate a phase of Koreans’ critical self-reflection—or even 
to humiliate themselves for their unrequited desire for acknowledgement—others are still 
hopeful that the inclusion of Han Kang’s name on the best-seller list will heighten the 
culture’s international status. 
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 I am using this anecdote of Han Kang’s recent achievement to question whether a 
paradoxically homogenizing tendency exists in world literature—namely whether a 
certain kind of already minted aesthetic dictates which works from Hong Kong, Somalia, 
and Argentina, for example, make it onto the front pages in the construction of world 
literature. Western recognition of the novel’s modernist aesthetic led Koreans to “start” 
considering the form of the novel culturally important. But The Vegetarian’s modernism 
would appear to be the decisive factor in its western success: why award this novel and 
not Han Kang’s novel on the Gwangju Massacre, Human Acts (2014), for instance, which 
appealed much more to the Korean reading public for its ostensibly political significance? 
It has even been disclosed recently that Han Kang was on a government mandated 
blacklist for writing about the massacre, and that President Park Geun-hye, who was 
recently impeached and arrested for her political scandals, had refused to congratulate her 
on the great success of winning the prestigious prize. Han Kang herself also makes clear 
many times that the novelistic style she employed in The Vegetarian had already become 
a thing of her past, implying that this work is not the kind of novel she considers ideal. 
The complicatedly woven but thematically consistent triptych structure of the novel and 
the attractive title, The Vegetarian (with its association of a minoritarian or bohemian 
lifestyle) are easily aligned with a general critique of gender and sexuality in South 
Korean society. The novel is an elegant combination of almost every modernist element, 
pleasantly reminding westerners of Frantz Kafka’s “A Hunger Artist” (1922), Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman’s “The Yellow Wallpaper” (1892), and even Herman Melville’s 
“Bartleby, the Scrivener” (1853). It is almost an unnecessary addition to say that Han 
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Kang, along with many other world-renowned Korean film directors such as Sang-soo 
Hong, Chan-wook Park, and Ki-duk Kim, was educated in one of the countries (the U.S., 
in particular) where she could gain so-called global consciousness. Aside from the 
possibility that the novel might perpetuate Orientalist stereotypes of the East’s persistent 
patriarchy and of the oppressed status of Korean women in a not very original way—thus 
hinting at an incongruity between the country’s economic development and its relative 
cultural backwardness—the West’s tribute to this particular novel is an important 
symptom of the current literary world system. It demonstrates how those subaltern 
elements of literature in the (semi-)peripheral world picked up by the core keep 
functioning as evidence to affirm the core’s aesthetic judgment.  
 This issue is not new at all, of course. It has been more than three decades since 
the unequal circulation of knowledge between the peripheral and the core economies has 
been discussed as a serious academic issue in studies of postcolonialism and comparative 
literature (though it was raised much earlier in communication studies and developmental 
economics). From Immanuel Wallerstein’s famous world-systems theory in the 1970s to 
the Beninese philosopher Paulin Hountondji’s case study of western views of African 
thought,1 a critique of how theoretical products made from Third World materials tend to 
structurally serve the interests of the First World has been a significant part of the 
academic endeavor. Nicholas Brown, in Utopian Generations: The Political Horizon of 
Twentieth Century Literature (2005), for instance, spells out the so-called affinity 
between the process of cultural production and that of economic production:  
                                                 
1 See his article “Recapturing” in The Surreptitious Speech: Présence Africaine and the Politics of 
Otherness 1947-1987 (1992), as well as “Scientific Dependency in Africa Today” in Research in African 
Literatures 21.3 (1990): 5-15.   
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In cultural as in directly economic production, the Third World tends to 
provide raw material (local knowledges, African novels, musical idioms) 
that are shipped to the research centers of the First World to be converted 
into finished products (anthropology and pharmaceuticals, literary 
criticism, Paul Simon albums) that are sometimes reimported to the 
periphery. (4)  
Responsive to possible forms of new cultural imperialism, Fredric Jameson, in a similar 
but more specifically literary context, warned as early as 1986, in his seminal essay 
“Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” against the potential 
pitfalls of studying Third World writers at the level of granting them a right to be 
recognized, “trying to prove that these texts are as ‘great’ as those of the canon itself” 
(65).  
Accordingly, we have witnessed radical self-questioning in the particular field of 
world literature since the mid-1990s, as a rallying point of varied academic efforts, with a 
renewed interest in the world-system school of economic history and new perspectives on 
Goethean Weltliteratur. The popularity of the more recent concept of the Global South, in 
particular, has brought our attention to the relation between aesthetic form and place, as 
its discourse emphasizes, above all, the ongoing problem of unequal development and the 
significance of “networking among decolonial local histories” (Levander and Mignolo 
10).2 Although many such efforts have been made in the last decade to be mindful of the 
                                                 
2 “The Global South” is a relatively recent concept that has slowly started to replace the term “Third 
World” in the post-Cold War era, according to Arif Dirlik, where “the ‘Third World’ is no longer viable 
concept geo-politically or as political project,” but “may still provide an inspiration for similar projects 
presently that may render the Global South into a force in the reconfiguration of global relations” (Dirlik 
   5 
 
literary contributions of parts of the world other than Europe and North America, debates 
on how to reinvent world literature with a global consciousness have kept the currently 
dominant selective criteria of the modernist aesthetic largely unchallenged. As Joe Cleary 
points out in “Realism after Modernism and the Literary World-System” (2012) in a 
special issue of Modern Language Quarterly, the imperative of an ethical sensitivity to 
voices from the periphery, as represented in the works of Dilip Parameshwar Gaonkar 
and Rebecca Walkowitz, for example, often led to the claim that “Third World societies 
have their own indigenous modernisms (and postmodernisms)” (266).3 In a similar 
context, Jed Esty and Collen Lye also show how the substitution of “alternative 
modernities and global modernisms” for postcoloniality during the 1990s, and the 
resultant legitimization of “the new modernist studies” (on the initiative of Douglas Mao 
and Rebecca L. Walkowitz) has been pursued at the level of merely replacing “a dualism 
of postmodernity and its subalterns” with “a dualism of modernity and its alternative 
versions,” leading ultimately to “the expansion of the field of modernism” (273).4 
Modernism may have started with its own essentially radical aspiration to go beyond 
describing merely existing realities; in Adorno’s words in Aesthetic Theory, modernist art 
attempted to “crystallize in itself as something unique to itself, rather than complying 
with existing social norms” (226), by pursuing autonomous aesthetic production 
                                                                                                                                                 
12). Less associated with specific geographical locations than a more general status of marginalization, the 
term highlights the agency of the periphery with its potential to “engage decolonial forces in art, 
knowledge, ethics, politics, and creative practice” (Levander and Mignolo 8). For a detailed discussion of 
the emergence of the concept and its promises, see Arif Dirlik’s “Global South: Predicament and Promise,” 
as well as “The Global South and World Dis/Order,” co-written by Caroline Levander and Walter D. 
Mignolo. 
3 See Dilip Gaonkar’s “On Alternative Modernities” in Alternative Modernities (2001) and Rebeca L. 
Walkowitz’s Cosmopolitan Style (2006).  
4 See Douglas Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz’s “Introduction: Modernisms Bad and New” in Bad 
Modernisms (2006).  
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containing a critical and subversive force in the otherwise standardized commodity 
structure of mass culture. But in the current situation, modernism ironically betrays this 
ambition. Indeed, one currently encounters a grim and sinister picture of the frustrated or 
even reversed Adornian project of autonomous art: modernism has become the dominant 
mode of literary critique, establishing for itself what Bourdieu calls “the monopoly of the 
power of consecration of producers and products” (224, original emphasis).  
What we fail to see in this context is the curious resistance from the global 
periphery to modernist styles; this resistance, which we can call “neo-realism,” is based 
on a cultural theory that explicitly posits a movement beyond modernism. That is, outside 
the major financial and media centers of Europe and North America, there is still an 
attraction, I suggest, to forms of literary and cinematic realism that have fallen out of 
favor within dominant modernist circles of metropolitan taste formation. Thus, what this 
dissertation calls for and intends to practice is a departure from the major attempts in 
modernist studies to discover in the periphery a modernism that has largely been exported 
there under the regimes of a colonial relationship. Since, with a particular focus on the 
liberating quality of the terms “alternative” or “divergent modernisms,” such attempts to 
pluralize modernism unwittingly tend to re-posit the West as the only origin of 
modernity. The dissertation pays attention instead to the concept of peripheral realism in 
place of peripheral modernism in considering modernity’s uneven and unequal effects 
under the current literary world-system. My use of the terms, “core,” and “periphery” is 
not to acknowledge the starkness of the contrast as Franco Moretti sometimes does. As 
the Warwick Research Collective rightly points out in Combined and Uneven 
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Development, some metropolitan writers “inhabit a ‘core’ relative to a ‘periphery’ within 
the (semi-) peripheral areas” (55), and writers from core countries are sometimes from 
the peripheries within the core due to their marginalized class, racial, and/or gender 
positions as well.5 But then, the terms can be still used in a useful way, as its opposition 
evokes the present problem of uneven development in peripheral nations.6 It registers an 
inevitable recognition that modernity, to which Adorno thinks modernism says no, cannot 
be fully investigated without thinking of its association with imperialist global capitalism. 
To delve into heterogeneous aesthetic forms corresponding to the structural and historical 
unevenness of the periphery, paying attention to formal specificities resulting from their 
social relationships, in this regard, can possibly have an advantage for revealing the 
existence of structural contradictions within an imperialist world-system, challenging the 
idea of global capitalism’s universality. 
It should be noted, however, that  this does not mean that I deny any existence of 
what Neil Lazarus calls in The Postcolonial Unconscious (2011), “a modernist writing 
after the canonization of modernism” that “refuses integration, resolution, consolation, 
comfort; protests and criticizes” (31, original emphasis). Modernism, however defined, 
emerged brilliantly, participating in the dissolution of the old Paris-centered literary 
world system and proclaiming radical roles for literature in a new world system. 
                                                 
5 The Warwick Research Collective is composed of a variety of specialists whose shared inquires include 
what constitutes contemporary global literary studies, and among others, how to rethink world literature as 
a “system structured on inequality (rather than cultural difference)” (7). The collective includes Sharae 
Deckard, Nicholas Lawrence, Neil Lazarus, Graeme Macdonald, Upamanyu Pablo Mukherjee, Benita 
Parry, and Stephen Shapiro. 
6 Studying Russian conditions in the 1930s, Trotsky observed that in the “backward” zones of the world 
system the imperialist powers had introduced the capitalist social relations while at the same time 
maintaining their archaic forms of economic life. The outcome was, in his words, “a drawing together of 
the different stages of the journey, a combining of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more 
contemporary forms” (27), which he proposed as a theory of uneven and combined development.  
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Modernist artists promoted the purity of art as a sacred realm above commerce (as in 
Eliot and Yeats) or took the revolutionary doctrines of art as the liberating vanguard of 
popular consciousness (as in Picasso and Brecht). As Raymond Williams and Fredric 
Jameson famously argue, however, the war of 1939-45 brought an end to many of the 
anti-capitalist movements and transformed most of the earlier positions; since the post-
war settlement and its accompanying, complicit academic endorsement in the U.S., 
modernism began to be canonized and comfortably integrated into the new international 
capitalism. For instance, its characteristic image of a contemplative loner in a crowd of 
strangers, which once captured the ambiguities of modern city life with its existential 
isolation as a simultaneous form of liberation, has become widely commercialized, and 
alienation itself has become romantically enshrined.   
  What we notice now is modernism’s stable settlement or fixation in the present; 
in Williams’s words, “modernism is here in this specific phase or period” (34, original 
emphasis), and there is nothing beyond it. “In an act of pure ideology,” Williams argues, 
“it stops history dead. Modernism being the terminus, everything afterwards is counted 
out of development. It is after, stuck in the post” (34-35, original emphasis). My project 
resists this exhaustion. It questions how modernism’s institutionalization in U.S. 
academia has marginalized realism, with the aim of reclaiming realism’s inevitability in 
explaining our changed social reality. Although the tendency that Esty and Lye call “a 
new realist turn” (277) may not be prominent yet, it seems that the necessity to represent 
realities and to remap the world system—beyond treating reality as a negative or 
impossible object of representation—is growing more significant with the expansion of 
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global capitalism. Though pushed to the margin, forms of peripheral realism, I argue, 
reveal that realism has not become exhausted but remains, even at the very moment of 
literature’s impossibility, as a possible alternative for reimagining the social value of 
literature.  
 By exploring the emergence of neo-realists after modernism in the global 
periphery, this dissertation investigates how the periphery demands mutuality between 
itself and the core in the global articulations of modern life as a constructive frame of 
world literature. My argument is that this mutuality can only be achieved on the premise 
of our shared understanding of modernity as a singular modernity, in Fredric Jameson’s 
phrase—that is, a world of difference unified by an essentially capitalist form. The return 
of realism in the margins of the world system is paradigmatic not only of the periphery’s 
untiring participation in the critique of homogenizing capitalism, but also its intervention 
in the task of reimagining the potential of the literary mode. Furthermore, the persistent 
replication of the aesthetic choices of an older realism in the periphery allows us to 
rethink realism not as a dead end on the way to modernism, but as a sort of ethical 
program after the hegemony of modernist aesthetics. In the face of modernism’s 
canonization and postmodernism’s conformist tendency as the cultural logic of 
capitalism, the periphery has chosen to reinvent the already familiar, whose political, 
aesthetic, and ethical potential, however, has not been exhausted. Keenly aware of the 
historical continuity of modernist forms and themes in realism, peripheral neo-realists 
transform the tension between realism and modernism into a productive force for a new 
ethical community. And it fundamentally evinces the strengthened desire of the people of 
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the periphery to “understand” the world beyond its unknowability. Such understanding is 
a basic condition for the possibility of change. 
 
I.2. Revisiting the Realism-Modernism Debate 
The sophistications of peripheral neo-realism are built, in fact, on a critique of 
modernist representation, and understanding the re-emergence of realism in the global 
periphery requires us to revisit the classic conflict between realism and modernism. 
Despite the diversification of theoretical perspectives since the formation of postwar 
critical theory, realism and modernism have continued to represent distinctive but 
inevitably interrelated modes of philosophical and political attitudes for investigating the 
relation between aesthetics and politics. Fredric Jameson, for instance, points out the 
continued relevance of the classical debate in the afterword to Aesthetics and Politics:  
Nowhere has this [Freudian] ‘return of the repressed’ been more dramatic 
than in the aesthetic conflict between ‘Realism’ and ‘Modernism,’ whose 
navigation and renegotiation is still unavoidable for us today. . . . The 
dispute is itself older than Marxism, and in a longer perspective may be 
said to be a contemporary political replay of the seventeenth-century 
Querelle des anciens et des moderns, in which, for the first time, 
aesthetics came face to face with the dilemmas of historicity. 
(“Conclusion” 217) 
As is well-known, Marxist thinkers—Georg Lukács, Theodor Adorno, and Jameson, 
among others—discussed realism and modernism, characteristically, in terms of the 
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dialectical relation between form and content. Even though they agreed on the basic idea 
that there is a fundamentally inseparable relationship between literature and the 
complexes and contradictions of society, their delineations of the artistic presentation of 
social contradictions were disparate, resulting in their different understandings of what it 
means to be “real.” 
Georg Lukács and the Dialectic of Form and Content 
Lukács’s realism, first of all, comes to light in its stark antagonism to modernism, 
which he relentlessly denounced as reactionary. He considered the modernist 
representation of reality, with its foregrounding of style and technique, as a 
fundamentally static approach to the world. That is, Lukács’s criticism of modernism, 
whose boundaries he extended from naturalism all the way to surrealism, is enacted not 
just an aesthetic one; the distinction between realism and modernism, for Lukács, is 
always the question of a politico-philosophical attitude toward reality. What is at issue is 
not primarily a question of style and formal technique but rather the hidden contrasting 
principles that underlie and determine the opposing styles of realism and modernism. To 
make this point clear, in “The Ideology of Modernism,” Lukács contrasts the disparate 
uses of the same stylistic technique of the interior monologue in James Joyce’s Ulysses—
Bloom’s monologue in the lavatory or Molly’s monologue in bed, in particular—and 
Goethe’s early-morning monologue as conceived by Thomas Mann’s Lotte in Weimar 
(17). Lukács’s argument is that, in Joyce, technique is elevated to the status of 
“something absolute” (18), since it is not just a stylistic device but the formative principle 
governing the whole construction of the story, from the presentation of character to the 
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narrative pattern. In Thomas Mann, however, the interior monologue is simply a 
technical device, “allowing the author to explore aspects of Goethe’s world which would 
not have been otherwise available” (18).  
Goethe’s experience is not presented as confined to momentary sense-
impressions. The artist reaches down to the core of Goethe’s personality, 
to the complexity of his relations with his own past, present, and even 
future experience. The stream of association is only apparently free. The 
monologue is composed with the utmost artistic rigour: it is a carefully 
plotted sequence gradually piercing to the core of Goethe’s personality. 
Every person or event, emerging momentarily from the stream and 
vanishing again, is given a specific weight, a definite position, in the 
pattern of the whole. (18)   
The dissimilar status of the same stylistic technique in Joyce and Mann leads Lukács to 
argue that modernism fails to penetrate what can be called “the inherent dialectic” of 
formal problems. With the “perpetually oscillating patterns of sense- and memory-data, 
their powerfully charged, but aimless and directionless, fields of force” (18), the non-
dialectical view of form and intention—the intention realized in the work by a writer, 
which does not always coincide with the writer’s conscious intention, he emphasizes—
ultimately ends up constructing a “static” structure, reflecting its inert and sensational 
view of the world.  
An exclusive emphasis on formal matters when considering modernism is derived 
from a misconceived relation between form and content, the problem of which, for 
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Lukács, transcends their merely aesthetic reference and is connected to the question of 
the social itself; what concerns him is the weltanschauung underlying a writer’s work, 
which constitutes the writer’s intention and is the formative principle of the work itself. 
Looked at in this way, Lukács argues, “style ceases to be a formalistic category. Rather, it 
is rooted in content; it is the specific form of a specific content” (19).7 In another essay, 
“Remarks Toward a Theory of Literature,” he makes a similar remark on aesthetic form: 
“every form is an evaluation of life, a pronouncement of judgment over life; it gains the 
power to do so from the fact that in its deepest aspect, it is already a Weltanschauung” 
(qtd. in Gluck 870). The ultimate identity of form and content through their dialectical 
movement of contradiction implied in this essay explains Lukács’s hostility toward 
modernism’s exclusive concentration on form as a solely aesthetic category, leading to 
the serious misunderstanding of the character of an artist’s work.  
The isolation of form from content robs the most rigorous modernists of a sense 
of perspective. The whole course and content of a story should be governed by 
perspective, but Lukács notices, in the works of Kafka, Benn, and Musil, the common 
lack of a perspective that can determine the direction in which characters develop and 
how the threads of the narration will be drawn together (“Modernism” 33). By dropping 
this selective principle, or “replacing it with its dogma of the condition humaine” (34), 
                                                 
7 Lukács’s understanding of aesthetic form is derived from Hegel’s dialectical conception of the relation 
between form and content. For Hegel, the content of art is the Idea, whose form is the artistic configuration 
of sensuous material, and the vocation of art is to “harmonize these two sides and bring them into a free 
reconciled totality” (Aesthetics 70). Though derived from the Platonic “idea,” Hegel’s Idea is different from 
Plato’s in that it is a “combination of concept with reality” (Aesthetics ix). In Phenomenology of Spirit as 
well, Hegel emphasizes the inevitable relation that form has with content, implying their ultimate identity: 
“It is for this reason unnecessary to clothe the content in an external [logical] formalism; the content is in 
its very nature the transition into such formalism, but a formalism which ceases to be external, since the 
form is the innate development of the concrete content itself” (Phenomenology 34-35). 
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however, Lukács argues that modernism ends up taking the principle of “naturalistic 
arbitrariness”: “We encounter it in the all-determining ‘social conditions’ of naturalism, 
in Symbolism’s impressionist methods and its cultivation of the exotic, in the 
fragmentation of objective reality in Futurism and Constructivism and the German Neue 
Sachlichkeit, or again, Surrealism’s stream of consciousness” (33). The distinction 
between realism and naturalism relies on the existence or absence of a “hierarchy of 
significance” in the situations and characters; modernists’ inability to grasp this 
difference leads to the “basically naturalistic character of modernist literature” (34).  
The static apprehension of reality coupled with the lack of perspective in 
modernist literature, for Lukács, is already rooted in the ideology of modernism, which 
has an inner connection with a certain tradition of bourgeois thought. What Lukács 
notices in modernist literature is the embodiment of the Kierkegaardian view of the world 
that gained remarkable popularity after the Second World War: “the individual exists 
within an opaque, impenetrable ‘incognito’” (27). The Hegelian dialectical unity is no 
longer posited between inner and outer world, and now “a man’s external deeds are no 
guide to his motives” (27).8 This philosophical doctrine, with its axiom of man’s 
inevitable isolation from his world, is represented in modernist literature through the 
repetitive emphasis on the role of psychopathology, which is, for Lukács, nothing other 
than an attempt to escape from the dreariness of life under capitalism into neurosis, as 
well as the obsession with morbidity, and, ultimately, meaninglessness, nothingness, and 
impotence—all of which imply that outer reality is not alterable. Beckett’s Molloy best 
                                                 
8 Lukács explains how Martin Heidegger, Ernst Jünger, Carl Schmitt, Gottfried Benn, and others 
passionately embraced this doctrine of the eternal incognito, and delineates the social implications of such 
ontology by relating the doctrine to their participation in Nazism (27). 
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exemplifies the modern fascination with what Lukács calls “morbid eccentricity” by 
presenting us with “an image of the most human degradation—an idiot’s vegetative 
existence” (31).  
Again, the perverse prevalence of idiocy and eccentricity as the condition 
humaine in modernist literature is not just a literary problem for Lukács; it is associated 
with an ideological problem, derived from the ontological dogma of the solitariness of 
man with which modern philosophy is imbued—here, Lukács is thinking about 
Heidegger’s “das Man,” Klages’ incompatibility of Geist, or Rosenberg’s racial 
mythology (32). “A glorification of the abnormal and an undisguised anti-humanism” 
(32) is Lukács’s ultimate evaluation of modernist literature. One consequence of the 
influence of modern philosophy, what he names subjective idealism, is the accentuation 
of subjective time in modernism, an abstractly conceived time, “separated from historical 
change and particularity of place” (37). Through a comparison with the different 
intention of realists’ dealing with time, Lukács reveals the essentially reactionary 
character of subjectivism, which is deeply rooted in the experience of modernists.  
The major realists of our time deliberately introduce elements of 
disintegration into their work—for instance, the subjectivizing of time—
and use them to portray the contemporary world more exactly. . . . But in 
modernist literature, the disintegration of the world of man—and 
consequently the disintegration of personality—coincides with the 
ideological intention. Thus angst, this basic modern experience, this by-
product of Geworfenheit, has its emotional origin in the experience of a 
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disintegrating society. But it attains its effects by evoking the 
disintegration of the world of man. (39-40)  
The isolation of time from the outer world of reality causes the inner world of the subject 
to be transformed into “a sinister, inexplicable flux” (39), endowing it with a static 
character.  
Man’s alienation from his reality is best described by the use of the aesthetic 
genre of allegory in modernism, Lukács points out. What is problematic about allegory, 
for him, lies not just in its rejection of an immanent meaning of human existence—
drawing on Benjamin’s examination of allegory, Lukács explains why transcendence, the 
essence of allegory, is doomed to destroy aesthetics itself (40-41)—but in its association 
with the annihilation of history. If the notion of objective time is essential to the 
understanding of history, as Benjamin and Lukács alike thought, modernism, because it 
does not hold any concept of the coherence and rationality of the world or any belief in 
man’s ability to penetrate them, cannot reach the proper consciousness of history. The 
logical result of the negation of history is a pervasively episodic and immediate 
representation of the world. Reality in modernist literature has a spectral character, with a 
hero who is confined within the limits of his own experience, or who is without personal 
history—he is just thrown-into-the-world. Lukács finds the culmination of this 
development in Kafka, whose aim is to “raise the individual detail in its immediate 
particularity to the level of abstraction” (45), which is typical of modernism’s allegorical 
approach. “This allegorical transcendence,” he asserts, “bars Kafka’s way to realism” 
(45). 
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For Lukács, modernist writers’ confinement to the representation of immediate 
experience and their inability to pierce the surface to discover the underlying essence are 
essentially due to their failure to understand the correct dialectical unity of appearance 
and essence—after all, how to envision the relation between appearance and essence is 
the crux of Lukács’s realism: “The richer, the more diverse, complex and ‘cunning’ this 
dialectic [of appearance and essence] is, the more firmly it grasps hold of the living 
contradiction of life and society, then the greater and the more profound the realism will 
be” (“Realism” 36). Thus, what he said about Ernst Bloch’s celebration of expressionism 
in “Realism in the Balance” should be also thought of as a criticism directed at 
modernism: “Bloch’s mistake lies in the fact that he identifies this state of mind directly 
and unreservedly with reality itself. He equates the highly distorted image created in this 
state of mind with the thing itself, instead of objectively unraveling the essence, the 
origins and the mediations of the distortion by comparing it with reality” (30). That is, 
frozen in its own immediacy, modernist literature fails to transcend the limits of such 
immediacy to probe more deeply the real world. Hegel has already taught us of the link 
between immediacy and abstraction, and here, Lukács is also thinking of Marx’s 
argument that the entire process of capitalist production “involves the obliteration of all 
mediations and so represents the most extreme form of abstraction” (36). Lukács admits 
that there can be no art without abstraction, but even so, abstraction must have a direction 
on which everything relies. Lacking this sense of direction, or perspective, modernist 
literature cannot get to the core of reality, which is possible only if the question of totality 
is properly formulated in search of the relation between literature and life.  
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With the consciousness of history as the living dialectical unity between 
continuity and discontinuity, realism in Lukács faces the people’s future, imagined 
through the mediation of the great literary traditions of past and present, for the creation 
of what he calls “life-creating, popular progressiveness”—“a struggle for a genuine 
popular culture, a manifold relationship to every aspect of the life of one’s own people as 
it has developed in its own individual way in the course of history” (“Realism” 57). True 
realist literature, therefore, beyond the immediately obvious aspect of reality, delves into 
forces that have not yet fully blossomed beneath the surface, and makes potentiality 
concrete by discerning and giving shape to it. If this is the great historical mission of the 
true literary avant-garde, Lukács concludes, “only the major realists are capable of 
forming a genuine avant-garde” (46).  
Theodor Adorno and the Autonomy of Art 
If Lukács’s dialectic of form and intention in works of art faithfully accentuates 
Hegelian content-aesthetics [Inhaltsästhetik], Adorno, while accepting the Hegelian 
understanding of form as “the innate development of the concrete content itself” 
(Phenomenology 35),9 tries to elevate form as the condition of possibility for any 
dialectic between the aesthetic and the empirical itself. For Adorno, one of Hegel’s 
mistakes in Aesthetics lies in his misconception of form as content, which causes his 
idealist dialectic to end up regressing to “a crude, pre-aesthetic level”: “It confuses the 
representational or discursive treatment of thematic material with the otherness that is 
                                                 
9 “If art opposes the empirical through the element of form—and the mediation of form and content is not 
to be grasped without their differentiation—the mediation is to be sought in the recognition of aesthetic 
form as sedimented content” (Aesthetic Theory 5). 
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constitutive of art. Hegel transgresses against his own dialectical conception of aesthetics, 
with consequences he did not foresee; he in effect helped transform art into an ideology 
of domination” (Aesthetic Theory 7). The unique status of art in Adorno is derived from 
the enigmatic and paradoxical character of form, which is itself what makes the very 
concept of the “autonomy” of art possible.  
In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno argues very clearly that art can only be understood 
by its laws of movement, and that it should be defined by its relation to what it is not; art 
“acquires its specificity by separating itself from what it developed out of” (3), and this 
element of otherness is essential to his “materialistic-dialectical aesthetics” (3). What 
makes his aesthetics distinguishable from those of other dialectical thinkers, however, is 
his exclusive emphasis on the role of form in the dialectical movement of art. For 
Adorno, form itself is the precondition of the dialectic between art and society, as the 
fundamental factor constitutive of the autonomy of art that enables art to resist the status 
quo of society.  
Art must turn against itself, in opposition to its own concept, and thus 
become uncertain of itself right into its innermost fiber. Yet art is not to be 
dismissed simply by its abstract negation. By attacking what seemed to be 
its foundation throughout the whole of its tradition, art has been 
qualitatively transformed; it itself becomes qualitatively other. It can do 
this because through the ages by means of its form, art has turned against 
the status quo and what merely exists just as much as it has come to its aid 
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by giving form to its elements. Art can no more be reduced to the general 
formula of consolation than to its opposite. (2)  
As is implied in his famous aphorism, “Every work of art is an uncommitted 
crime” (111) in Minima Moralia—and as he makes clear in the chapter on “Society” in 
Aesthetic Theory—Adorno considers the virtue of art as its ability to break through 
reified consciousness in the industrial or totally administered society, and he discovers 
the momentum of this resistance in the “autonomy” of art. The concept of autonomy 
embodies Adorno’s unique and complex understanding of the relation of the artwork to 
the world. Although Adorno thinks that the antagonisms of society are preserved in art 
and the truth content of artworks is historical (“as the materialization of the most 
progressive consciousness, . . . the truth content of artworks is the unconscious writing of 
history bound up with what has until now been repeatedly vanquished” [Aesthetic Theory 
191-192]), he tries to avoid the perils of historicism by emphasizing the immanent 
relation of history to artworks. Art is not externally related to history, which complicates 
the relation between art and the social:  
Art, however, is social not only because of its mode of production, in 
which the dialectic of the forces and relations of production is 
concentrated, nor simply because of the social derivation of its thematic 
material. Much more importantly, art becomes social by its opposition to 
society, and it occupies this position only as autonomous art. By 
crystallizing in itself as something unique to itself, rather than complying 
with existing social norms and qualifying as “socially useful,” it criticizes 
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society by merely existing, for which puritans of all stripes condemn it. 
(226) 
Art, for Adorno, is related to the world by the principle that contrasts it with the world, 
and by its difference from empirical reality the artwork can constitute itself in relation to 
what is not. Art’s rejection of the empirical world is not a mere escape, but a law 
immanent to the concept of art itself, and in this way “art sanctions the primacy of 
reality” (Aesthetic Theory 2).  
Adorno’s emphasis on art’s autonomy from the empirical world explains the 
reason why he fiercely opposed Sartre’s endorsement of politically committed works of 
art. For him, the fundamental distance that art maintains from empirical reality is already 
partly mediated by that reality (“the imagination of the artist is not a creation ex nihilo; 
only dilettanti and aesthetes believe it to be so” [“Commitment” 211]), and bad politics 
inevitably ends up being bad art. The example that he gives here is Brecht’s work, The 
Measures Taken, whose political intentions are impossible to separate from its beauties. 
What is problematic about the notion of a message in art, for Adorno, is that it already 
contains an accommodation to the world, easily falling prey to popularization and 
adaptation to the market, and this is the basis of his criticism of what he thinks Lukács 
defended, a so-called “normal artwork” (Aesthetic Theory 188). For art tolerates no 
correspondence to a norm or any establishment of the meaning of a norm, but negates the 
“spurious universal of the norm” (188) by being distanced from it. Hence his paradoxical 
conclusion: “Art, which even in its opposition to society remains a part of it, must close 
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its eyes and ears against it—it cannot escape the shadow of irrationality” (“Commitment” 
215).  
While committed works all too readily lose the power of resistance by “easily 
crediting themselves with every noble value and manipulating them at their ease” 
(“Commitment” 215), autonomous works of art, whose governing principle is their own 
inherent formal structure, become more than just ideology, and they keep themselves 
alive through their form’s social force of resistance; Kafka and Beckett, the great 
modernist writers whose works Adorno thinks best exemplify the principle of 
autonomous art, “compel the change of attitude which committed works merely demand” 
(212, emphasis added). By separating themselves from their other, i.e., the empirical 
world, autonomous works of art witness that the world itself should be other than it is, 
and it is in this sense that Adorno calls them “the unconscious schemata of that world’s 
transformation” (Aesthetic Theory 177).  
In fact, autonomous art’s power of resistance, which Adorno embraces, is not 
unrelated to his conception of artworks as “things.” In any given work of literature, for 
example, Adorno thinks the role of the writer in the production of his work is minimal; 
his act is reduced to that of “mediating between the problem that confronts him” and the 
“solution, which is itself similarly lodged in the material as potential” (166). Naturally, 
the creator is not the subject of the work—the subject of art is “spirit bound up with, 
preformed and mediated by the object” (166)—and he is not who speaks in the work 
either. Neither is the audience or receiver of the work. Rather, who speaks in the work of 
art is the latent I, “who is immanently constituted in the work through the action of the 
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work’s language” (167). The collective essence of the latent I, Adorno explains, 
externalizes the private I, and it constitutes the linguistic quality of works; the collective 
is formed more intimately as it turns against linguistically reified expression; “Art must 
testify to the unreconciled and at the same time envision its reconciliation; this is a 
possibility only for its non-discursive language. Only in this process is its We 
concretized” (168). 10 For Adorno, great modernist literature achieved this aim of art 
through “the negation of meaningful reality” (“Endgame” 130) and the art of 
meaninglessness as the only meaning.11 
Artworks as “things” in Adorno, however, have a paradoxical mission to negate 
their own status as things, and thus, to turn against art itself, since “the totally 
objectivated artwork would congeal into a mere thing, whereas if it altogether evaded 
objectivation it would regress to an impotently powerless subjective impulse and flounder 
in the empirical world” (Aesthetic Theory 175). The same logic constitutes the aporia of 
art: artworks should insist “fetishistically” on their coherence “as if they were the 
absolute that they are unable to be” (228), but their survival becomes precarious as soon 
as art becomes conscious of its fetishism. That is, art keeps itself alive through its social 
force of resistance against a mass cultural situation in which nothing can escape the 
danger of the communicational; in Adorno’s own words, “unless it reifies itself, it 
becomes a commodity” (226). In Adorno’s aesthetic theory, therefore, art cannot help 
                                                 
10 Like art itself, the knowledge of art should be dialectical as well, Adorno argues: “The more the observer 
adds to the process, the greater the energy with which he penetrates the artwork, the more he then becomes 
aware of objectivity from within. He takes part in objectivity when his energy, even that of his misguided 
subjective “projection,” extinguishes itself in the artwork. The subjective detour may totally miss the mark, 
but without the detour no objectivity becomes evident” (Aesthetic Theory 175). 
11 For Adorno’s analysis of Beckettian absurdity as the supreme example of the immanent dialectic of form, 
see his essay “Trying to Understand Endgame” in The Adorno Reader (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 2000).  
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assuming a new form of reification in which the work resists the commodity reification, 
in Fredric Jameson’s words, “in order to homeopathically to undermine commodity 
reification itself” (Modernist Papers 182). This “perverse formulation” (182) of Adorno’s 
serves as a starting point for Jameson’s own dialectic of form and content.  
Fredric Jameson and an Aesthetics of Failure 
Jameson’s evaluation of Adorno’s valorization of high modernism—as 
autonomous aesthetic production containing critical and subversive force in the 
commodity structure of mass culture—is ambiguous. On the one hand, he shares Adorno 
and Horkheimer’s analysis of the culture industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment that the 
commodity structure has been introduced into the very form and content of the work of 
art itself12—Jameson considers their analysis as the extension and application of Marxist 
theories of commodity reification to the works of mass culture (“Reification” 130). 
Everything in consumer society has now taken on an aesthetic dimension, as is expressed 
in Guy Debord’s assertion of the ultimate form of commodity reification in the universal 
commodification of our objective world in The Society of the Spectacle: “the spectacle is 
capital accumulated to the point that it becomes images” (33). On the other hand, what is 
unsatisfactory about Adorno’s stance for Jameson, who is seeking the possibility of a 
reconciliation between modernism and mass culture, lies in its valorization of modernism 
as a new “solution”: “The conception of the modernist text as the production and the 
protest of an isolated individual, and the logic of its sign systems as so many private 
                                                 
12 Jameson here tries to measure Adorno and Horkheimer’s application of the notion of reification to works 
of art against the Kantian definition of art as a “finality without an end,” that is, as a “goal oriented activity 
which nonetheless has no practical purpose or end in the ‘real world’ of business or politics or concrete 
human praxis” (“Reification” 131).  
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languages (‘styles’) and private religions are contradictory and make the social or 
collective realization of its aesthetic project an impossible one” (“Reification” 135). What 
Jameson worries about is the possibility that the great works of high modernism will 
serve as a fixed standard against which the “degraded” status of mass culture might be 
measured (133), which leads Jameson to insist, instead, on the necessity of viewing 
modernism as a symptom, as a “result of cultural crisis” (135), rather than as a new 
solution.  
Jameson’s attempt to examine the dialectical relation and structural 
interrelatedness between modernism and mass culture13 fundamentally opens up the 
question of the dilemma of form and content. In a way, he endorses the view that only 
modernism is capable of resisting the omnipresence of the commodity form, because its 
formal vocation is not to be a commodity and moreover to create an aesthetic language 
not subject to commodity satisfaction and instrumentalization. The way modernist writers 
achieved this vocation was by trying to transform content into pure form, and for this 
quest for the “Absolute,” namely, the “ultimate mirage of the identity of form and 
content” (Modernist Papers xix), Jameson idiosyncratically calls a “Utopian impulse.” In 
mass culture as well, Jameson discovers a similar Utopian longing for the authentic 
cultural creation that capitalism systematically dissolves, yet processed in a very different 
                                                 
13 What Jameson means by mass culture needs to be distinguished from so-called popular culture, which he 
thinks does not exist any longer. If the popular “reflected and were dependent for their production on quite 
different social realities, were in fact the ‘organic’ expression of so many distinct social communities or 
castes, such as the peasant, village, the court, the medieval town, the polis, and even the classical 
bourgeoisie when it was still a unified social group with its own cultural specificity” (134), mass culture 
represents the agglomeration of atomized and fragmented individuals by late capitalism’s universal 
commodification, which has nothing in common with older forms of popular art. This constitutes, for 
Jameson, the reason why the relation between modernism and mass culture needs to be newly understood 
as an object of cultural study in a whole new field.  
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form. That is, modernism and mass culture should be considered as a single historical and 
aesthetic phenomenon, from which the two different modes were dissociated by the ruse 
of capitalism “to dissolve the fabric of all cohesive social groups without exception” 
(“Reification” 140).  
Both mass culture and modernism have as much content, in the loose 
sense of the word, as the older social realisms; but that this content is 
processed in a very different way than in the latter. Both modernism and 
mass culture entertain relations of repression with the fundamental social 
anxieties and concerns, hopes and blind spots, ideological antinomies and 
fantasies of disaster, which are their raw material; only where modernism 
tends to handle this material by producing compensatory structures of 
various kinds, mass culture represses them by the narrative construction of 
imaginary resolutions and by the projection of an optical illusion of social 
harmony. (“Reification” 141)  
The reading of high modernism and mass culture as historically and dialectically 
interdependent phenomena requires Jameson to fundamentally reconsider the binary 
opposition between form and content, not in order to do away with the opposition, but to 
multiply it, which is what he believes to be the true method for undoing binary 
oppositions (Modernist Papers xiii). The consequence is his suggestion of a four-term set 
of positions, borrowed from Hjelmslev’s linguistics, rather than a simple dualism of form 
and content (Modernist Papers xiv). 
                                                         form                                               content 
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CONTENT                  form of content                              content of content 
FORM                           form of form                                  content of form  
By adding the new entities, the “content of the form” and the “form of the content,” to the 
form-oriented perspective (“the form of the form”) and the content-oriented perspective 
(“the content of the content”), Jameson tries to challenge the traditional binary opposition 
of form and content—for example, a stereotypical socialist realism on the one hand and a 
linguistic formalism on the other. What is generally designated as a “context” is no less 
figural, no less a “form,” for Jameson, and the focus of formalism on the purer version of 
form necessarily fails as well since “we cannot escape our being-in-the world, even by 
way of its formalizing negations” (Modernist Papers xvii). Yet the attempt to escape the 
world’s ideologies deserves to be valued as a Utopian longing for the identity of form and 
content—Jameson, however, never forgets to add that Utopia is also the name for the 
failure of their identification with each other—and the “pure forms still bear the traces 
and the marks of the content they sought to extinguish” (Modernist Papers xvii). This 
perspective foregrounds Jameson’s understanding of literary modernism, which he 
defines as the historical moment in which “the ideological forms of an older content are 
somehow neutralized and bracketed by an abstraction that seeks to retain only from them 
their purely formal structures, now deployed in a kind of autonomy” (Modernist Papers 
xviii).  
Jameson’s adoption of the new entities of the “form of the content” in the “limits 
of a specific historical situation and its contradictions” and the “content of the form,” or 
“the possibilities for figuration of representation” (Modernist Papers xix), in approaching 
   28 
 
literary modernism can thus be read as representing his attempt to correct the most 
commonly held stereotypes about modernism: namely, the apolitical characters of 
modernism and its increased subjectification and introspective psychologization. It is 
misleading for Jameson to characterize modernism as some inward turn away from the 
social materials of realism, since there is nothing private or personal in it, and even the 
so-called purest linguistic style is intricately enmeshed with the extraliterary elements of 
modern politics and economics. His example, here, is James Joyce’s Ulysses. In Ulysses, 
there is something like the “coincidence of the social and the aesthetic” (Modernist 
Papers 163) due to the singularity of the geographical background of the novel, Dublin. 
Dublin in Ulysses indicates a “national situation which reproduces the appearance of First 
World social reality and social relationships—perhaps through the coincidence of its 
language with the imperial language—but whose underlying structure is in fact much 
closer to that of the Third World or of colonized daily life” (164). On the one hand, Joyce 
secures the modernist autonomy of language by way of the consistent refusal of 
expression and human communication, with the blockage of communication producing 
the “illusion of a language that speaks all by itself, without the intervention of human 
agency” (191), as is shown in the impersonal sentence combinations in the “Cyclops” 
chapter of Ulysses: “Love loves to love love. Nurse loves the new chemist / Constable 
14A loves Mary Kelly. Getty Macdowell loves the boy that has the bicycle. M.B. loves a 
fair gentlemen. Li Chi Han lovey up kissy Cha Pu Chow / Jumbo, the elephant, loves 
Alice, the elephant. Etc” (qtd. in Jameson, Modernist Papers 191). On the other hand, 
locating the whole story in the peculiar space of Dublin, the colonized marginal space of 
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the imperial system, makes the “essential linguisticality of Ulysses”14 itself a result of 
imperialism, which “condemns Ireland to an older rhetorical past and to the survivals of 
oratory (in the absence of action), and which freezes Dublin into an underdeveloped 
village in which gossip and rumor still reign supreme” (166); stories and gossip are 
pervasive in the world of Ulysses. The deeper reality of the colonial situation of Ireland 
itself makes it unnecessary to generate an aesthetic form to symbolize the space in 
Ulysses, and it constitutes the unique status of Ulysses as Irish modernist literature, as 
differentiated from First World modernist literature.  
Jameson’s reading of Ulysses in terms of the reconciliation between the aesthetic 
and the political is one indication of his understanding modernism as an unfinished 
Utopian project. With a recognition that the key to the successful fulfillment of the 
project lies in dereifying the now-institutionalized modernist texts, Jameson emphasizes 
the necessity to presuppose canonical modernist works as “failures,” not successes. 
Fundamentally, an aesthetics of failure—whose ethos is, needless to say, linked to the 
meaning of Utopia as the impossible—characterizes Jameson’s reading of every Utopian 
modernist work; the images of death and failure—which are at the heart of Being, 
according to Jameson—as the precondition for imagining utopia are ubiquitous, and the 
experience of suffering and violence are elevated as if it were the only route to the 
“impossible” Utopia. The most salient example of this is found in his reading of the 
socialist realist novel, Chevengur by Andrei Platonov, in the chapter “Utopia, 
Modernism, and Death” in The Seeds of Time. Here Jameson’s search for the essential 
                                                 
14 Jameson points out that every encounter in Ulysses is always already linguistic, as Joyce himself said 
about “the last great talkers” (166).  
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consistency between Utopia and death culminates in the beautification of the suicide of 
the protagonist, Dvanov, romanticizing one of the most tragic socialist novels: “ . . . it is 
not the function of Utopia to bring the dead back to life nor to abolish death in the first 
place; death is so deeply inscribed in this Utopia that it begins and ends with an 
exemplary suicide” (“Utopia” 110). What is problematic about his reading is not that he 
tries to discover a connection between death and Utopia in the novel, but that his reading 
of the socialist realist novel contradicts the intention to engage with socialist realism he 
announces in the beginning of the essay: “ . . . in the west modernism is over and our 
approach to the older classics of modernism must necessarily be a mediated and a 
historicist one for which we have as yet worked out few enough historiographic 
protocols” (“Utopia” 79). Moreover, what one sees in his textual analysis is less the 
mediation between a concluded First World or western modernism and what he calls 
second world modernism as evidence of alternative and even Utopian literary forms, 
(“Utopia” 78), but the subsumption of the latter into the former. It shows the 
impossibility for Jameson of getting out of the western modernist episteme that he tries to 
overcome.  
Beyond Modernism: Raymond Williams and Edward W. Said 
If Jameson’s emphasis on the liberating formal energy of modernism ultimately 
echoes Adorno’s endorsement of aesthetic modernism—it is not an accident that, in the 
conclusion of Aesthetics and Politics, Jameson projects a new realism that would “resist 
the power of reification in consumer society” (“Conclusion” 236), repeating Adorno’s 
argument in essence— Raymond Williams shares the problematic of modernism that 
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Lukács had fundamentally defined, but renews it as a contemporary issue of modern 
theory itself. As Mary Gluck rightly argues in her essay “Toward a Historical Definition 
of Modernism: Georg Lukács and the Avant-Garde,” Lukács’s discontent over 
modernism mainly had to do with not just aesthetic questions, but politico-philosophical 
ones of historical continuity and traditions:  
[My desire] to hold on to the great literary traditions of the past and 
present didn’t stem from any kind of ‘conservatism,’ but from a longing 
for a contemporary art that is capable of artistically shaping and depicting 
our own problems on the level of the old art, in a way that is at the same 
time contemporary and yet a continuation of a past. It is for this reason 
that I turned against that shortsighted and limited artistic cry which 
insisted breaking with the nineteenth century: the century which is, of 
course, not only the century of Goethe and Thomas Mann, but of Karl 
Marx as well. (qtd. in Gluck 882). 
Similarly, what Williams notices in conventionalized modernism is its inability to 
achieve self-consciousness as a historical movement; simply put, “without Dickens, no 
Joyce. But in excluding the great realists, this version of Modernism refuses to see how 
they devised and organized a whole vocabulary and its structure of figures of speech with 
which to grasp the unprecedented social forms of the industrial city” (Modernism 32). If 
Jameson and Adorno discover in the great modernist works what Jameson calls 
modernism’s “trans-aesthetic vocation” to go beyond itself and reach the realm “in which 
aesthetics and ethics, politics and philosophy, religion and pedagogy, all fold together 
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into some supreme vocation” (“Reification” 80), Williams sees the same modernism as 
going too far, elevating itself into the realm of the absolute, as if it had never belonged to 
human history.  
For Williams, the politics of modernism is not also unrelated to the status of 
modern literary theory. If modernism was an aesthetic and ideological response to the 
crisis of what Edward Said names “filiation”—“linear, biologically grounded process, 
that which ties children to their parents” (Beginnings xiii)—the current status of 
modernism, which has consistently gained its philosophical nourishment from modern 
theory, indicates that the crisis of affiliation has succumbed to the reproduction of 
filiative relationships within social affiliation. Williams blames the crisis upon the failure 
of modernism to consider itself subject to the movement of history, and its blindness to 
its own internal contradictions. For him, what was (and is still) offered as modern literary 
theory in the West from the 1960s “as if it had not . . . been comprehensively analyzed 
and refuted” (Modernism 167) is the recurrence of early formalism, which was itself a 
reaction against a crude sociologism. Following Medvedev and Bakhtin, Williams 
identifies formalism as the theoretical consequence of Futurism, in which “extreme 
modernism and radical negation of the past is combined with complete absence of inner 
content” (qtd. in Williams 167), but he also endorses the formative and positive element 
in it, namely its great specificity: “its detailed analysis and demonstration of how art 
works are actually made and gained their effect” (167). Being unable to consider its 
specificity itself as historical, however, led formalism away from some key forms of 
specificity, “under the cover of a selective attention to those versions of specificity which 
   33 
 
Medvedev and Bahktin defined as the Formalist assumption of an ‘eternal 
contemporaneity’” (167).  
Williams’s diagnosis of modern theory as the absence of “the socially and 
historically specifiable agency of its making” (172) resonates with Edward Said’s 
criticism of recent literary theory’s “religious” tendency; under the sway of semiology, 
deconstruction, and even the archaeological descriptions of Foucault, Said complains, the 
notion of “text” has been transformed into “something metaphysically isolated from 
experience,” and loses “the messier precincts of ‘life’ and historical experience” (“Exile” 
xviii).15 Said notices many unnecessary efforts toward defining what is “purely” literary, 
in particular, and problematizes what Williams calls the “language paradigm” of the 
modernist escape route that the obsessive pursuit of “purity” in literature ultimately 
depends on. Instead, what Williams and Said similarly suggest is the “real” work on 
language, impure and secular in essence: “a systematic and dynamic social language, as 
distinct from the ‘language paradigm,’” which does not exclude the language of works 
“marked as temporarily independent and autonomous” (Williams, Modernism 174, 
original emphasis).  
And then with the return of language, in any full sense, we enter the most 
available evidence of the full and complex range of agencies and 
intentions, including those agencies which are other than analytic and 
                                                 
15 In “Secular Criticism,” the introduction to The World, the Text, and the Critic, Said categorizes the 
practices of today’s literary criticism into four major forms—practical criticism, academic literary history, 
literary appreciation and interpretation, and literary theory. He makes clear that what he calls “critical 
consciousness” or secular criticism can only be practiced outside and beyond these four accepted forms, as 
they represent in each instance specialization and a precise division of intellectual labor. This leads him to 
emphasize the necessity for criticism to be between the dominant culture and the totalizing forms of critical 
systems (1-5).  
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interpretive: creative and emancipatory agencies, as in Fekete’s correct 
emphasis that ‘the intention of emancipatory praxis is prior to interpretive 
practice.’ Precisely so, because any such social or cultural or political 
intention – or, we can say, its opposite—is drawn not, or at least not 
necessarily, from the objects of analysis but from our practical 
consciousness and our real and possible affiliations in actual and general 
relations with other people, known and unknown. (174, his emphasis)  
Williams and Said’s imagination of a new realism, therefore, ultimately involves the 
movement from the unknowability of modern experience to the need to see “actual 
human societies as knowable entities” (Country and City 247), pregnant with a 
“collective consciousness” in Williams, for the imagination of a new community, and 
“critical consciousness” in Said to grasp the secularity of literature and life.16  
Williams and Said’s sense of the real does not contradict the imaginary, and for 
them, the exploration of the real always involves a search for new possibilities for life 
through the investigation of what is intolerable in the present. As will be shown further in 
the dissertation, their theory resonates in many ways with the spirit of the neo-realistic 
works explored in this dissertation. It is through the medium of these works of art that 
one comes to the realization that realism is not so much a literary mode as an attitude to 
life, if we can remember the old lesson by Medvedev and Bakhtin: “Works can only enter 
                                                 
16 It is worth pointing out the difference between Williams and Said in understanding the notion of 
“culture” and “the common.” If Williams see in them both the opposing power to a notion of competitive 
individualism as well as the force of resistance to dominant authority, Said considers culture not as a 
communal term, but as a term of a system of exclusions by which some are identified as inside, in place, 
common, belonging, while others are designated as outside, excluded, anomalous, and lacking. That is, for 
Said, the power of culture as a system of discriminations and evaluations is nothing other than the power of 
the State, and this understanding of culture leads Said to insist on the significance of not being fixed in a 
certain culture, being in-between cultures, or being an exile.  
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into real contact as inseparable elements of social intercourse . . . . It is not works that 
come into contact, but people, who, however, come into contact through the medium of 
works” (qtd. in Williams 173).  
 
Outline of the Dissertation 
In the chapter, “World Literature and the Place of Realism,” I examine recent 
scholarship on the South African novelist J. M. Coetzee’s novels and analyze the degree 
to which the process of making and reading the post-colonial canon is influenced by the 
demands of western aesthetic tastes. The political implications of literary form and the 
issue of South African literary realism beyond the modern western episteme have always 
been Coetzee’s main concern, but they have not been explored by critics with the same 
significance as his (post-)modernist textual practice—the allegorical and deconstructive 
tendencies of his oeuvre infused with the overtones of the privileging of textuality. I 
observe that Coetzee’s attention to the potentials of literary realism comes to the fore in 
his late works, in particular, in which he almost challenges the dominant interpretations 
foisted on his novels as postcolonial allegories. Through a realist lens, I look at the 
dimensions of Coetzee’s work that are not typically addressed. Specifically, I analyze his 
Australian trilogy, Elizabeth Costello (2003), Slow Man (2005), and Diary of a Bad Year 
(2007) to explore the turning point of Coetzee’s voluntary distancing from the “South-
Africanness” of his national origin where in his late style he speaks of the future of 
realism in postcolonial literature. 
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 “After Magic: The Emergence of Latin American Narco-Realism” reads the 
current work of Latin American neo-realists as a reaction against magical realism, which 
has long been the brand of Latin American literature since the worldwide popularity of 
Gabriel García Márquez’s novel, One Hundred Years of Solitude (1967). While 
addressing a new era of political strife, along with its attendant social realities, I show 
how the work of emerging Latin American neo-realists try to redefine the continent in 
their literary articulations. Through my textual analysis of the Colombian writer Juan 
Gabriel Vásquez’s novel The Sound of Things Falling (2011), in particular, I investigate 
how one of the so-called narco-novelists achieves a sober realism through the defense of 
truthfulness and reveals the ethical dimension of political life as essentially collective.  
The periphery’s neo-realistic visions traverse the various expressive forms of 
media. In the chapter, “Between the Core and the Periphery: Semi-peripheral Neo-realist 
Cinema and Ethics after Modernism,” I explore in detail the relationship of peripheral 
thinking to the history of aesthetic forms in the core by taking up the case of South 
Korean literature and cinema. South Korean cinema, in particular, has long struggled 
with the conflicting desire to be responsive to western expectations of Third World 
cinema, on the one hand, and to be liberated from its desire for recognition, on the other. 
By analyzing how this dilemma is reflected and finally negated in Chang-dong Lee’s 
Poetry (2010), I suggest a new direction in world cinema in which the traffic in ideas 
flows from East to West.  
In the final chapter, entitled “Deleuze, Affect Theory, and the Future of Realism,” 
I critically discuss mainstream postwar theory’s suspicion of all forms of representation 
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as such and its ultimate denial of agency. The current prominence of affect theory is 
particularly chosen for the object of my analysis; I show how affect theorists whose ideas 
have been significantly influenced by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze restrict the 
functions of consciousness, representation, and agency to rigid codification, despotic 
power, and authoritative unity. Examining how affect theorists’ understanding leaves no 
possibility for representation to be rethought as a meaningful faculty to create effective 
ways for the self to engage the world, I argue that the task of imagining a new realism 
after modernism can begin only after our re-appropriation of representation as an 
affirmative procedure that brings one closer to the world again.   
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II. World Literature and the Place of Realism 
 
II.1. Peripheral Realism and Its Discontents 
 The past decade has witnessed radical questioning of what “world literature” 
signifies in the age of globalization. Across the full range of literary and cultural studies, 
the inquiry involved a self-reflection upon traditional intra-European preoccupations in 
world literature and actual moves to construct more inclusive literary scholarship. David 
Damrosch’s What Is World Literature? (2003), for example, promulgated its basic tenet 
of all literary works’ necessity to enter the world “beyond their culture of origin,” to be 
globally circulated in different historical period in order to be “worldly” (4). In her 
seminal work, The World Republic of Letters (2004) and subsequent research, Pascale 
Casanova, while being attentive to the unequal and hierarchical distribution of literary 
capital in transnational literary space, highlighted the potentials of the worldly force of 
relative autonomy that the literary space holds. Franco Moretti, particularly drawing on 
the one and unequal process of international capitalism, claimed to grasp world literature 
not as a canon of masterworks nor a mode of reading (as in Damrosch), but as a system, 
structured not on difference, but on inequality in his famous essay “Conjectures on World 
Literature.” Most recently, Emily Apter, in her provocatively entitled book Against World 
Literature (2013), evoked an attention to the blindsided concept of “the Untraslatable,” as 
opposed to the prevalent assumption of translatability that she argues the recent attempts 
to revive World Literature rely on.  
   39 
 
 Despite the variety of their specific theoretical focal points, the world literature 
debates so far indicate that a great deal of effort has been made to reinvent world 
literature in a manner that is both ethically and politically responsive to the peripheries. 
That reflections on the righteous movement of the world literature debates should not be 
considered exhaustive, however, has something to do with the fact that the affirmative 
gesture toward literature from different worlds so far does not seem to have done enough 
justice to the literature from the peripheries. Especially so, when its stylistic 
“difference”—hailed by North American academia since the philosophical discourses of 
the concept gained great popularity with the rise of poststructuralism in the mid-twentieth 
century—derived from its geographical, economic, and cultural marginality, and 
therefore, is “too” radical, or “too” indigenous to be understood by the western modern 
mind.  
 The ongoing particular western evaluative criteria are generally based on, in the 
Warwick Research Collective’s terms, “not comparison but incommensurability, not 
commonality but difference, not system but untotalisable fragment, not the potential of 
translation but rather its relative impossibility, and not antagonism but agonism” (6). The 
ideological vocabulary of this inherited poststructuralist framework—of the fragment, 
difference, and so on—is, in the last analysis, not dissimilar to what we have long known 
as a fundamentally modernist aesthetic. And thus, my aim in this chapter is to show to 
what extent modernism, as the unexamined mainstream aesthetic in the metropolitan 
book markets, has participated in the process of making so-called “Third World 
celebrities,” pushing its dialectical pair of realism to the margins of the major literary 
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scene. The case study of J. M. Coetzee as currently one of the most renowned Third 
World writers in the North American academy comprises the second part of the chapter. 
In addition to casting a critical eye on recent scholarship of “Coetzee Studies” that has 
reinforced the reception of Coetzee as a South African Beckett, I bring his main concern 
of realism—in his Australian Trilogy, Elizabeth Costello (2003), Slow Man (2005), and 
Diary of a Bad Year (2007)—to the fore, and suggest a possibility to read him against the 
grain.  
 Resummoning the dialectical opposition of realism and modernism can be 
particularly useful in examining the present debates of world literature. One notices that 
in the conflicted modernizing Third World, realism, whose aesthetic and political 
potentials have been considered already worn out in the West, is still saluted as a 
meaningful weapon in cognitive and cultural struggle or else returns after a period of 
modernism as if it had been historically oppressed. Our post-structural fear of the act of 
defining, classifying, and categorizing in favor of the seemingly modest values of 
uncertainty, undecidability, and indetermination makes it difficult to argue with the 
opposition, but I believe that the two specific conceptual categories of realism and 
modernism are still viable, as long as we are conscious of the historical continuity of the 
terms; the dialectical tension between realism and modernism that actually upsets rigid 
classifications has shaped our recognition of the relationship between aesthetics and 
politics in an important way. And investigating the current subordinate status of realism 
whose practices are newly imagined in the margins of the world can allow us to see the 
blindness of the center when it offers an understanding of literature from other parts of 
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the world. It is true that many writers from the periphery are deeply involved in that same 
modernist aesthetic as a release from the relentlessly political and quotidian realities of 
underdevelopment that they seek to escape or transcend. However, it is also because they 
want to be read by metropolitan audiences, and it is essential to analyze how this desire 
has significantly affected both form and content of peripheral literature.  
 It would be ill-advised to simply suggest anti-modernist realism as an easy 
alternative to the prevalent hegemony of modernist aesthetics or to propose a necessity to 
return to classical realism as if modernism as a political and aesthetic project has never 
been fruitful. However, it is indolent to accept modernism as our terminus, as if it were 
fixed in our present moment and there were no ways we could think beyond it. That the 
innovations of modernism have somewhat lost their criticality and are not sufficiently 
efficacious in the changed, globalized literary system has been consistently pointed out, 
but attempts to ponder the dominance of modernism are minimal. It seems that many find 
the comfort zone of modernist aesthetic intellectually challenging and thus pleasant; the 
abstruse and somewhat arcane traits of literary modernism, for example, have offset the 
guilty comfort one feels within the zone. In this sense, Edward Said’s warning in The 
World, the Text, and the Critic (1983) that “there is a danger that the fascination of 
what’s difficult—criticism being one of the forms of difficulty—might take the joy out of 
one’s heart” (30), needs to be modified. One notices today that a fascinating difficulty 
can be a consistent cause of the joy and the comfort of some intellectual minds as long as 
it remains enigmatic; it allows them to legitimately dwell in the notion of impossibility as 
a sophisticated way of doing criticism or to accept all-encompassing interpretations 
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comfortably without taking a specific critical positon. In effect, modernism’s dominance 
in our time is closely linked with its impossible balance; the aesthetically satisfying 
qualities of modernism are claimed to be both political and ethical at the same time. 
Said’s statement above becomes only true when it is backed up by his other remark on 
the role of critics; that is, we should always have a critical eye on whatever is 
“dominant,” since dominance always “involves a limitation or selection of the activities it 
covers, so that by definition it cannot exhaust all social experience, which therefore 
always potentially contains space for alternative acts and alternative intentions which are 
not yet as a social institution or even project” (qtd. in Said 29). It is out of this kind of 
fundamental obligation that I urge the necessity to be strategically oppositional to the 
hegemony of modernism, with a “critical consciousness” in its Saidean sense, and look 
into the historical process through which modernism has had far-reaching global 
influence at the expense of other possible practices that needed to be systematically 
jettisoned for its ascendency.  
 The influences of the ascendency of modernism in the North American academy, 
especially in the particular fields of postcolonial studies and world literature, are well 
documented in the recent issue of “Peripheral Realisms” published in the Modern 
Language Quarterly (Vol 73, 2012). In this special issue, Joe Cleary shows how 
modernism was essentially the literature of an interregnum between the dissolution of the 
old Paris-centered literary world system and a new kind of the U.S. cultural imperialism: 
“Repudiated as decadent in Moscow, condescended to or ignored in London,” modernism 
“was taken into custodianship by New York (with generous backing from Washington) 
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and bolstered the United States’ own cultural prestige as a new cosmopolitan-minded 
world power” (263), and it promulgated “a more radically cosmopolitan idea of 
literature” (261). He admits that modernism did start as an attempt to expand literature 
both cognitively and spatially, trying to invigorate the field of postcolonial studies, in 
particular, which mainly offered access to new types of critical materials from a wide 
range of different countries. As modernist criteria in the US academy predominated, 
however, postcolonial studies also started showing an inclination toward modernist 
credentials, causing it to be institutionalized in the 1980s and 1990s in a somewhat 
uniform and one-sided way. Cleary explains the crucial outcome as the following:  
. . . one consequence of this development is that postcolonial studies has 
privileged modernist-associated terms such as hybridity, polyphony, 
pastiche, irony, and defamiliarization rather than realist-associated 
conceptual categories such as historical transition, class consciousness, 
and totality. Ultimately, this has had a detrimental effect, since it has 
meant that postcolonial studies has not only often ignored postcolonial 
realisms but also lacked intellectual criteria by which to evaluate 
postcolonial modernisms and magic realisms other than those generated 
by or largely immanent to those modes to begin with. (266)  
The resultant underappreciation of realism also meant the replacement of the frame of 
class politics with ethnic, racial, or gender politics whose representation was certainly 
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political in intent, but was not always at odds with the cultural logic of capitalism, as 
Žižek famously argued.17  
The modernist criteria of aesthetic innovation in postcolonial studies have gained 
momentum since the 1980s with the rise of certain highly publicized Third World writers 
whom Timothy Brennan in At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now (1997) and 
other articles calls “Third World cosmopolitan celebrities” (“Cosmopolitans” 2). 
Represented by Mario Vargas Llosa, Bharati Mukherjee, Derek Walcott, Isabel Allende, 
and Salman Rushdie, the new cosmopolitans, Brennan argues, interestingly enhanced the 
role of the West with their special focus on the western metropolitan city; their emphasis 
of the global nature of everyday life, rife with the rhetoric of nomadism and diasporism 
and the modernist “innovation” and “discovery,” brought about an ironic consequence of 
the justification of western tastes. Those writers of the so-called “resistant literature” in 
Cuba, Angola, and Vietnam, for example, who practiced it usually in the form of literary 
realism, could not find a critical arena for a serious discussion of their ideas, as they were 
too easily identified as the advocates of a new state power, which tends to be associated 
in some radical minds with another reductive territorializing schema launched in an 
attempt at recodification; Deleuze, for instance, reduces it to the logic of “the State has 
made you ill, the State will cure you” (253) in “Nomadic Thought,” allowing it no 
alternative value. For him, this kind of “schema” is supposed to “fall back on the despotic 
and bureaucratic organization of the party or State apparatus” (260).  
                                                 
17 See his article, “Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism” (New Left Review 
225 (1997): 28-51.  
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The general marginalization of realism in the North American academy, in this 
sense, is not unrelated to this intellectual mood around the new cosmopolitanism that the 
selective groups of Third World writers have consciously or unconsciously promoted. 
Rooted in the post-Cold War modernist movement of the U.S. for its own cultural 
authority, the new cosmopolitanism fitted the aesthetic and political scope of new 
immigrants whose declaration of cultural hybridity offered, in Brennan’s words, “certain 
advantages in negotiating the collisions of language, race and art in a world of disparate 
peoples comprising a single, if not exactly unified world” (“Cosmopolitans” 7). As the 
pluralism of the new cosmopolitan had settled down, the spirit of “being in-between” 
slowly gained ascendency over an aggressive sense of nation, home, community, and 
belonging; the significance of not being fixed in a certain nation, being in-between 
cultures was fervently addressed and discussed by critics, and the dispossessed or abject 
bodies of the subaltern subjects started to be interpreted as positive symbols of an 
increasingly globalized world.  
While the Third World celebrities’ “familiar strangeness” has added an exotic 
flavor to the collection of World literature, offering a sort of official Third World 
approval and material evidence of the new cosmopolitanism, the persistence of the 
seemingly anachronistic mode of realism that survived and underwent consistent 
mutations after modernism in the margins of the twentieth-century literary world-system 
has been systematically ignored. The current work of South American neo-realists and 
South Korean new realist cinema, for example, is indicative of the peripheral worlds’ 
recognition of a necessity to move beyond modernist practice whose aesthetic and 
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political strategies might be efficacious at an individual level, but is too limited to amount 
to a common program; the neo-realists in Latin America have witnessed the 
inefficaciousness of magical realism that fantasized Latin America as an uncontrollable 
and fantastical continent. A similar movement towards political realism is discovered in 
South Korean cinema as well; the new realism, or Shin Sasiljueui found in the recent 
Korean films suggest one way to reimagine political realism as a sort of urgent, ethical 
program “after” modernism that is considered still a luxury to the general public suffering 
in the deadlock of social regression and economic pressure under the rule of the allied 
forms of political conservatism and neoliberal capitalism.  
Yet, these varied forms of realism are rarely assured of their introduction to the 
international art world, not because they are difficult for the parochial tastes of the 
western public—they are actually difficult for their indigenousness, rooted in too alien 
histories and mythologies. The familiarity of the western public with traditional realism 
gives rise to an easy impression that the Third World artists still perform outmoded 
practice—but because they are radically “different” and their styles allow less room for 
aesthetic sympathies. In Jameson’s words, this lack of sympathies has to do with “some 
deeper fear of the affluent about the way people actually live in other parts of the world—
a way of life that that still has little in common with daily life in the American suburb” 
(“Third World Literature” 66):   
The way in which all this affects the reading process seems to be as 
follows: as western readers whose tastes have been formed by our own 
modernisms, a popular or socially realistic third-world novel tends to 
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come before us, not immediately, but as though already-read. We sense, 
between ourselves and this alien text, the presence of another reader, of 
the Other reader, for whom a narrative, which strikes us as conventional or 
naïve, has a freshness of information and a social interest that we cannot 
share. The fear and the resistance I’m evoking has to do, then, with the 
sense of our own non-coincidence with that Other reader, so different from 
ourselves; our sense that to coincide in any adequate way with that Other 
“ideal reader”—that is to say, to read this text adequately—we would have 
to give up a great deal that is individually precious to us and acknowledge 
an existence and a situation unfamiliar and therefore frightening—one that 
we do not know and prefer not to know. (66, original emphasis) 
A compromised position between this fear of the complete Other and the liberating value 
of “difference” appeared to be Third World cosmopolitanism as the western critics’ new 
object of desire; not too distant but also not too familiar, it ensures an appropriate degree 
of otherness that satisfies modern minds of sophisticated political and aesthetic tastes. 
After all, the issue with the current status of world literature seems to be, then, despite all 
its disposition towards the ethics of alterity, it did not embrace difference to the fullest, in 
its true sense. 
 
II.2. J. M. Coetzee and the Realism of Embodiment 
 One of the Third World writers who has benefited from modernist taste cultures is 
undoubtedly J. M. Coetzee, an author and academic from South Africa. His Foucauldian 
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understanding of history as a kind of “discourse,” with his interest in the constitutive role 
of language as a novelist and linguist and his European heritage has attracted many 
western literary critics. And they formulated a sort of “Coetzee Studies” whose nature is 
significantly (post-)modernist—how many academic articles on Coetzee’s novels have 
been reproduced in which the barbarian girl in Waiting for the Barbarians (1980) is the 
textual evidence of the Spivakean unknowable other, Michael K in Life & Times of 
Michael K (1983) is a sort of Derridean trace, and the tongueless Friday in Foe (1986) is 
a guardian of absolute absence? What has been ignored in the canonization of Coetzee, 
however, is the political implications of literary form and the issue of South African 
literary realism beyond the modern western episteme, which have always been Coetzee’s 
main concern. The tension between realism and modernism is particularly intensified in 
his late works—his so-called Australian Trilogy: Elizabeth Costello (2003), Slow Man 
(2005), and Diary of a Bad Year (2007)—but the tension exists in his better known, 
earlier South African novels as well. Looking at the dimensions of Coetzee’s work that 
are not typically addressed with the same seriousness as his modernist textual practice 
through a realist lens may complicate the dominant interpretations foisted on his novels 
as postcolonial allegories, helping to understand ways in which Third World writers 
unwittingly but systematically participate in the establishment of the modernist aesthetic 
as the dominant mode of literary critique in world literature.  
 Coetzee’s writings are utterly oppositional—oppositional in the Saidean sense 
that critical consciousness in his work refuses to be reduced to a doctrine or a certain 
political positon, but closer to Adornian resistance when it comes to the actual practice of 
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the opposition; despite the difference between the contexts of South African literature and 
of the European modernist cultures of Adorno’s description, he shares the similar fear of 
relentlessly totalitarian history in the politically overdetermined conditions of South 
Africa (“I have never known how seriously to take Joyce’s—or Stephen Dedalus’—
History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake” [Doubling 67]). Hence 
Coetzee’s skepticism towards the activist tendency of political novels with hope-filled 
optimism in South Africa. Furthermore, Coetzee tries to evince the emancipatory 
potentiality of art through his strategic way of representing history, which he says is 
unrepresentable: “History may be, as you call it, a process for representation, but to me it 
feels more like a force for representation, and in that sense, yes, it is unrepresentable” 
(Doubling 67). And his determined pursuit of “Grace” that he defines as “a condition in 
which the truth can be told clearly without blindness” against “Cynicism”—“the denial of 
any ultimate basis for values” (Doubling 392)—resembles in many senses Adorno’s 
modernism, unflinchingly truthful in its nature, whose act of defying the burgeoning 
instrumentalism and total administration that surround modern man reveals itself as 
critically oppositional.  
 In fact, the epistemological and methodological affinity in resistance between 
Adorno and white South African authors was noticed as early as 1987 by Neil Lazarus, 
who pointed out the political efficacy of aesthetic modernism in Coetzee’s oeuvre in 
“Modernism and Modernity: T. W. Adorno and Contemporary White South African 
Literature.” With rich and ungarbled understanding of Adorno’s philosophy, what 
Lazarus pays attention to is the acute self-awareness of white South African authors, “the 
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manner in which their work enters into history—or, more precisely, refuses to be encoded 
seamlessly into history, where history is understood, . . . as the relentlessly totalitarian 
and reductive discourse of the oppressor” (135). Coetzee’s fidelity to Adornian 
modernism is particularly highlighted in his discussion; his ethical rationalism, 
fundamentally humanist, is considered faithful to modernism’s original tenet, as Lazarus 
tries to rescue both modernism and Coetzee’s aesthetics from all too easy attempts to 
regard them as “proto-deconstructionist” (154).18 
 Lazarus’s appreciation of the way white South African authors resist by writing, 
how they keep bringing unforgettable history back to reality rejecting oblivion and 
reification—“All reification is a forgetting” (qtd. in Lazarus 140)—culminates in the 
conclusion of the essay where he shows the deepest sympathy for the writers whose 
strategic modernist negativity is too often mistaken for mere passivity.  
It would be too much to claim these white writers write for the revolution. 
Such a task is no longer theirs, if, indeed, it ever was. Instead, they write 
against apartheid, where the core of their resistance consists in the practice 
of truth and in contestation of the legitimacy of official ideology. . . . The 
task that white writers in South Africa have shouldered is that of pulling 
                                                 
18 Lazarus complicates the conventionally held contrast between Adornian modernism and Lukácsian 
realism by arguing for affinity between what their aesthetic projects ultimately pursued—the affinity 
derived from their same intellectual debts to the “critique of Romanticism elaborated in the Aesthetics of 
Hegel” (138). According to Lazarus, Adorno could be thought of as “more thoroughly Lukácsian than 
Lukács himself” (137), as he, following Lukács, explored the theory of reification within the same 
Hegelian traditions, and pursued, with greater intensity, the Hegelian idea that “all significant art is in its 
nature implicitly critical, since in the dialectic of its form—as matter and ideas—it succeeds in 
counterposing a utopian image to its representation of the world as it is” (138). However, this analysis 
skims over what is incompatible between Adorno and Lukács—on forms of organization, on the ideology 
of form, on decisionism, and so on.  
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back from oblivion the memory and continued existence of radical white 
opposition to apartheid. (155, original emphasis)  
Such a task might not be theirs, and to oblige them to write for the revolution can be 
certainly disturbing. What can be equally disturbing, however, is to regard South African 
writers who have decided to pursue the task to write for the revolution, unlike Coetzee or 
Gordimer, whose politics are more often than not measured against that of their 
modernist counterparts, as merely outdated, naïve, and less refined for their explicit 
passion and actions. Our modernist sensibilities that have been slowly but substantially 
internalized tend to intensify the belief that the implicit way of resistance is not only 
intellectually more appealing but also politically much more successful as its subtle, 
nuanced (non-) messages are less subject to capture by the oppressive state power; it  
situates the committed political writings in South Africa as a half-thought, amateurish act 
of resistance out of immature passion and outright indignation against oppression before 
they reach a sort of modernist awakening, and therefore, doomed to fail ultimately. The 
ongoing prejudices unreasonably deprived the politically committed writings of the 
opportunities to be studied as, for instance, a logical consequence of serious reflections 
upon the radically different socio-economic and cognitive context of their time and place, 
to which western modernist aesthetics is inadequate for producing change. Thinking this 
way requires our changed recognition of modernism; it is only possible when we think of 
modernism not as an evolutionary denouement of our politico-aesthetic practice but as an 
insufficient project whose historical fruits cannot be universally guaranteed, and which 
we might need to think beyond. The prevalent phenomenon of the emergence of neo-
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realism after modernism in the global periphery evidences that the periphery has already 
confirmed the pale face of modernism and decided to renew what is already familiar, 
with a critical understanding of the paradoxical newness of what is repeated.  
 Aside from Lazarus’s less sensitive coupling of Coetzee and Gordimer as white 
modernist South African writers, whose resistance strategies are clearly distinct,19 what 
he does not question is a possibility that the writers’ pivotal mission of “stubborn truth-
telling” (Lazarus 140) might not find the best form in the mere representation of the 
victimized South African people, planting a seed for hope—Michael K’s obsession with 
pumpkin seeds and his decision not to join history to keep the idea of gardening—without 
directions of how to grow it. He keeps arguing that Coetzee’s modernism should be 
thought of as socially meaningful historical act, full of awareness of the South African 
reality, but he is less concerned about how the complacent “meaningful” act can amount 
to an “effective” strategy in the specific South African context where the social nature of 
literature is still expected to have much to offer.   
 Furthermore, some of the rich and versatile layers of multiplicity in Coetzee’s 
oeuvre, which have not been fully explored as they should, make it hard to refer to his 
work as entirely modernist. Despite Coetzee’s notorious evasiveness in interviews (he is 
self-conscious of his reputation as “an evasive, arrogant, generally unpleasant” [Doubling 
                                                 
19 In “The Idea of Gardening,” her review of Coetzee’s The Life and Times of Michael K, Gordimer points 
out the insufficiency of Coetzee’s “deceptively passive protagonist” despite her overall evaluation of the 
novel as a great work. For Gordimer, Coetzee’s heroes are “those who ignore history, not make it,” and she 
notices in Michael K, in particular when he decides not to join the guerrilla “because enough men had gone 
off to war and it’s the time for gardening,” the denial of “the energy of the will to resist evil.” As a faithful 
reader of Lukács, Gordimer is certainly more sensitive to the writerly responsibility of suggesting a way to 
take part in the determination of the course of history, whereas Coetzee remains indeterminate. To 
Gordimer’s inquiry of Michael K’s agency, Coetzee made another elusive response, saying “the book about 
going off with the guerrillas . . . is not a book I wanted-to-write” (Doubling 207-208, original emphasis).  
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65] interviewee) derived from his skepticism towards the genre of the interview itself—
“In my experience, writers rarely have much of interest to say about their own work for 
the simple reason that they cannot be expected to act as their own critics” (“Interview” 
852)—it is not difficult to see how much academic effort has been made to position 
Coetzee as a South African Kafka or Beckett; the most well-known collection of his 
interviews, Doubling the Point (1992), serves as one example, in which almost every 
interview question is geared towards an attempt to establish Coetzee’s endeavors as late 
modernist while Coetzee keeps dodging the force of the questions to define him. At one 
point, the editor of the collection, David Atwell, is quick to interpret Coetzee’s suspicion 
of modernism as his repudiation of Lukácsian realism—Coetzee actually seems to have 
had a different understanding of what Attwell meant by modernism here—and move to 
define his work Adornian, in which Coetzee shows little interest (201). In another 
interview where the first question asked of Coetzee is about Beckett’s influence on the 
writer, Coetzee bluntly says: “Let us not overstate my involvement with Beckett. There 
are writers who have meant more to me than he has. But leaving that aside, let me try to 
answer your questions” (“Interview” 847). His nuanced responses and reservation are not 
analyzed as much as they deserve, and the elusiveness and ambiguity of his writerly 
attitude itself ends up being treated as if it were a marked evidence of his modernism 
embodied.  
 Coetzee in several interviews admits his admiration of Kafka and Beckett when 
facing questions on the affinity between his and their works, and it is well known that he 
wrote several pieces of critical writing about them, including his doctoral dissertation on 
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Beckett.20 What he is particularly attracted to in Kafka’s fiction is his opening up a 
possibility “to think outside one’s own language” (Doubling 198), what Coetzee calls 
“the moments of analytic intensity” (199). As for Beckett, Coetzee acknowledges that his 
dissertation was driven by Beckett’s “language-sensibility [that] was both personal and 
communal, Beckettian and Irish” (“Interview” 848), and he clarifies that he wrote it as “a 
child of the times, the times of formalism and then of structuralism, with their debt to 
science and their own quasi-scientific ambitions” (848). What makes the impacts of the 
great writers on Coetzee’s fictions more interesting, however, does not seem to lie in their 
possibly cognitive and stylistic similarity that interviewers are eager to hear of, but in 
how Coetzee complicates his critical affiliation with Kafka and Beckett by withdrawing.  
Returning to Kafka: I have no objection to thinking of alienation as not 
only a position but a practice as well. From that point of view, alienation is 
a strategy open to writers since the mid-eighteenth century, a strategy in 
the service of skepticism. What I balk at is the common understanding of 
alienation as a state, a state of being cut off not only from the body of 
socially dominant opinion but also from a meaningful everyday life (this is 
implicit in Marx’s account of the worker who loses touch with that his 
hands are fabricating), and even (in the old-fashioned psychological sense 
of the term) from oneself. (Doubling 203, original emphasis)  
Beckett’s prose, which is highly rhetorical in its own way, lent itself to 
formal analysis. I should add that Beckett’s later short fictions have never 
                                                 
20 The essays include “The Comedy of Point of View in Beckett’s Murphy” (1970), “The Manuscript 
Revisions of Beckett’s Watt” (1972), “Samuel Beckett and the Temptations of Style (1973),” and “Time, 
Tense, and Aspect in Kafka’s ‘The Borrow’” (1981).  
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really held my attention. They are, quite literally, disembodied. (Doubling 
23, my emphasis)  
 The answers above requires us to explore Coetzee’s particular attentiveness to the 
importance of body as embodiment, and the undeniable existence of physical fact as 
evidence of “something more historically substantial” (Doubling 63). His understanding 
of the embodied body is well explained through a contrast that he makes with fiction: 
unlike fiction “that is which is not” (248), body is not that which is not. And the way he 
proves it is by depicting the pain it feels, the “authority of suffering” of the body (248) 
with full ethical weight. Coetzee makes clear that he does not consider Foe, for example, 
as that much an ironical novel: “Friday is mute, but Friday does not disappear, because 
Friday is body. If I look back over my own fiction, I see a simple (simple-minded?) 
standard erected. That standard is the body” (248). His preoccupation with what he calls 
an “ethical weight” is indicated in his dismissal of Freudian psychoanalysis, whose 
pursuit of ethical impulses he thinks is incomplete due to its lack of proper ethical weight 
and thus needs to be overcome (244-245). And one way he carries the ethical 
responsibility in his work is by seeking a way truth can be stated in a realistic description 
of human suffering, the indisputable fact of physical pain, with no metaphor involved, as 
is exemplified in the torture scene of the prisoners in Waiting for the Barbarians:  
Then the beating begins. The soldiers use the stout green cane staves, 
bringing them down with the heavy slapping sounds of washing paddles, 
raising red welts on the prisoners’ backs and buttocks. With slow care the 
prisoners extend their legs until they lie flat on their bellies, all except the 
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one who had been moaning and who now gasps with each blow. The black 
charcoal and ochre dust begin to run with sweat and blood. The game, I 
see, is to beat them till their backs are washed clean. (121) 
In the discussion of the description of torture in his essay “Into the Dark Chamber: The 
Writer and the South African State” (1986), Coetzee warns against a sort of obscene 
beauty that lyrical metaphors create in the description of the physical experience of 
torture. Explaining how a torture room provokes novelistic imagination for South African 
writers—“the dark, forbidden chamber is the origin of novelistic fantasy per se; in 
creating an obscenity, in enveloping it in mystery, the state unwittingly creates the 
preconditions for the novel to set about its work of representation” (Doubling 364)—
Coetzee goes on to say that the same kind of dark lyricism is not “a fault limited to South 
African novelists” (366) and also evident in the famous torture scenes in Gillo 
Pontecorvo’s film The Battle of Algiers (1966), but most vividly observed in Alex La 
Guma’s In the Fog of the Seasons’ End (1972).  
From the beginning of his career, La Guma . . . ran the risk of 
immortalizing a Cape Town of seedy slums and dripping rain in a prose of 
somewhat lugubrious grandeur. In his presentation of the world of the 
security police, no matter how much he insists on its banality, its lack of 
depth, there is a tendency to lyrical inflation. It is as though, in avoiding 
the trap of ascribing an evil grandeur to the police, La Guma finds it 
necessary to displace that grandeur, in an equivalent but negative form, on 
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to their surroundings, lending to the very flatness of their world hints of a 
metaphysical depth. (365)  
Coetzee acknowledges that the romantic figuration of human suffering by dark lyricism 
constitutes one way that the game is played by the rules of the state, and a real challenge 
for writers should be to “establish one’s own authority,” by “imagin[ing] torture and 
death on one’s own terms” (364). In Coetzee’s oeuvre, the scars left by the violence of 
history are inscribed in the bodies of his characters, and the suffering bodies of the 
physically disabled figures—the barbarian girl’s tortured body in Waiting for the 
Barbarians, Friday’s muteness in Foe, Michael K’s defective lip in Life & Times of 
Michael K, and Paul’s amputated right leg in Slow Man (2005)—that resist figurative 
language take the full authority; it is how history Coetzee considers basically 
unrepresentable finds one way to be represented. Written in the deformed bodies, history 
keeps claiming its continuity, remaining as indelible and inexpungible physical evidence 
of social violence and repression.   
 In his essay “The true words at last from the mind in ruins: J.M. Coetzee and 
Realism,” Jonathan Lamb defines Coetzee’s realism as the realism of embodiment—“the 
idea that ideas have no autonomous existence, can exist only in things” (Elizabeth 
Costello 9)—originally pioneered by Defoe and explained by Coetzee himself as “pure 
writerly attentiveness, pure submission to the exigencies of a world which, through being 
submitted to in a state so close to spiritual absorption, becomes transfigured, real” 
(Stranger Shores 20). Exploring the possibility of the conditions under which realism that 
resists figurative language and the force of figuration that “overwhelms the univocal 
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language of things” (Lamb 179) can be compatible, Lamb reaches a conclusion that 
language that “transfigures it[the real]” (180, original emphasis) constitutes a condition 
of the possibility that the world becomes real: “the impurities of secondary meaning . . . 
contaminate[s] the real language, but they are necessary if it is ever to be uttered” (184). 
Indeed, it is one way that Coetzee mediates fiction—what is that which is not—and 
body—what is that which is, and the way he can justify his novelistic engagement with 
the real as a writer. Realism, in Coetzee, is affirmed not as things readily achieved but as 
that which is necessary to pursue for the possible mediation of the true (the ideal) and the 
real (the material). Hence realism, which fundamentally explores the relation between 
one and everyman—the particular and the universal—necessarily constitutes an 
unignorable part of Coetzee’ project.  
 If Coetzee’s interest in realism started from his serious reflection upon the relation 
between the existence of bare facts and how they should be uttered, or how ideas can be 
materialized—“what is the status of an idea about the necessity of embodied or 
materialized ideas,” to put it in Lamb’s words (178, original emphasis)—the later 
movement of his fictions shows that his initial reflection has evolved into a quite outright 
inquiry into what makes a true materialism. In one of his Australian Trilogy, Elizabeth 
Costello, the topic of realism is explicitly addressed by the narrator in the opening 
chapter of the novel, “Lesson 1: Realism.”  As if trying to answer the aforementioned 
question on the status of materialized ideas directly, the narrator says:  
Realism has never been comfortable with ideas. It could not be otherwise: 
realism is premised on the idea that ideas have no autonomous existence, 
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can exist only in things. So when it needs to debate ideas, as here, realism 
is driven to invent situations—walks in the countryside, conversations—in 
which characters give voice to contending ideas and thereby in a certain 
sense embody them. The notion of embodying turns out to be pivotal. In 
such debates ideas do not and indeed cannot float free: they are tied to the 
speakers by whom they are enounced, and generated from the matrix of 
individual interests out of which their speakers act in the world . . . . (9, 
original emphasis) 
Costello, who “reclaimed Molly from Joyce” in her fiction The House on Eccles Street 
according to her critics (12), is not considered a particularly realist author in the novel, 
but she delivers a speech entitled “What is Realism?” at the acceptance of the Stow 
Award at Alton College in Williamstown, Pennsylvania. Referring to the uncertainty of 
Kafka’s story “Report to an Academy,” her speech is filled with nostalgia for the days 
when the “word-mirror” worked in a transparent way, when the words on the page “stand 
up and be counted, each proclaiming ‘I mean what I mean!’” (19). When her son John, 
who accompanied Costello, asks her “why realism?” that no one wants to hear about any 
more, and says that, when he thinks of realism, he thinks of people in “smelly underwear” 
“picking their noses” (“What is your interest in it? And where does Kafka fit in? . . . You 
don’t write about that kind of thing. Kafka didn’t write about it” [32]), Costello’s answer 
is simple and determined:  
No. Kafka didn’t write about people picking their noses. But Kafka had 
time to wonder where and how his poor educated ape was going to find a 
   60 
 
mate. And what it was going to be like when he was left in the dark with 
the bewildered, half-tamed female that his keepers eventually produced for 
his use. Kafka’s ape is embedded in life. It is the embeddedness that is 
important, not the life itself. His ape is embedded as we are embedded, 
you in me, I in you. That ape is followed through to the end, to the bitter, 
unsayable end, whether or not there are traces left on the page. Kafka stays 
awake during the gaps when we are sleeping. That is where Kafka fits in. 
(32)  
Two years later in her lecture at Appleton College in suburban Waltham, Australia, she 
recalls this speech that she made in the States and proclaims again that her remark should 
not be construed ironically: “It means what it says. I say what I mean. I am an old 
woman. I do not have the time any longer to say things I do not mean” (62).  
 Aside from the question as to whether one should trust what Costello says or not, 
or the question as to whether Costello truly ventriloquizes her creator Coetzee’s beliefs as 
Bill Ashcroft believes21, one thing noticeable is that Coetzee’s engagement with the 
question of the real has been less exhausted than foregrounded in his later work, with 
renewed interests in the “ontology of the writer as agent of the writing” as David Atwell 
points out in “Mastering of Authority” (217). The significant presence of the writerly 
authority runs through the Trilogy, be it a philosophical meditation upon realism in 
Elizabeth Costello or the investigations into the quality of the Australian real in Slow 
Man or J.C.’s strong opinion in the language of reportage in Diary of a Bad Year. As 
                                                 
21 See his essay “Silence as Heterotopia in Coetzee’s Fiction” in Strong Opinions: J.M. Coetzee and the 
Authority of Contemporary Fiction (2011).  
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Elleke Boehmer rightly observes in “J.M. Coetzee’s Australian Realism,” Coetzee in 
these fictions seems to feel more comfortable about his language referencing a “wider 
social world” in the form of “journalistic outline or sketchy reportage, or as a metonymic 
visual shorthand”; “In writing Australia Coetzee has kicked away some of the more 
abstract metafiction schemas that in South Africa underwrote his visual imagination, and 
has resorted to a referential vocabulary that at least superficially has a more immediate or 
less mediated relationship to the world that is being described” (5). Though janus-faced, 
the stories in their affiliations with the modes of realism are more explicit in revealing 
Coetzee’s belief in the transcendental nature of authority in fiction for his bigger writerly 
goal of mediating the realms of the personal, the social, and the transcendental. Costello’s 
almost Williams-esque belief in “No ideas but in things” highlighted in her frog story, in 
particular—“the life cycle of the frog may sound allegorical, but to the frogs themselves 
it is no allegory, it is the thing itself, the only thing” (217)—and her emphasis on the 
reality of the frogs, without regard for her own belief in that reality or the frogs’ own 
indifference to her belief, becomes evidence of their existence itself, asks us to push our 
reading of Coetzee beyond the long-held interpretations foisted on him as an allegorical 
writer. One might be tempted to say that Coetzee allegorizes the impossibility of allegory 
itself here—this is Julian Murphet’s claim in his recent article22—but the general modal 
transition in Coetzee’s late style and the consistent tone in his argument for the power of 
the real makes it much more plausible to regard the frogs’ story less as an allegory than, 
as Boehmer rightly argues, “an illustration of existence, of life, and hence, . . . of reality; 
of that which continues, eluding and resisting language” (15).  
                                                 
22 See Julian Murphet, “Coetzee’s Lateness and the Detours of Globalization,” 3.  
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 If Derek Attridge’s point in his book J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading that 
Coetzee has always drawn on the power of realism, “on the vivid representation of a 
world, external and internal, into which the reader is invited” (201) is correct, Coetzee’s 
later fictions seem to show that his displacement to Australia provided him with a more 
comfortable place where he could explore the tension between a realist and 
transcendental imperative in his work in full measure; that his late style was almost 
caused by his voluntary distancing from the “South-Africanness” of his national origin, 
his decision to relieve himself from the burden of a preponderant historical guilt. He has 
once said that the reason why he turned down job offers in Canada and Hong Kong after 
his failed attempt to immigrate into the U.S., was due to “a will to remain in crisis” 
(Doubling 337). Though he left South Africa “to be part of a wider world,” Coetzee was 
rather self-conscious of the fact that he would only remain as a specialist in African 
studies “with my [his] rather European tastes” if he were going to accept any of the 
invitations. His move to Australia, in this sense, could be an alternative to bypass both 
options; the middle path to live as a writer in its entirety in the rather post-historical place 
of Australia positions Coetzee as a sort of symbolic exile, regardless of his Australian 
citizenship. And his newly chosen exilic positon created a place where he could talk 
about the “real” that he found impossible to discuss in his home that he identified as a 
place of “too much truth for art to hold . . . truth that overwhelms and swamps every act 
of the imagination” (Doubling 99).  
 In his Jerusalem Prize Acceptance Speech (1987), Coetzee diagnosed South 
African literature as imbued with “feelings of entrapment, entrapment in infinitudes” 
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(97). He accentuated that the sheer freedom of imagination should come together with a 
“yearning to have fraternity” rather than “the land . . . mountains and deserts, birds and 
animals and flowers,” that is “least likely to respond to love” (97, original emphasis).  
The veiled unfreedom of the white man in South Africa has always made 
itself felt mostly keenly when, stepping down for a moment from his 
lonely throne, giving in to a wholly human and understandable yearning 
for fraternity with the people among whom he lives, he has discovered 
with a shock that fraternity by itself is not to be had, no matter how 
compellingly felt the impulse on both sides. Fraternity ineluctably comes 
in a package with liberty and equality. (Doubling 97)  
Coetzee articulates in the speech that what his fiction has involved, regardless of each 
novel’s dissimilar situational specificities, is what it means to be “wholly human” (97). 
Due to the large scale of the project, and the universal nature of humanism that he seeks, 
Coetzee keeps himself from being occupied with the singular South African political 
situation. But the dominating theme of what being human entails has been present in his 
oeuvre from the first, as one notices from the relation between the magistrate’s 
sympathetic attitudes towards the barbarian girl in Waiting for the Barbarians: “the novel 
asks the question: why does one choose the side of justice when it is not in one’s material 
interest to do so? The magistrate gives the rather Platonic answer: because we are born 
with the idea of justice” (Doubling 394-395). His rather innocent belief in human justice 
that consistently infiltrates his fiction from In the Heart of the Country (1977) to the 
recent Slow Man, although the latter can be characterized as realist in its philosophical 
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outlook not in its literary style, implies that what grounds his ethics is a sort of true 
optimism for the future, with his novelistic but also real grounds for it.   
Coetzee’s late style in his Australian fiction in this sense can be thought of as a 
sign of his transition from an artistic confirmation of unrepresentable beings and an 
aesthetic attention to the aura around the sublime other—the strange beauty of the 
tortured barbarian girl and the mute Friday, for instance—to the pursuit of the writerly 
task of having to make the unknowable knowable. The task of the storyteller is already 
confirmed when Foe tells Susan Barton: “till we have spoken the unspoken we have not 
come to the heart of the story . . . It is for us to open Friday’s mouth and hear what it 
holds.” (It is also Foe who teaches Barton, when she becomes frustrated with her 
recognition that Friday might be willfully silent—“then I began to recognize that it might 
not be mere dullness that kept him shut up in himself, nor the accident of the loss of his 
tongue, nor even an incapacity to distinguish speech from babbling, but a disdain for 
intercourse with me” (98)—that Friday has fingers—his body—to express instead of 
speech). In Slow Man, there is a degree of absurdity in Paul Rayment’s affectionate 
feelings for his nurse Marijana Jokić, a Croatian refugee who takes care of the disabled 
protagonist, unlike the mysteriously appealing relationship between the magistrate and 
the barbarian girl in Waiting for the Barbarians. The way Paul comes to face the bareness 
of his existential alienation via his love towards the object of his desire resonates with 
how the magistrate gets to the core of the brutal truth of colonialism in which he himself 
is involved. But this time there is less room for sympathy for the protagonist since Paul’s 
romanticization of the power relation between him and Marijana, between the immigrant 
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intellectual and the immigrant working class woman, is manifested in the frequent 
moments of her more straightforward and explicit resistance to his desire. Her refusal is 
not expressed in verbal terms, as if speech were not allowed for her, but her willed 
muteness, which resembles Friday’s willed submission, soon develops to a physical act of 
refusal—her intentional absence from work—and at this point, her body, her bodily non-
existence, becomes her own sign, as Friday finds his “home” in a “place where bodies are 
their own signs” (157) in the mysterious ending of Foe.  
Slow Man, in addition, is consistent, from the first, in revealing that its main 
interest lies in the investigation of what constitutes the real and what its impact is. 
Waking up at a hospital after the fatal accident that caused him to lose his leg, Paul says 
to himself: “This—this strange bed, this bare room, this smell both antiseptic and faintly 
ruinous—this is clearly no dream, it is the real thing, as real as things get” (9, original 
emphasis). His preoccupation with the thing itself is soon followed by his realization of 
the bodily pain that he feels as evidence of the present real:  
Pain is nothing, he tells himself, just a warning signal from the body to the 
brain. Pain is no more the real thing than an X-ray photograph is the real 
thing. But of course he is wrong. Pain is the real thing, it does not have to 
press hard to persuade him of that, it does not have to press at all, merely 
to send a flash or two; after which he quickly settles for the confusion, the 
bad dreams. (12, original emphasis)  
If Michael K’s endless and painful walking in Coetzee’s earlier novel in Life & Times of 
Michael K allows the protagonist to be understood as a beautifully withdrawn nomadic 
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subject, less possibility is left in Paul’s case that his physical pain could be considered 
metaphorical; his lost leg is what makes the protagonist disabled, what makes him “lost 
[lose] the freedom of movement” (25) (Paul’s feelings for Marijana from the first derives 
from the fact that she, unlike other nurses, does not see him as the old man without a leg 
and treat him like a baby, but interacts with him as a “man hampered in his movements 
by injury” [28]).  
In the cautiously designed pseudo-autobiographical form, fiction and the real 
compete against each other in Coetzee’s later work. With the line between storytelling 
and autobiography blurred (“all autobiography is storytelling, all writing is 
autobiography” [Doubling 391]), characters try to obtain full substance via their immense 
preoccupation with the relation between the real and the truth. It is significant, in this 
sense, that JC’s corroboration of the real of the emotions in Dostoevsky leads to the final 
statement of Diary of a Bad Year—JC’s belief in the “indisputable certainty” (Diary 227) 
that Russian realist writers provided, and how JC relates it to what he understands as an 
“ethically better” (227) artist. That the formal change in his late style was possible for his 
relocation to Australia tempts one to argue that Coetzee himself testifies to how the 
writer’s spatial dislocation, Coetzee’s own symbolic confinement of himself in exile, 
leads to the alteration of his style—that is, how material displacement induces formal 
transformations. Discussing the topic of “how to tell the truth in autobiography” 
(Doubling 392), Coetzee has talked about how the “alienness (not alienation)” rather than 
homesickness that he felt when he left South Africa at the age of twenty—which was 
recurrent with his time “on the fringes of the left without being part of the left” (394)—
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actually grew to a sense of being outside a culture even when he was home—“not to be at 
home in one’s home” (“Exile” 184), to borrow Said’s words. This feeling of “alienness” 
is more positively pursued, though, in Coetzee’s life, and it ironically brings him closer to 
himself; and finally, as he claims, “autrebiography shades back into autobiography” 
[Doubling 394, original emphasis]). His destination of Australia, ultimately, provides the 
cautious author with a pseudo-Saidean exilic venue where he could further develop the 
“Dostoevskian confrontation between faith and skepticism” (248)—a place where he 
could fully perform the writer’s duty from a “transcendental imperative” (Doubling 340) 
rather than society’s call. For Coetzee, faith and skepticism are synonymous with “grace” 
and “cynicism,” and he is not shy about defining them as “a condition in which the truth 
can be told clearly, without blindness” and “the denial of any ultimate basis for values” 
(392), respectively. The project that Coetzee adopted from Dostoevsky is essentially 
based on his hopeful belief in the possibility of the idea of justice and human awareness: 
“I don’t believe that any form of lasting community can exist where people do not share 
the same sense of what is just and what is not just. To put it another way, community has 
its basis in an awareness and acceptance of a common justice” (340). At the place of non-
belonging, which allows him to mediate allegorical transcendence (ideas) and realist 
immanence (things), lexis and praxis, Coetzee dreams of an ethical community, “a world 
where ‘a living play of feelings and ideas is possible,’ and people who are still entangled 
in ‘abstract forces, of anger and violence’—thus not yet real—can actually take 
residence, that is, a ‘world where we truly have an occupation’” (98). It is a move that 
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attempts to make people desire true being, by converting the place of alienness to the 
place of responsibility.  
Coetzee once said that Defoe, one of the authors that he admires the most, is a 
realist in the only sense that he is an empiricist (Stranger Shores 19). Defoe, who was 
such “a loner at heart” wrote the kind of “novel” which is almost “fake autobiography,” 
“the kind of recital his hero or heroine would have given had he or she really existed” 
(19). Coetzee is attracted to the liveliness of Defoe’s work, its permanent historical 
quality. In many ways, Coetzee’s late movement resembles Defoe’s, and it shows that he 
started walking slowly out of his own difficulty “taking positions” (Doubling 205). He 
has started taking empiricism much more seriously than before, trying to forge his own 
form of realism between the two worlds. It is not a kind that says a meaning for the world 
yet, but it has started to say, at least, that it is possible to have a meaning.  
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III. After Magic: The Emergence of Latin American Narco-Realism  
 
III.1. No More Magic: Against Exhaustion  
“My work is a reaction to the idea of magical realism as the only way to discover 
Latin America. It’s something that still many readers believe. And this is obviously 
something I strongly oppose. I don’t feel Latin America is a magical continent. I feel 
Latin American history, is if anything, tragedy.” In a bold and confident manner, Juan 
Gabriel Vásquez, a Colombian novelist of the new generation after the “Boom,” points to 
the exhaustion of mesmerizing magical realism that has haunted readers of Latin 
American literature until recently. Vásquez continues:  
I want to forget this absurd rhetoric of Latin America as a magical or marvelous 
continent. In my novel there is a disproportionate reality, but that which is 
disproportionate in it is the violence and cruelty of our history and of our politics. 
Let me be clear about this. . . I can say that reading “One Hundred Years of 
Solitude,” . . . in my adolescence may have contributed much to my literary 
calling, but I believe that magic realism is the least interesting part of the novel. I 
suggest reading “One Hundred Years” as a distorted version of Colombian 
history. (qtd. in White)  
Even its staunchest defenders share in the general agreement that magical realism has lost 
its criticality and become an attractive, well-selling commodity worldwide. What follows 
magical realism? Vásquez appears to respond with his novel, The Sound of Things 
Falling (2011); the novel itself is forward looking despite the seemingly retrospective 
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narrative, as the narrator Antonio fumbles around in search of the lost past—“lost” not 
because it has been unspoken, but because it is buried in spontaneous oblivion—in order 
to understand the present. Vásquez’s aspiration to redefine the continent of Latin 
America as a tragic one is deeply associated with his attention to the fundamental task of 
creating an alternative narrative of Latin American history, which he sees magical 
realism as having insufficiently carried out. While renewing Balzac’s maxim that novels 
are the private histories of nations, he makes use of the tragic realm of the crime novel as 
a venue for investigating the tensions between memory and oblivion, the private and the 
public, and the past and the present. While joining the group of the so-called narco-
novelists thematically, his version of the historical novel is more sober, as Antonio’s 
journey to the past is navigated by the solid perspective of “truthfulness.”  
The beauty of magical realism, which has become a metaphor of the whole 
continent of Latin America after Gabriel García Márquez, would lie in the lesson that it 
has taught us: that the real does not contradict the imaginary and that the exploration of 
the real always involves a search for new possibilities for life through the investigation of 
what is intolerable in the present, as is well shown in Jorge Luis Borges and Alejo 
Carpentier’s magical worlds of realism, among others. In the blend of real and magical, 
Borges, for example, expresses both how reality is stranger than fiction and how even the 
most fictional creations have a worldly basis at the same time: his fictional Uqbar in the 
short story “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” from Ficciones (1944) is based on the actual 
town of “Uqbar” in Algeria, or “Uqbara” in Iraq, of which he is known to have been 
aware. Also, Carpentier’s vision of the marvelous in the real that he shows in The 
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Kingdom of This World (1949) captures the mystery immanent to the history of Latin 
America, penetrating the cruel political reality of late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century Santo Domingo with richly poetic language of both hope and despair. To repeat 
his proclamation: “What is the entire history of [Latin] America if not a chronicle of the 
marvelous real?” (“Marvelous Real” 88). In spite of his links with the writers of Latin 
American magical realism, however, Carpentier’s insistence on autochthony, as Timothy 
Brennan argues in At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now, had a “political rather 
than a cultural-nationalist meaning” (267), derived from his mixed feelings about the 
European avant-gardes. That is, the crude elements of ordinariness in his work are not 
registered to promote the “indigenous” as a place of the supernatural, the folkloric, and 
the mythic. This primitivist gesture is still practiced in discussions of Latin American 
literature, as if the continent only existed as a standard against which Western civilization 
can be conveniently criticized. Such an approach falls prey to the long-held stereotype of 
the Third World for its unwitting re-positing of the West as modernity’s provenance. 
Rather, the criticality of Carpentier’s marvelous real should be understood as lying in the 
way he embraces the features of “secularity” as an essential element of literature, and the 
degree to which he amplifies our perception of reality.  
For the significance of the term and its influence on the “Boom” novelists 
thereafter, including Julio Cortázar, Gabriel García Márquez, Carlos Fuentes, Jorge Luis 
Borges and Mario Vargas Llosa, it is worth investigating what Carpentier meant by lo 
real maravilloso (the marvelous real), in the first place. As is well-known, the concept 
stems from his experience of staying in Haiti, where he noticed that thousands of men 
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believed in François Mackandal’s power “to the extent that their collective faith produced 
a miracle on the day of his execution” (“Marvelous Real” 86-87). Finding himself in 
daily contact with it, Carpentier soon realizes that the marvelous real is not specific to 
Haiti, but can be extended to the whole of Latin America. He describes the essence of the 
marvelous real by contrasting it with European Surrealism, a movement in which he 
participated in France in the 1930s; that is, the marvelous, according to him, is “baroque” 
in its spirit and practice, as opposed to surrealism in which “everything is premediated 
and calculated to produce a sensation of strangeness” (“Baroque” 103) as a 
“manufactured mystery” (104, original emphasis)—Salvador Dalí’s soft clocks, or the 
large snake in Pierre Roy’s “Danger on the stairs” (1927). While the marvelous in 
Surrealism is not looked for in reality, the strange in the marvelous real, in comparison, is 
“commonplace, and always was commonplace” (104). It was a new literary opportunity 
for Carpentier to be able to express how the strange has already become the ordinary in 
contemporary Latin American history, as seen in the fact that “the first socialist 
revolution on the continent should occur in the country least likely to sustain a 
revolution” (107).  
The original tenet of the marvelous real was less than an abstract style with a 
manufactured mixtures of images to transcend what is assumed as an objective reality 
than a sort of awakened attitude towards the history of Latin America—it is a style, of 
course, but a style “reaffirmed throughout our [Latin American] history” (“Marvelous 
Real” 83, original emphasis) that inheres in human realities. Defining the nature of the 
marvelous real as “the baroque,” Carpentier highlights its forward-looking quality. For 
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him, the baroque is less an invention of the seventeenth century than what Eugenio d’Ors 
called “a human constant” (“Baroque” 91, original emphasis) which “arises where there 
is transformation, mutation or innovation”: “baroque always projects forward and tends, 
in fact, to a phase of expansion at the culminating moment of a civilization, or when a 
new social order is about to be born. It can be a culmination, just as it can be a 
premonition” (98). His suggestion of Vladimir Mayakovsky, among others, as a 
monument of the baroque, and his critique of the German art critic Franz Roh’s magical 
realism, located on the opposite side of his juxtaposition, indicates how the marvelous 
real was imagined according to its capability to depict the “strange” reality—the bizarre 
reality that is resistant to being captured by our familiar language. When Carpentier 
claims that it is a new language forged out of our “duty” to “depict the world” and “to 
uncover and interpret it ourselves” (“Baroque” 106), the marvelous real departs from the 
mere creation of heterogeneous effect through premediated images of the fantastic as in 
surrealist work—the French post-impressionist Henri Rousseau’s “The Sleeping Gypsy” 
(1897), for instance. What Surrealism and Roh’s magical realism lacked for Carpentier 
was, simply put, “faith” (“Marvelous Real” 87):  
The problem here is that many of them [surrealists] disguise themselves 
cheaply as magicians, forgetting that the marvelous begins to be 
unmistakably marvelous when it arises from an unexpected alteration of 
reality (the miracle), from a privileged revelation of reality, an 
unaccustomed insight that is singularly favored by the unexpected richness 
of reality or an amplification of the scale and categories of reality, 
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perceived with particular intensity by virtue of an exaltation of the spirit 
that leads it to a kind of extreme state [estado límite]. To begin with, the 
phenomenon of the marvelous presuppose faith. . . . the marvelous 
invoked in disbelief—the case of the Surrealists for so many years—was 
never anything that is oneiric ‘by arrangement’ or those praises of folly 
that are now back in style. (86-87, my emphasis)  
Carpentier’s lament over the lack of faith in surrealism, and his diagnosis that the 
marvelous real is trapped in its poverty of imagination, resonates with Raymond 
Williams’s observation in The Politics of Modenrism that avant-garde practice has been 
driven to conform to modernist styles, losing its criticality (34-35). Williams 
distinguishes avant-garde artists from the modernists of the late nineteenth-century in that 
the former was a “fully oppositional,” and even aggressive group, whose members were 
the “millitants of a creativity which would revive and liberate humanity” (51). While both 
avant-garde and modernist movements were composed of alternative and innovative 
experimental artists and writers, and despite their common interests in rejecting tradition, 
emphasizing creativity, and affronting the bourgeoisie, members of the avant-garde 
identified themselves as the breakthrough to the future and were accordingly more direct 
in proclaiming political revolution based on the workers’ movements. Their crucial 
difference becomes clear in Williams’ respective description of each movements as “the 
organized working class with its disciplines of party and union” and “the cultural 
movement with its mobile association of free and liberating, often deliberately marginal 
individuals” (52).  
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Even the most faithful defenders of magical realism have admitted its changed 
status; as a commodity fetishized, with its magic lost in the comfortable consumption of 
the image of Latin American exoticism; “it’s become kitschy, a commodity . . . It’s 
getting so that when you don’t know what to do with a character, you send her to heaven 
in a flutter of butterfly wings” (Stavans, qtd. in Margolis). It is often said that the 
experimental spirit of magical realism faded sometime after Augusto Roa Bastos’s Yo, el 
Supremo (1974), which led some Latin American authors to find an alternative to the 
commercialized literary genre. The McOndo movement was one of the attempts to seize 
the throne from magical realism, though it failed to reach a global audience. Proclaiming 
the death of magical realism, the authors of the McOndo movement, including Alberto 
Fuguet, Giannina Braschi, Edmundo Paz Soldán, Hernán Rivera Letelier, Jorge Franco, 
Pedro Juan Gutiérrez, Pia Barros, Sergio Gomez, tried to expel ghosts, flying women, and 
fantastic objects from the literary world of Latin America, and fill up the space, instead, 
with “McDonald’s, Macintoshes and condos” (Fuguet 70). It purposely showcased the 
opposition between the central location of Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude, the 
natural world of exotic people in the literature of magical realism, and the contemporary 
urban Latin (American) cities that have been under the constant influence of the 
twentieth-century modernization and globalization. The project, launched in 1996 with a 
collection of short stories by 18 authors under the guidance of the co-editors, Alberto 
Fuguet and Sergio Gomez, however, came across as too familiar and even shallow, with 
its presentation of the new landscape of the Latin American real as “big . . . crowded, 
polluted, with highways, and subways, cable TV . . . five-star hotels built with laundered 
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money” (qtd. in Margolis). Alberto Fuguet himself introduced an attack on the movement 
in “Magical Neoliberalism”; “McOndo was little more than a neoliberal, even fascist, 
manifesto suggesting that the poor had been all but erased from the continent and that the 
new Latin American fiction was no more than the rants of U.S.-style alienated rich kids” 
(71). This might be too dismissive, but it is hard to deny that McCondo writers were, in 
their strategies, not original enough to go beyond writers that are “far too powerful,” such 
as Jorge Luis Borges, Julio Cortáza, Mario Vargas Llosa, and Gabriel García Márquez 
(72). Their desire to go global but remain rooted in the local ended up producing all-too-
familiar novels for American readers living in a multiethnic society in the age of 
globalization.  
No wonder that the first short story submitted by Fuguet to a U.S. magazine was 
rejected for the reason that “it wasn’t Latin American enough” (qtd. in Margolis). No 
matter how the McOndo movement is evaluated, this episode, as well as his critique of 
magical realism as the dominant mode of Latin American literature, asks us to confront 
the difficult inquiry of how to achieve the specificity of the local without condescending 
to it, however charitably: “Latin America is quite literary, yes, almost a work of fiction, 
but it’s not a folk tale. It is a volatile place where the 19th century mingles with the 21st. 
More than magical, this place is weird. Magical realism reduces a much too complex 
situation and just makes it cute. Latin America is not cute” (Fuguet 69). Caught up in his 
mission to divest Latin American literature of its “cuteness,” Fuguet pursued the global to 
such a degree that McOndo ended up producing only another form of ethnic literature, 
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mimetically reaffirming the age of global diversity, without being able to suggest to us 
something new—an unfamiliar perspective on Latin American literature.  
The McCondo movement, however, was also a sign that it might be the time to 
unseat the lame duck of magical realism and to think instead about new responses to the 
contemporary political and social strife of the continent. Roberto Bolaño, who is best 
known for his posthumous novel about Mexican homicides, 2666 (2004), can be thought 
of as one of the mainstays who worked in this spirit. He departed from his 
contemporaries in Latin American literature, whom he described as “imitators of a 
magical realism made for the consumption of zombies” (271). Diagnosing how magical 
realism lost its revolutionary traits and became “the aesthetics of globalization” (qtd. in 
Denning 51) as it has dominated the world literary field, Bolaño attacks some of the 
writers whose magical realism caters to the market taste, calling “the sacred cows of 
Latin American Literature, especially the boom” “the rancid private club full of cobwebs 
presided over by Vargas Llosa, García Márquez, Fuentes, and other pterodactyls” (qtd. in 
Moya). Also, he was fairly critical to McOndo generations for their empty 
cosmopolitanism and “programmatic rebellions imitating North American or European 
fictions” (Deckard 353). Bolaño tenaciously reformulates realism less as a problem of the 
distinction between the realistic and the fantastic than as a question of “ways of seeing” 
(“Interview”).  
Similarly, we notice most recently that a new crop of writers in Mexico and 
Columbia, in particular, pursue a new form of realism along the same line of Bolaño’s 
inquiry, but through the creation of a different regional genre called the “narconovela.” 
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The so-called Latin American neo-realists working on the genre have turned their backs 
on Márquez’s fantastic world to shed light on the darker sides of the continent. In 
Mexico, there has been a flood of narco-literature, narco-cinema, and narcocorridos 
(narrative folk songs), enjoying widespread popularity since the 1990s. And in Colombia, 
narco themes have been explored both in the novels of Fernando Vallejo, Jorge Franco 
Ramos, and Juan Gabriel Vásquez, to name a few, and in such films as Rodrigo D: no 
futuro (Rodrigo D: No Future, 1990) and Maria, llena eres de gracia (Maria, Full of 
Grace, 2004). Jorge Volpi, a novelist and essayist from Mexico City, states that the 
popularity of narconovelas stems from the Mexican playwright Óscar Liera’s El jinete de 
la divina providencia (The Rider of Divine Providence, 1991) and the Colombian writer 
Vallejo’s La virgin de los sicarios (Our Lady of the Assassins, 1994). While noting that 
many writers in Colombia and Mexico created “one of the essential features of the so-
called narconovels” by giving a “literary patina to the language of the narcos” 
(“Narconovelas”), Volpi laments how the portrayal of Mexico as a world of spectacular 
violence in most of the works makes the genre a well-consumed commodity in the 
international markets:  
In these books [narconovelas], Mexico is portrayed as a violent, 
uncontrollable and fantastic world in contrast to the West, which 
consumes drugs without suffering or being scarred by the violence of the 
trade. . . . These and other books created a world that transcended 
stereotypes and became a paradigm repeated incessantly in novels, TV 
serials and films: a universe dominated by danger, death and the 
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unforeseeable, a world of pathetic heroes and villains increasingly hard to 
tell apart—poor adolescents who become professional killers; beautiful 
young girls used as a medium of exchange; gunmen killing one another for 
no reason other than to fill an existential void; clumsy, ill-paid cops, 
almost always corrupt; and, of course, a few narco bosses transformed into 
multimillionaires, notable for their outsize eccentricities. These were new 
romances of chivalry in which no one knows what he’s fighting for; 
where, as the corrido says, “life is worth nothing”; where acts of heroism 
are extreme and rare; and where staying alive past 30 is a kind of victory. 
(“Narconovelas”)  
Volpi’s targets are, among others, Sergio González Rodríguez’s El vuelo (The Flight, 
2008), Mario González Suárez’s A wevo, padrino (Hell Yes, Got Father, 2008), 
“Heriberto Yépez’s Al otro lado (On the Other Side, 2008), Rogelio Guedea’s Conducir 
un trailer (Driving a Trailer, 2008), Hilario Peña’s Malasuerte en Tijuana (Bad Luck in 
Tijuana, 2009), and Luis Humberto Crosthwaite’s Tijuana: crimen y olvido (Tijuana: 
Crime and Oblivion, 2010). In such works, the authors dramatize the dangers of life in 
the narco-world of Mexico, devastated by drug trafficking and its attendant violence. 
Alejandro Herrero-Olaizola’s extensive study of how Latin American literature has 
become labelled by falling prey to the strategies of global marketing, and how magical 
realism and narco-literature were two of these labels, seems to justify Volpi’s concerns.23 
Volpi’s criticism that narco-literature is a nostalgic attempt to revive the idea of 
Latin American literature, taking the place of magical realism in the minds of readers in 
                                                 
23 See Herrero-Olaizola’s “Publishing Matters: The Latin American ‘Boom’ and the Rules of Censorship.”  
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the West, has a point; it suffices to mention the popularity of the Netflix gangster drama 
Narco (2015). His generalization that narco-literature is just a marketing device, 
however, needs to be reconsidered as it, most of all, neglects to see the local constitutions 
of literary form in each dissimilar political and cultural field. Furthermore, Volpi 
disregards what has caused the Latin American authors to create what we can call a form 
of “neo-realism” by choosing a different path than magical realists followed; saying that 
both magical realism and narco-literature are mere marketing ploys leads to an indolent 
critique, as it fails to raise an important question--why narco after magic? Gabriela Polit 
Dueñas asks that we go beyond framing narco-literature as “a paradigm of production,” 
or “a label of easy marketing,” and “explore the impact narco trafficking has on the 
production of literature in several regions of Latin America” (4). If we agree with her 
premise that within the Latin American cultural context, it is still common that “a 
political or social phenomenon propels the development of literary genre, or that it 
motivates artistic manifestations” (3), the task of exploring the inquiry of why narco has 
succeeded magic becomes more significant.  
One of the authors of narco-narratives, Juan Gabriel Vásquez provides us with an 
important hint on the potential of narco-literature in his work The Sound of Things 
Falling. Depicting the shared experience of the narco cultures of Columbia, drug 
trafficking, wars on drugs, and drug-related crimes, Vásquez suggests how narco-
literature avoids the danger posited by Volpi of indulging the nostalgia of those who want 
to recover the idea of Latin-Americanness and portrays instead the common realities of 
the diverse people of the continent. Hermann Herlinghaus, in this regard, argues that “in 
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today’s narco narratives, the affective realities of the Global South are expressed” (ix). In 
the narco narratives, “the realities of hemispheric narcotics traffic and informal travel are 
taken as a lens for problematizing the revamping of North-South conflicts under the 
pressures of advanced neoliberalism. These narratives point to an imbalance that has 
become strategically sensitive” (Herlinghaus 34). The narco is a symbol that cannot be 
omitted in describing the country of Columbia; Vásquez moreover shows how the narco 
is as much a reality as a symbol—not a thing of the past, but a force that still leaves its 
traces on the country. At the same time, Vásquez’s version of the narco-novel refuses to 
take the road to cheap melodrama and Hollywood movies to focus on “how the drug 
trade affects somebody not involved in it; somebody who—like me—has never seen a 
gram of coke in his life” (“Interview”). The narco has been everywhere in the continent, 
so prevalent that it is impossible not to narrate its effects. Both magic and drugs are 
intoxicating, but Vásquez’s narrator Antonio’s journey to the tragic history of Columbia 
reveals how much sobriety it involves to restore memory from the nation’s communal 
oblivion. Both magic and drugs are haunting, but Vásquez is unambiguous about 
suggesting that what has haunted the country as much as flying women, mythic figures, 
and the mysterious power of the supernatural, is the apparition of the tragic Columbian 
past, which has captivated its people, devouring their present moment. Unlike the stories 
of magic that lead us to feel inebriated, Vásquez’s narrative of the narco sobers us up, 
showing how only the moment of awakening, led by an uncompromised defense of 
truthfulness, allows us to proceed toward a future out of the dismal present suffused with 
symptoms of the violent past.  
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III.2. Juan Gabriel Vásquez’s The Sound of Things Falling and the New Historical 
Novel 
 “The first hippopotamus, a male the color of black pearls, weighing a tone and a 
half, was shot dead in the middle of 2009” (3)—the novel’s first sentence implies that the 
country has not yet learned how to mourn the death of the hippopotamus, a figure of the 
undead that looms large in The Sound of Things Falling. One is even tempted to say that 
the novel is all about the hippo: the creature represents in turn Ricardo Laverde, a former 
aviator and prisoner, the exploration of whose life is a task for the narrator and the main 
character Antonio Yammara; then Antonio himself; and finally the history of Colombia. 
As is indicated from the first line of the novel, Vásquez is more interested in the remains 
of the past, after the death of the drug lord and trafficker Pablo Escobar, than in the 
suspenseful and sensationalist narratives that have circulated about his notorious drug 
cartel. By implying that the hippo provides a link through which the lives of all 
Columbians are connected, Vásquez, from the first, shows straightforwardly how in 
Colombia one’s individual life is inseparable from the shared fate of the collective.  
The news about the death of the poor creature who escaped from a deserted zoo 
once owned by Escobar reminds Antonio Yammara, a young law professor at a university 
in Bogotá, of the former aviator and prisoner, Ricardo Laverde, whom Antonio met in a 
billiard hall in the capital. For Antonio, remembering Ricardo well “has become an 
urgent matter” (5), so he decides to investigate the prisoner’s mysterious life, which 
seems to intersect with his own, by throwing himself into the “damaging exercise of 
remembering” even though he believes it will bring nothing good but only “hinder our 
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normal functioning” (5). It is implied from the first in the novel that Colombia, even 
almost 20 years after its most turbulent and violent times, is still haunted by the past, and 
that the whole generation who lived through the 1980s seems to suffer from 
posttraumatic stress disorder. Relating Colombian reality to the task of storytelling, 
Vásquez states, “You have to ask why, 30 years after all that began, they are just popping 
up everywhere. The reason is that we haven’t got to the bottom of that. We haven’t really 
understood why that happened, what the consequences of those years are. So we tell 
stories” (qtd. in Montgomery). Not yet knowing how the mysteries of Ricardo’s 
experiences could ever relate to his own or even to the fate of the country, Antonio, 
Vásquez’s fictional alter ego (their relationship resembles that of James Joyce and 
Stephen Dedalus), decides to follow his sheer interest in tracing the “story of his life” (5). 
For a narco genre, the rest of the novel is pretty quiet. Without any rambunctious scenes 
of drug-dealing or violent crimes, it focuses on the silent suffering of ordinary people 
who have “never seen a gram of coke,” like the protagonist himself. By emphasizing such 
people, Vásquez also departs from Márquez’s allegedly “single and narrow perspective” 
(Polit Dueñas 111) in his only narco reportage, Noticia de un secuestro (News of a 
Kidnaping, 1996), which focuses on elite professionals as the sole unfortunates of the 
narcos’ violence.  
What is most haunting, for Vásquez, is rather, again, the mute pain of ordinary 
people, and he chooses to concentrate on hearing the sound of things falling in their 
everyday lives: a rain of bullets, plane crashes and explosions in mid-air, tears over 
assassinated human bodies, etc. Because the spectacular scenes of violence involved in 
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this history of Colombian narco trafficking are depicted in such a placid way, the novel 
almost arouses the feeling that the turbulent events only happened in the pathological 
mind of the protagonist. As the story unfolds, it shows how Antonio starts his journey to 
be able to mourn the death of the hippo, i.e, the drug-infused Colombian past, in a proper 
manner; however, one soon realizes that his journey can be only completed by his 
awakening to the connections between his trauma and the Colombian collective memory. 
The latter has been repressed at will for its life-threatening preponderance, and Antonio’s 
search for the lost memory suggests that the “dysfunction” (55) at both individual and 
national levels can only be normalized through a process of externalization in Columbia, 
where the abnormal has become the normal status of being and almost no one, including 
Antonio’s therapist, tries to seriously question it. “Politicians were murdered; bombs 
went off in Bogota all the time, aimed at district attorneys and the intelligentsia. You 
were afraid violence could touch you at any point. It was amazing how easily you get 
used to that—how normal a life you can lead” (“Interview”), Vásquez recollects; the 
narco-related violence was so omnipresent, with its consequences penetrating every 
corner of society, that not narrating it would be impossible. If Freud thought of 
externalization as an unconscious defense mechanism, Vásquez redefines it as a 
conscious, active human practice of revisiting the essence of the past to discover its 
correlation with the national, collective illness. Vasquez explores what he calls the 
“darker corners of Colombian history that have made us what we are now” (“Interview”) 
through his character Antonio, in the novel, whose journey to the truth slowly sheds light 
on the darkness by bringing the hidden back to reason. It is a process in which Antonio, 
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as an individual specimen of humanity, gains the historical consciousness necessary to 
approaching the truth of Colombian reality.  
That his mission is a life-shattering one for Antonio is implied in the depiction of 
his personality, particularly in his occupation as a law professor. The safe zone where he 
can shelter in “the double abyss of authority and knowledge” (7) from the unknowable 
real world, enabled him to sustain himself in those days when his life didn’t seem to 
belong to himself. Students’ admiration for him was “like a drug,” (8) he confesses, and 
its resultant intoxication provides him with an enjoyable distance from the youth who 
“gesticulate and shout and lose themselves in ridiculous arguments in their attempts to 
find . . . the ideas of Law and Justice” (8). Still, readers sense that Antonio’s propensity 
for lucidity will soon contradict his cynicism in his unknowable world, as the novel hints 
at his attraction to legal studies for its secretless theoretical world, a world unlike his 
shadowed reality. That he wrote his thesis on “madness as grounds for exemption from 
legal responsibility in Hamlet” (7) foreshadows this novel’s reversed ending, in which he 
takes full responsibility to be awakened from the madness that has dominated Columbian 
history.  
Relating his feelings and memories to others in his generation, whose key stages 
are punctuated by Escobar’s significant commissions of murder, Antonio realizes how the 
private existence of individuals has been always intertwined with the public history of the 
country:  
I was fourteen years old that afternoon in 1984 when Pablo Escobar killed 
or ordered the killing of his most illustrious pursuer, the Minister of 
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Justice Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (two hit men on a motorcycle, a curve on 
127th Street). I was sixteen when Escobar killed or ordered the killing of 
Guillermo Cano, publisher of El Espectador (a few steps away from the 
newspaper’s offices, the assassin put eight bullets in his chest). I was 
nineteen and already an adult, although I hadn’t voted yet, on the day of 
the death of Luis Carlos Galán, a presidential candidate, whose 
assassination was different or is different in our imaginations because it 
was seen on TV . . .” (10)  
But it is not until the mysterious Ricardo, whom he got to know in a Bogota billiards hall 
but to whom he “didn’t pay too much attention” (12), is killed in a drive-by on the street 
before Antonio’s eyes that Antonio decides to leave the realm of stability only to find 
how the lives of all Colombians, including his family and friends, are conditioned by the 
country’s past. That is, the gun attack, in which Antonio is also seriously injured, serves 
as a goad for him to feel that he is nothing other than another Ricardo in their shared fate 
of falling: “My legs no longer held me up. Ricardo fell to the ground, and I fell with him, 
two bodies falling without a sound, and people started to shout and in my ears there was a 
continuous buzzing” (46). They are connected via violence and pain, but if there is one 
difference, it is that Antonio survived, unlike Ricardo, and thus he can take up the task of 
asking questions, or starting to ask questions, at least. “A life unlived, a life that runs 
through one’s fingers, a life one suffers through while knowing it belongs to someone 
else: to those who don’t have to suffer” (14). For the first time, Antonio begins to 
question the sort of life in Colombia, a place that “live[s] outside of time” where “reality 
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adjusted—as it doesn’t often to—to the memory we[they] have of it” (71). His therapist 
asserts that “any dysfunction is normal,” and his not-at-all unusual situation “would 
eventually pass, as it had passed for all the others who had visited his office” (55). His 
wife Aura furthermore reasserts that the same incident would not happen again, but 
Antonio refuses to let it go. While his doctor diagnoses him as suffering from 
agoraphobia, he feels the opposite—“a violent claustrophobia was what was tormenting 
me [him]” (65)—and he chooses to get out of “the closed world” of disguised stability.         
Antonio’s journey to the silenced truth is a matter of abandoning the given 
stability of his life; he departs from this stability not to wander aimlessly but rather to 
return with a definite perspective that does not seem to be achievable except by his 
leaving his home first. It means that he needs to refuse his loving wife Aura’s desire for 
him to stay with her and their newly born daughter Leticia in their realm of law where 
she would like to dwell without any disturbance. When Antonio asks Aura why she has 
chosen law as her major, Aura answers, “to be able to stay in a single place”; “Lawyers 
can practice only where they’ve studied, said Aura, and she no longer felt able to 
postpone that kind of stability” (29). Aura is faithful to the place of law, the sedentary, 
and the lucid, but Antonio realizes that it has been clouded, and only flight from its false 
reality would allow him to get to the essence of its “aura.” In a notebook that his doctor 
gave him for the therapeutic benefit of writing, he can only write two words, “what,” and 
“why” (67). And he knows that he can only answer his own questions by distancing 
himself from the familiar place. Accordingly, he becomes nomadic, but only temporarily; 
he leaves his home, but only to return with a new way of seeing that will help him 
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demystify Colombian reality. Guided by “the scar on his belly” (73) that he shows to 
people as evidence of his trustworthiness in the community of shared suffering, his 
journey is a resistance to sedentariness and to the oblivion that supports the sedentary 
world. Sobriety is a requirement, and his traveling to the forgotten past reveals how 
painful it is to revisit things that have been hidden, how difficult it is to stay awake and 
resist oblivion.  
As the title The Sound of Things Falling implies, the pain is rather heard than seen 
in the novel. Listening to the black-box recording of the flight on which Ricardo’s wife 
Elaine died transforms the death of “strangers”—Elaine “is not, will never be, one of my 
[his] dead” (88, original emphasis)—to something of his own:  
However those sounds now form part of my auditory memory. Once the 
tape fell silent, once the noises of the tragedy gave way to static, I knew I 
would have preferred not to have listened to it, and I knew at the same 
moment that in my memory I would go on hearing it forever. No, those are 
not my dead, I had no right to hear those words . . . but the words and the 
voices of the dead had already swallowed me like a whirlpool in a river 
swallow up a tried animal. . . . Experience, or what we call experience, is 
not the inventory of our pains, but rather sympathy we learn to feel for the 
pain of others. (88)  
His listening to Flight 965’s black box creates a moment when he moves from the 
importance of not forgetting to the impossibility of forgetting. The black box survived the 
accident and went through two owners before Antonio finally gets to listen to it, and he is 
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fascinated by how the black box seems to keep claiming its history. When it finally has 
come to “form part of my [his] memories,” Antonio decides not to go home yet, as home 
is the Hamlet-like realm where he can be exempted from responsibility by choosing to be 
mad or intoxicated. Instead he resolves to “keep living in the black box, with the black 
box” (91).  
Still at this moment, though, Antonio is ignorant of the relation between his own 
pain and that of others. He feels “sympathetic” to the sufferings of the dead, hence his 
attempt to get to the core of the silenced truth, but one can only be sympathetic when 
there is a clear non-identity of the self and the other; one cannot feel “sympathetic” to 
one’s own pain. And this is where Maya Fritts, Ricardo’s daughter, appears as a mediator 
between Antonio and Ricardo, giving him a hint at the link between the self and the 
other, and furthermore, the individual and the collective. As a fellow truth-seeker who 
has gone through the same turbulent eighties and is afraid to confront the truth about her 
father, Maya becomes an important comrade on Antonio’s journey to the truth. When she 
states that she is orphaned, but suffering from “the gaze of absent ones” (117), as she 
feels that Elaine and Ricardo keep watching her, one sees how much her present is, like 
Antonio himself, devoured by the apparition of the past. They are haunted for the same 
reason: they do not know what happened to Elaine and Ricardo, and therefore they do not 
know what happened to Colombia. She hasn’t yet reached the dark core of the dead’s 
history. To Maya’s request to help her unearth the truth of her father by telling her about 
the end of his life, Antonio answers with silence. When he asks her if she could do the 
same for him, Maya provides the same response of silence. Looking at Maya settled 
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down into her hammock the same way he himself was in his, however, Antonio realizes 
that it was all he wanted to know. He feels that they share the same words, the words 
sketched out in Antonio’s head when he tried to write something in his diary, “I want to 
know” (138, original emphasis), and believes that their shared desire to “know” will 
guide them to the truth.  
They share what they know to understand how the dead can take up so much 
space in their lives and thereby to get out of their mutual, “contagious” fear (149). 
Antonio tells her what he thought he knew, as well as all that he remembered and what he 
feared he had forgotten. Maya also shares with him a family archive made up of letters, 
recordings, and newspaper clippings that she has collected. The stories told in a form of 
“confession” (138) lead us to Ricardo’s youth as a pilot, his involvement in drug 
trafficking from Colombia to the United States, and his final arrest, which led to a 
twenty-year sentence; and also to the life of Elaine, who arrived in Colombia as a 
volunteer for the Peace Corps and returned to the United States when the violence in 
Colombia started to intensify. When the pieces brought by Maya and Antonio are put 
together, one realizes that they form nothing other than a personal version of Columbia’s 
history. Elaine, who first came to Colombia “to have an enriching experience, leave her 
mark, do her share, no matter how small” (152), is made fun of by the locals, including 
Ricardo, for the naïvete of her mission. Her love for Ricardo incites her desire to discover 
Colombia’s place in the world, to leave her safe position as a visitor and her pretension to 
be a “social missionary, a Good Samaritan for the Third World” (197), and from that 
moment, Elaine tries to be part of the country by living its history herself. She protests 
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with Ricardo against the Vietnam War, but as a mediator between the First and the Third 
World, she also participates in social events organized by the American community in 
Bogotá. When the annoying, sarcastic lines of a Frank Zappa song that Ricardo used to 
sing enthusiastically to deride the mission of the Peace Corps—“What’s there to live for? 
Who needs the Peace Corps?”(190)—suddenly enter her mind, hummed in her head, 
however, she feels that Colombia is finally within her; she is pregnant with Maya.  
Again, the private existence of individuals is intertwined with the public history 
of the country; Maya is born “in July 1971, more or less at the same time President Nixon 
used the word war on drugs for the first time in a public speech” (216). The history of an 
individual is told through public events in Colombia, which shows how individuals are 
already born in the shared fate of the community. Elaine complains in her letter to her 
grandparents about Cien años de soledad, a book she received as a going-away present; 
she writes that she has tried to read it but the Spanish is very difficult, and there is even a 
typo on the cover of the novel in its 14th printing. When she says that it is the most 
tedious thing she has read in a long time, one detects Vásquez’s playful riposte to magical 
realism. Her whining that “everybody has the same name” (180) in the novel, however, 
constitutes a symbolic statement about the whole country’s familial modes of living 
beyond just Márquez’s magical world. As is asserted by Maya later, they are one in their 
communal destiny in Colombia: “That’s the great thing about Colombia, nobody’s ever 
alone with their fate” (254).  
This very fact of shared destiny helps Antonio realize that the truth about Ricardo 
he has been trying to discover was, from the first, the truth of his own life. The image that 
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he conjured up when he put on a man’s shirt in Maya’s house, in which he looked like 
Ricardo, becomes the real, when he reaches an “inexplicable” and “confusing” (152) 
understanding of the identity of Ricardo and himself. At this moment, he no longer feels 
sympathy, but an extreme solitude: “The discomfort of knowing that this story in which 
my name did not appear spoke of me in each and every one of its lines. All this I felt, and 
in the end all my feelings were reduced to a tremendous solitude, a solitude without a 
visible cause and therefore without remedy. The solitude of a child” (152). The solitude is 
homologous to the kind of essential loneness of aviation that Ricardo felt as a pilot while 
he was in the air: “the air gets cold, it’s noisier, you feel more alone. Even if someone’s 
there. Yeah, even if there’s someone with you” (219). But the extreme solitude in 
Vásquez’s novel does not lead to an easy conclusion of alienation; in the community of 
shared destiny, even the solitude is shared. The dead’s loneliness is shared by the living, 
and the solitude of the past is joined by the present. Solitude serves as another link in 
Colombia, a connection that shows how each and every individual is united via the 
somber feeling.  
This union of feeling is shown to the fullest in the novel’s climax, when Antonio 
and Maya re-visit Hacienda Nápolés, Escobar’s luxurious estate where he owned a zoo. 
Surprised by the possibility that they might have visited it on the same day when they 
were little, Antonio feels that they are united by some “unexpected and unjustified 
solidarity” (269). Together, they feel the necessity to re-visit the deserted zoo, “a symbol 
of the same things for both of us [them]” (269), and dare to see Escobar’s house, its 
desolateness, the remains of their common past, which “was there without being there” 
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(270). They confront every kind of fear and memory that it evokes with a complete but 
shared silence. When they finally encounter a stray hippo, whom Maya considers a baby 
female, at thirty steps away from them, one almost feels that their journey to the past was 
to meet the hippo. As Maya and Antonio undertook that journey so that they could 
understand their history, the creature of the past also studies them gravely:  
The hippopotamus, male or female, juvenile or full-grown, didn’t bat an 
eyelid: it looked at us, or looked at Maya, who was leaning over the 
wooden fence and looking at it in turn. I don’t know how much time went 
by: one minute, two, which in such circumstances is a long time. Water 
dripped off Maya’s hair and all her clothes were a different color now. 
Then the hippopotamus began a heavy movement, a ship trying to turn 
around in the sea, and I was surprised to see such a long animal in profile. 
And then I didn’t anymore, or rather I saw only its powerful ass and 
thought I saw streams of water sliding over its smooth, shiny skin. It 
wandered away through the tall grass, with its legs hidden by the weeds in 
such a way that it seemed not to make any progress, but just to get smaller. 
(272-273)  
Maya thinks of the creature as a beauty, while Ricardo says that it’s the ugliest animal in 
the world (272). When Maya worries about the future of the stray hippos that were once 
owned by Escobar and have since escaped from the zoo after his death, Antonio realizes 
how Ricardo said the same thing when they first met in the billiard. The hippo as the 
remains of Colobmia’s tumultuous eighties connects the lives of Colombians, reminding 
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them that it remains as the living dead, a thing of the past that has survived to the present. 
Maya said, “Everything seems smaller” (268) when she and Antonio arrived at the zoo; 
Antonio likewise notices the hippo wander away as it disappears from his view, “in such 
a way that it seemed not to make any progress but just to get smaller” (272-273).  The 
ultimate confrontation with their common past indicates that Antonio’s journey is about 
to be wrapped up, and at this point, it becomes clear that his journey, whose purpose was 
unknown even to himself, led him to encounter the stray hippo. It is at the end of the 
journey when one sometimes gets to understand its beginning; a story had unfolded 
completely only at the destination where the significance of its beginning is revealed ex 
post facto.  
Vasquez overturns modernism by converting its privileged novelistic genre—
psychological fiction—into something that looks more like the Lukacsian historical 
novel. Motivation—or in Lukács’s word, perspective—regains its importance in 
Vásquez’s new historical novel. What appears aimless—his traveling to the past—at first 
turns out to have been motivated by something to which the protagonist unwittingly held 
onto; his desire to understand himself has been driven all along by his unconscious need 
to accept the nation’s history as his own. Rosecrans Baldwin argues in his review that 
The Sound of Things Falling is a “more of a metaphysical detective story where cause 
and effect can be difficult to pin down,” and “the events that matter most occur inside 
characters.” Unlike his argument that Vásquez “has taken the psychological novel and 
made it political,” however, what Vásquez manifests in this pseudo-detective story is the 
intertwining of the psychological and the political, where seemingly psychological events 
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cannot be explained without referring to their situatedness in the structures of the outer 
world. In his destiny, complicatedly woven with the lives of others, the history of the 
individual is already collective, and his particular individuality turns out to have 
originated from the historical peculiarity of his generation. Vásquez’s new historical 
novel is, in this sense, utterly realist, not because it meets the unjustifiable criterion of 
plausibility but because of its suggestion of the possibility for men to “comprehend their 
own existence as something which deeply affects their daily lives and immediately 
concerns them” (Lukács, Historical Novel 24). On his journey to achieve historical 
awareness of himself, history is also written afresh; the process is interactive.  
The novel’s use of detective or mystery conventions best serves Vasquez’s 
purpose to create a new historical novel, as it allows the protagonist to be guided by his 
solid desire to define his feelings of loss and fear, rather than sinking indulgently in 
abstract emotion. That is, Antonio’s action, going back to “the exhausting work of 
memory” (280) to recognize the present’s imbrication with the past, is a prerequisite for 
his own ability to proceed toward a future in which he wouldn’t be mired in fear. His 
journey to the past in the novel is a vertical movement: Antonio descends as he patiently 
listens to the sound of things “falling” in Colombia, including the crash of Flight 965 
from the back box. Antonio feels that the sound made by Flight 965 “in some absurd way 
was also the sound of Ricardo’s life, tied irremediably to that of Elena Fritts,” and that of 
his own downfall as well “which began there without my [his] knowledge” (285). The 
sound of the city’s downfall, which produced fugitives like the writer himself, is 
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amplified by the voices of the Bogotán poet Aurelio Arturo’s “Ciudad de Sueña” (“City 
of Dream,” 1929), a poem Antonio keeps thinking about in the end of the novel:  
I’ll tell you that one day I saw a crazed, arrogant, swarming city burn 
through the night . . . Unblinking, I watched it collapse, and fold like a 
rose petal under a roof  
[…]   
It burned like a loin, amid forests of flame 
and the cupolas fell and the walls fell  
over the beloved voices and over the broad mirrors 
. . . ten thousand howls of pure resplendence!  
and they were the flames like my own hair,  
red panthers set loose in to the young city,  
and the walls of my dram burning, toppling, 
like a city collapsing in screams. (293-294, original emphasis)  
“The beloved voices of the poem” becomes the voices of his family, “Aura’s voice and 
Leticia’s voice” (294), and when he returns home after his experience of the city 
“collapsing in screams” is over, he has difficulty in breathing at first. As seen in 
Antonio’s description of his return as a movement “from sea level to the altitude of 
Bogotá,” his journey is proven to correspond to the experience of the crash of the Flight 
965 into the sea. He feels “the lack of oxygen that my [his] heart was demanding,” as if 
he were just rescued from drowning. The only difference is that he survived, unlike 
Elaine, but he is left alone in a new reality in which his wife left him with their daughter. 
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The novel is inconclusive, ending with with the protagonist’s multiple questions about 
what he will do next; Vasquez does not inform readers whether Antonio will reunite with 
his family or not. But this obscure conclusion at least allows the understanding that, 
whichever path he chooses to take, he will not remain what he was before he started the 
journey.  
 The retrospective self-knowledge that Antonio achieves by traveling back to the 
past, however, does not seem to function as an imaginary resolution, or a sort of soothing 
reconciliation with the Colombian past. As the ending scene of the novel implies, it only 
appears to demonstrate how the demand of the recognition of oneself is destabilizing, and 
might change the course of one’s comfortable life completely. Comparing magical 
realism to conventional realism, Lois Parkinson Zamora and Wendy B. Faris argue that 
realism “intends its version of the world as a singular version, as an objective (hence 
universal) representation of natural and social realties—in short, that realism functions 
ideologically and hegemonically” (3); by contrast, magical realism, despite maintaining 
the term realism upon which it builds, “resists the basic assumptions of post-
enlightenment rationalism and literary realism” (6). Their analysis of a close affinity 
between forms of magical realism and postmodernism, and the elevation of the latter’s 
liberating effect for its “decentralizing” quality, demonstrates, however, how their 
understanding of literary realism is based on a common stereotype of what they call 
“conventional realism.” As Vásquez shows in The Sound of Things Falling, narrative 
closure in literary realism, for one thing, does not correspond to ideological closure, as 
Zamora and Faris seem to think. Rather, the usual “ideological” role of narrative closure 
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in the novel is inverted here, and the recognition that the protagonist achieves in the novel 
leaves him desolate. Zamora and Faris consider the “intentionality implicit in the 
conventions of the two modes of magical realism and realism” (3) as an essential 
difference between them. It is true that the necessary mediation of perspective is written 
into realism, but the perspective is not a given that the writer from the first can take but is 
uncovered and seized self-consciously as the writer pursues the arduous task of “a deeper 
probing of the real world” (Lukács, “Realism” 34). As reality does not manifest itself to 
the writer, he needs to put himself to the labor of “penetrat[ing] the laws governing 
objective reality and to uncover[ing] the deeper, hidden, mediated, not immediately 
perceptive networks of relationships that go to make up society” (35).  
 Vásquez’s new historical novel, therefore, actively resists the inert understanding 
of literary realism as a copy or reflection of reality. Expressing his fascination with realist 
fiction over magical realism and his obsession with writing history, he makes clear how, 
for him, realism is less a literary strategy than “a way of being in the world”:  
My favorite novelists are people who seem to be fascinated by other 
human beings, by their hidden areas, and they take that into their novels. 
Perhaps that’s why a certain tradition of realist fiction is much more 
important for me than magical realism. Novels such as Dostoyevsky’s 
“Demons,” Conrad’s “Lord Jim,” Fitzgerald’s “The Great Gatsby,” down 
to (W.G.) Sebald's “Austerlitz” and Philip Roth’s “[The] American 
Trilogy” have informed my writing much more than “One Hundred Years 
of Solitude.” What do they have in common? They are built around an 
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investigation of sorts into somebody else’s life. They are built around the 
basic human impulse of curiosity—knowing what the other is like, what 
secrets he has, what is he hiding. This is not a literary strategy. It’s a way 
of being in the world. (qtd. in Nance)  
Following Conrad’s idea that “novels go into dark places and come back with the news” 
(“Interview”), Vásquez shows how writing a historical novel is an already future-oriented 
task. If it is someone else’s past that devours the protagonist’s present in The Sound of 
Things Falling, his “going into darker places” of the Colombian history is to reclaim the 
past as his own to be able to proceed a future where one can recover one’s own place; in 
his own words, it is to “make Latin America’s past come alive so we can gain some 
control over our future” (“Interview”). If there is one truth that The Sound of Things 
Falling shows, it is that reality emerges only when it is assiduously challenged: it is not a 
thing out there, but rather a process. Although Antonio’s act of becoming conscious has 
not yet turned into practice, the significance of the moment of recognition enables us to 
imagine a new reality where he can truthfully take residence. Vasquez finds realism 
essential in Latin American literature because it offers the best approach to the wreck of 
the Latin American past.  
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IV. Between the Core and the Periphery:  
Semi-peripheral Neo-Realist Cinema and Ethics after Modernism 
Each image is beautiful not because it is beautiful in itself . . .  
but because it is the splendor of the true. (Jean-Luc Godard)24 
 
IV.1. The Nation In-Between and the Dilemma of Semi-peripheral Aesthetics 
 Since the 1990s, the global awareness of the unequal literary system was 
intensified with the efforts of western intellectuals, who tried to provide a more inclusive 
framework to remake world literature after the task of, in the Warwick Research 
Collective’s words, “‘unthinking’ Eurocentrism” (5). South Korea has fervently 
participated in the world literature debates, though its critics have received less attention 
in the world forums devoted to this issue than they should. For South Korea, a country 
precariously positioned between the core and the periphery with particular political, 
economic, and cultural contradictions—its regressive democracy, widening gap between 
the rich and the poor despite the relative wealth of the country, and both economic and 
cultural dependency on the core countries—imagining the place of its aesthetics in the 
world republic of letters came as an urgent issue that would make South Korea visible not 
for its world-historical scar as a tragically divided country but for its rich aesthetic and 
cultural assets.  
 The work of Pascale Casanova, Franco Moretti, and David Damrosch, among 
others, reached the country at precisely the moment when researchers started seeking to 
mediate the national peculiarity of South Korean politico-aesthetics and the universality 
of world literature. In her seminal work, The World Republic of Letters (2004), Casanova, 
                                                 
24 Quoted in Peter Brunette, 206-207. Originally appeared in Cahier du Cinema 96 (1959).  
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relying on Pierre Bourdieu’s notion of a “field,” defines the literary field as a world of 
rivalry, consistent competition, and inequality, “a world that has its own capital, its own 
provinces and borders, in which languages become instruments of power” (4). According 
to her, in this literary world governed by unequal power relations, each writer struggles 
for recognition, and “rival languages compete for dominance” (4). By making a further 
argument that the rivalries have created world literature, where the “literary Greenwich 
meridian” (87) is a standard set of criteria on which literary values are based, she has 
provided a useful framework for rethinking world literature in terms of its symbolic 
capital in the literary world system.  
 Together with Franco Moretti’s attempts to position debates of world literature in 
the discursive context of the modern capitalist world-system, Casanova’s insight into the 
workings of linguistic and literary power relations in the literary battle for authority—
where will be the main place of consecration after Paris?—has inspired many critics of 
non-Anglophone Third World countries, in particular. Due to the features of their 
languages that make them difficult to translate and thus less approachable, their entrance 
to the field of world literature is somewhat held back. In that situation, her emphasis on 
the significance of the periphery as an advantageous place to gain better sight of literary 
power relations—evoking the critical potentials of peripheral perspectives created in the 
uneven process of modernity—particularly invigorated them.  
The irremediable and violent discontinuity between the metropolitan 
literary world and its suburban outskirts is perceptible only to writers on 
the periphery, who, having to struggle in very tangible ways in order 
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simply to find “the gateway to the present” (as Octavio Paz put it), and 
then to gain admission to its central precincts, are more clearsighted than 
others about the nature and the form of the literary balance of power.  
(Casanova 43)  
It did not take long, however, for her seemingly liberating prioritization of literary space 
to alienate Korean critics and audiences. Despite declaring, in the preface of the book, the 
imprudence of the attempt to “geographically enlarge the corpus of works . . . to provide 
an impossibly exhaustive enumeration of the whole of world literary production,” and 
demanding instead that critics “change our ordinary way of looking at literary 
production” (xi), they doubted that her project could be radical enough to reframe world 
literature. Even as she resisted Eurocentric approaches to geographic relations, she 
maintained some Eurocentrism in her understanding of aesthetic form. Ji-kwan Yoon in 
his article “Does World Literature Have a Foreign Office?” (2011), with a title identical 
to Fredric Jameson’s keynote speech at 2008 Holberg Prize Symposium and written 
under its influence, clarifies the (semi-)peripheral discomfort about the work of Moretti 
and Casanova:  
It becomes clear from his [Moretti’s] almost arbitrary list of the “Modern 
Epic” constructed around the great western works of literature that his 
reading of the history of literature is still caught up within the literary 
influence of the Western canon. His focus lies in how the contradictions of 
modernity engendered the explosion of modernism and how it was 
reflective of the stubbornness of the world-system. And he is rather blind 
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to the phenomenon that the encounter between the modern forms and the 
concrete realities of the Third-World has made remarkably creative 
achievements not just through modernism but through a renewal of 
realism in the periphery of the world-system. (50-51, my translation) 
The literary revolution that Casanova speaks of, however, is against the 
grain of the peripheral awareness of the problematics of Third World 
literature. . . . If the Third World perspective suggests an understanding of 
the world as a whole without alienating a national viewpoint, Casanova’s 
peripheral perspective lacks a recognition of the peripheral source of 
change, including the concrete realities of the periphery and actual 
movements to alter the realities. Rather, what constitutes the core of 
Casanova’s innovation is to expunge its political origin. One can almost 
say that it is modernism that Casanova has set as twentieth-century 
literature’s Greenwich meridian. (52, my translation, emphasis added)  
Taking the example of Sang-Seop Yom’s Three Generations (1931) and its achievements 
in realism, enabled by the complex situation of the feudalistic and colonial system’s 
encounter with the modern world, Yoon argues that it is not just narrowly defined 
modernism, but the resourceful heritage of realism that has been renewed through its 
restless confrontation with modernity and that has inspired and enriched the peripheral 
literary space (53). The relative marginalization of realism not just in the Western 
academy but also in the field of world literature is a significant issue, Yoon implies, 
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which has tended to alienate the kinds of literature shaped by realistic forms and visions 
specific to the national particularity of its origin. 
Korean aesthetics’ historically incessant indulgence in the potential of realism in 
literature and cinema, in this sense, is a double-edged sword; while it hinders Korean 
literature and cinema from gaining admission to the international art world, it secures a 
sort of aesthetic particularity specific to the region, which might add radically dissimilar 
insight to the discourse of, in Yoon’s words, “how to innovate the existing unimodal 
structure of world literature” (58, my translation). If the country tried to overcome the 
aesthetic distance from the core by choosing to pursue its desire to be recognized and 
prove the peripheral ability to catch up with the sophisticated western aesthetics, the 
promotion of the semi-peripheral realism might not be effective as it lacks dramatic or 
spectacular scenes to exhibit, shown in other Third-World literature or cinema, like 
Iranian realist films; that is, Korean aesthetic is not Third-wordly enough for the western 
audience. The recent revival of realism in Korean literature, cinema, and even TV series 
seems to attest to the high level of fatigue that Koreans have felt in the struggle for 
recognition. Despite the fruitful achievements that the western modernist aesthetic has 
brought out to the realms of the Korean academy and popular art with its revolutionary 
advancement in the expression of the fundamental human alienation in modernity—
which is best exemplified in the work of Yi Sang (1910-1937), The Wings (Nalgae, 
1936), in particular—the unhealthy, defeatist feeling of despair and “its deep-rooted 
anxiety and disbelief about life” (53) in Hong-soo Jung’s words, was something to 
overcome for Korean arts, since their task had been historically inseparable from the 
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long-term, grand political project for human freedom. The emergence of neo-realism in 
Korean art and its attendant discourses should be thought of, in this respect, as a result of 
the critical reflection upon the idea of the universality of modernism and its alleged 
potentials, and people’s shared understanding that historically dissimilar experiences of 
the periphery necessitate a different kind of politico-aesthetics than the imported form of 
modernism. In this sense, Roberto Schwarz’s description of “half-baked” (65) 
literature—in “The Importing of the Novel to Brazil and its Contradictions in the Work of 
Alencar,” he argues that western influence on 19th-century Brazilian literature 
contradicted the actual reality of Brazil—applies to the current situation of South Korean 
art as well. The liberating ideas imbued by western modernism, say, the unrestricted 
liberation of individual subjectivity, and a further possibility of the subjective energies to 
construct a radical (non-)community as an alternative to the so-called repressive power of 
the nation-state have temporarily veiled the scars left by the historically unresolved 
contradictions of South Korean social reality. But the festering wounds that have come to 
the fore in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century as the forms of regressive 
democracy and deteriorating social equality seem to have led to the South Korean 
people’s realization of the need for arts of their own: that is, new forms of art that 
unambiguously communicate the social realities in a country where up to 40 of its people 
choose to take their own lives every day.25  
It is significant that realism has been resummoned in this context as Korean artists 
have decided to choose the already familiar but not obsolete tactics of realism and 
                                                 
25 South Korea has had the highest suicide rates in the industrialized world for the past eleven years, and the 
second highest in the whole world behind Guyana.  
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resharpen its criticality. Realism has always been an aesthetic mode for the breakthrough 
of historically important political crises in Korea—the colonization of the country by 
Japan (1910-1945), its division by Western powers into the opposed states of North and 
South Korea (1948), the Korean war that ravaged the peninsula (1950-1953), and the 
social oppression that persisted in the post-war era and the decades of military rule (1961-
1993). The recent revival of realism as an aesthetic form of crisis in the literary and 
cinematic scenes is exemplified by the reactivation of the reportage genre (Ji-a Jung and 
Nam-il Kim, among others), the poetic and novelistic neo-realism (Eun-young Jin, Joong-
il Kim, and Hong-kyu Son), and the filmic eruptions of the attempts to unseal the pains of 
the violent past, still ruling over the present moment, and visualize the weight of 
historical truth (Chang-dong Lee, Woo-seok Yang, and Ji-young Boo). In the “shadow of 
almost disabled historical consciousness,” in Jong-won Song’s words, these witnesses to 
the South Korean reality are either voluntarily “walking into the place of both discomfort 
and trepidation only to be introduced to the place of collective subjectivity, transcending 
the ‘I’ in the fragmented world” or “spreading out the seed of history” onto the soil of art 
“to rethink the world” (Song 281). The astonishing popularity of the TV series, Misaeng 
(Incomplete Life, 2014) and the widespread social impacts of Songkot (Awl, 2015) evince 
the people’s strengthened desire to “understand” the world beyond its unknowability. In a 
rather serious manner for television dramas, both reexamine the cruel workings of the 
current economic system from which no one is supposed to benefit but a handful of 
capitalists. In a recent interview entitled “Writers’ Encounter with Reality,” by the 
Changbi Publishers on the return of the real in the aesthetic scene of South Korea, Ji-a 
   107 
 
Jung, a Korean neo-realist writer, pointed out the changed role of the Korean general 
public as the most distinguished difference in this newly emerging realism from the 
1970s-1980s realist movement (286); if the Korean intelligentsia, as the spearhead of the 
movement, led Minjung (literally “the subjects of history,” but are oppressed and 
exploited) to realize the brutal truth hidden behind the dictatorial government’s reality-
distortion (whose sometimes propagandistic practices dissociated them from their own 
literary tasks), the current neo-realism has emerged by the voluntary demands of people 
hungering for arts that touch on the sufferings of their hard times. That is, a request for 
art as a witness to their pains has driven the neo-realist movement towards a different 
kind of politico-aesthetics that does not fundamentally dismiss the artistic achievements 
of modernist innovation but overcomes the general lack of perspective in it. 
The emergent Korean neo-realism is mediated by the consciousness that an ethics 
which is not based on our fierce struggle to encounter reality ultimately leads to the self-
sufficient, fugitive feeling of individual freedom; it does situate one in a disagreeable 
position letting us face the agony of others, but the ironically pleasant feeling of 
alienation in a dismal world, enjoyed more often than not by a small number of cultural 
elites in the country, does not always amount to the realization that it is necessary or 
possible to break through the reactionary state; it almost gives one a feeling that it is fine 
and even beautiful to withdraw into the state of alienation, and into meaninglessness, 
nothingness, and impotence, which is rooted in the ongoing national unconsciousness of 
the unalterable reality. Korean neo-realism is vigilant against this kind of cynical 
narcissism; the world that the neo-realist attempts to picture is utterly painful to watch, 
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not because fictional characters in the world have such horrendous lives dissimilar to ours 
but because of the very affinity of their world with our own. The alienation that the 
audience feels in the work is unbearably hurtful and they ultimately find “alienation” 
itself a dolorous state from which they want to escape. The South Korean neo-realists, in 
this sense, seem to push their aesthetics forward against the Kantian concept of 
transcendental beauty; rather, they renew Godard’s insight that the beautiful comes out of 
the truthful, trying to show how beauty becomes real only when its form is revealed as 
“innate development of the concrete content itself” (Hegel 35), and how it requires a 
series of labors that engage us in the dynamic encounter with existing things, the painful 
analysis of the things, and the ultimate negation of our thinking of the things to obtain 
what we might call the reality of the truth.  
 
IV.2. South Korean Neo-Realist Cinema and Chang-Dong Lee’s Poetry  
One of the aesthetic attempts that exemplifies the aforementioned characteristics 
of Korean neo-realism is Chang-dong Lee’s film, Poetry (2010). Beginning his career as 
a realist novelist, Lee took a detour as a director in 1997 with his first film Green Fish 
and kept refining a cinematic realism of his own through various filmic experimentations 
in Peppermint Candy (1999), Oasis (2002), and Secret Sunshine (2007). His fidelity to 
the aesthetic and ethical potential of realism has been unswerving even when the 
directors of the so-called Post Korean New Wave in the mid-1990s, including Chan-
wook Park, Ki-duk Kim, and Sang-soo Hong, were successfully introduced to the 
international art world, due in part to their films’ cosmopolitan vision, formed by their 
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education in the most globalized cities—Paris for Kim, San Francisco and Chicago for 
Hong. While the internationally acclaimed master directors replaced the traditionally held 
Korean ethic that “the most Korean is the most international” with “the most international 
is the most international,” Lee’s relative aloofness from the tumultuous debates on how to 
make Korean film internationally more recognizable and his intense focus on incessant 
sophistication of his realist practice instead led to the most evolved form of Korean 
realism in Poetry.  
If he, in the genre of noir, tries to show the history of Korean urban modernity to 
tackle the issue of alienation itself in Green Fish and depicts social neglect and 
discrimination through the appropriation of traditional melodrama in Oasis,26 Lee seems 
to free himself from the frame of any cinematic genre in Poetry to concentrate on the 
inquiry into what art is. His digging into the issues of loss and forgiveness thematized in 
both Peppermint Candy and Secret Sunshine continues in Poetry as well, but this time 
Lee is hopeful enough to go beyond a desiring subject’s constant failure as in Peppermint 
Candy or the “unresolvable aporias about forgiveness” (Chow 111) as in Secret 
Sunshine.27 As always, Lee, as a storyteller, intervenes actively in the film to direct the 
experience of the audience according to the perspective that he has already set. He 
regards cinema as an aesthetic device through which the author, as an ethical subject, 
should impose the task of thinking upon the audience; “some audiences complain that my 
                                                 
26 See Chapter 6. “Virtual Trauma,” in Kyung-Hyun Kim’s Virtual Hallyu for a detailed discussion of Lee’s 
use of the uncanny in Oasis to emphasize its melodramatic effect.   
27 See Chapter 5. “I insist on the Christian dimension” in Rey Chow’s Entanglements for a discussion of 
how Lee thematizes aporias about forgiveness in Secret Sunshine by stripping forgiveness “of its 
supposedly absolute status and finality . . . and (re)inserting forgiveness in the circuit of social exchange” 
(112). For an analysis of Peppermint Candy, especially regarding how its reverse chronology functions to 
challenge the idea of national identity, see Todd McGowan’s “Affirmation of the Lost Object: Peppermint 
Candy and the End of Progress” (2007).   
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films are so tightly knit together and intentional that there is no place for them to escape. 
I admit this is true, but I don’t think it’s something I should avoid. If a film is to capture 
an audience, then having no way of escape is a virtue” (qtd. in Young-jin Kim, 66). Lee’s 
exploration of the raison d’etre of art in the film unfolds around two motifs that are 
intricately intertwined: the main character Mi-ja’s alternative way to respond to the small 
town’s gang rape case, and her desire to write poetry. Mi-ja is taking care of her 
grandson, Jong-Wook, while her divorced daughter lives in a city nearby, and she now 
has to face the cruel fact that Wook is involved in the gang rape case. Poor, ill (she is 
diagnosed with early stage Alzheimer’s disease), and alienated from people due in part to 
her transcendent and somewhat weird attitude toward life, Mi-ja appears to have lost 
touch with reality in some ways and to dwell in her own world of beauty, but she is 
passionate enough about art to join a poetry class at a local community center and attend 
a weekly poetry reading too. While the parents of the boy perpetrators try to resolve the 
case by paying a settlement of 30 million won to the victim’s poor widowed mother, Mi-
ja chooses to give her ill-mannered grandson several chances to atone for his sin, but he 
keeps refusing to confront his crime. Her pursuit of a righteous way to mourn the death of 
the young girl coincides with her effort to complete the poetry class assignment to write 
one poem by the end of the month-long course.  
Throughout the film, Mi-ja struggles with her inability to write a poem despite her 
enormous sensibility, and the director unambiguously reveals that he is invested in 
portraying Mi-ja’s voyage to the moment when she is finally able to write a poem. In this 
sense, the film is almost a bildungsroman of a 66-year-old female, Mi-ja, who comes to 
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understand what it means to write poetry and, further, what art has to do with her weary 
life. Mi-ja’s initial belief that writing poetry is all about discovering “true beauty” is 
slightly but intentionally revised by a series of intrusive moments of her reality; or, her 
conceptualization of “true beauty” goes though some inevitable alterations as she realizes 
that completing her poetry assignment cannot be separated from her dealing with Wook’s 
rape case. In the scene in which she is summoned to meet with the parents of other boy 
perpetrators at a local restaurant for the first time, Mi-ja, though shocked by the briefing 
of the parents and ashamed of Wook’s involvement with the crime, leaves the room in the 
middle of their conversation to feel flowers in the yard of the restaurant, of cockscomb, in 
particular. To Ki-bum’s father, one of the parents in the meeting who comes out to bring 
her back into the room to discuss a settlement money for Hee-jin’s mother, Mi-ja says 
that the cockscomb flower symbolizes a “shield.” Shielded from the beauty of the flower 
“as red as blood,” Mi-ja steps back from the case to be immersed in her attempt to solve 
the enigma of “seeing well” that the instructor of her poetry class, Yong-tak Kim, 
emphasized as the most significant ability to have in order to able to write poetry:  
Instructor: Writing poetry. It’s about discovering true beauty in everything 
we see in front of us in our everyday life. True beauty, not things just 
looking beautiful. Every single one of you carries poetry in your heart. But 
you’ve imprisoned it, and it’s time to free your poetry. The poetry trapped 
inside you must be given wings to take flight.  
Mi-ja: When does poetic inspiration come? 
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Instructor: It doesn’t. You must go and beg for it. It is somewhere nearby, 
not far away.  
Wook’s involvement with the hideous crime becomes a catalyst for Mi-ja to move from 
seeing “things just looking beautiful” to “true beauty,” but at the first stage of avoidance, 
she tries to dodge facing the ugliness of her grandson’s crime as if “seeing” the case 
directly taints her endeavor to seek for the purest form of beauty. Her failed 
understanding of the instructor’s focus on “seeing” leads to several ludicrous moments 
when she takes the literal meaning of “seeing” from the instructor’s lesson that, “You 
haven’t seen an apple for real. To really know what an apple is, to be interested in it, to 
understand it, to converse with it, is really seeing it,” and peers at natural objects around 
her, sky, trees, and apples. She is still passively waiting for poetic inspiration to come 
visit her at this point, not “go[ing] and beg[ging] for it,” as the instructor advises. As if 
beauty could not be associated with human affairs, she clings to the aesthetic objects of 
the non-human, the glowing splendor of nature, and the red glamour of flowers. As her 
always overly chic outfit, which Ki-bum’s father finds too outlandish for the 
neighborhood, operates as a defense mechanism for her not to “see” her poverty, she 
hides herself behind the beauty of nature, a safe shield from the truth of her reality to 
which she is reluctant to step forward.  
Mi-ja is voluntarily trapped in her own fantasy, and is hesitant to get out of it until 
she becomes serious about writing poetry. Unable to prepare the settlement money of five 
million won on her part, she is urged by Ki-bum’s father to tell her divorced daughter, 
who lives alone in Busan for work, about both the case and Wook’s involvement with it. 
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Despite her confident remark that she and her daughter are “good friends,” and “talk 
about everything on the phone,” she cannot tell her daughter about Wook’s crime. She 
understands that fantasy keeps them safe from the pain of torturous life and seems to 
argue that it is one little thing that she deserves to have; it is too much to demand that she 
and her daughter face the brutality of the ugly truth. At this point, the need to recognize 
and face her reality becomes a matter of life and death.  
With passion for beauty and integrity at heart as her name symbolizes (Korean 
and Japanese language share logographic Chinese characters, and “Mi-ja” (美子) means a 
person of beauty)—she is a person with principles and ethics enough to quit her part-time 
maid job right way when the elderly stroke victim that she has cared for makes a 
desperate sexual request—Mi-ja cannot just close her eyes and ignore the voice of her 
conscience. And at the Catholic mass to mourn the death of Agnes (Hee-jin’s baptismal 
name), Mi-ja, who sneaked into the mass to join the condolence ceremony, experiences 
the macabre power of “seeing” and “being seen” for the first time when she is exposed to 
the accusing gaze of a few of Hee-jin’s friends. Unable to stand their truth-piercing gaze, 
Mi-ja hurriedly runs out of the place, taking with her a framed picture of Hee-jin put on 
the entrance of the church for the mass. When she decides to take her involvement with 
the tragedy seriously, there is no room for sympathy of the kind Mi-ja felt when she as a 
passerby saw Hee-jin’s mother crazy with grief at her daughter’s death in the first scene 
of the film. As Mi-ja slowly begins to accept the death of Hee-jin as something she is 
fully responsible for, her invitation to bring Hee-jin back into her life progresses, and the 
director carefully but willfully portrays how the process coincides with Mi-ja’s endeavor 
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to complete the assignment to write a poem. Mi-ja is still naïve at this moment and 
cannot recognize the link between the two, and thus approaches the two tasks separately. 
She starts to feel uncomfortable, however, with the parents group’s easy attempt to bury 
the case for the safe future of their sons, letting the existence of Hee-jin itself be forgotten 
forever. Mi-ja, rather, thinks the miserable death of Hee-jin deserves to have a meaning, 
and without knowing how, she tries to track the traces of Hee-jin when she was still alive. 
She visits the school Hee-jin attended, and peeks into the science lab where she heard that 
the boy perpetrators used to rape her. And a few days later, when she visits the bridge 
from which Hee-jin jumped, the audience witnesses Mi-ja step out of her passive stages 
of complete avoidance and then painful sadness due to her grandson’s involvement with 
the case, and enter the level of active mourning of the victim.  
Poetry, meanwhile, remains her place of escape from her guilty conscience, but 
the film is cruel to show that Mi-ja’s inability to write a poem is derived from the very 
ignorance of the relation between true beauty that she longs for and her wretched life, the 
gruesomeness of her reality. The way she realizes the link corresponds to the process in 
which Mi-ja’s conception of poetry is corrected by a series of intrusive moments of the 
real that disrupts her own fantasy world of beauty. To her absurd infatuation with the 
beauty of red camellias at the doctor’s room in a hospital in Seoul where she is diagnosed 
with early stage Alzheimer’s disease, the doctor, after explaining the future seriousness of 
her disease, responds by saying “those [flowers] are fake.” On the bridge that she visits to 
feel Hee-jin’s last day of life, Mi-ja’s hat is blown off by the wind, and she smiles, 
enjoying the momentary sense of freedom enabled by the nature that she loves. Within 
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seconds, however, she is brought back to reality by the flying hat slowly coming down to 
float on the river that Hee-jin jumped into, reminding the audience of the image of Hee-
jin’s corpse in the first scene of the film. Mi-ja wants to dwell in the moment of natural 
beauty and takes her notebook out of her purse to record her feelings, but the sudden 
shower hinders her from writing. The full camera shot with a close-up of the image of the 
raindrops on the notebook seems to convey the purest moment of the film, but before the 
audience can be taken up by the Kantian moment of disinterested beauty, the director 
taints its purity by evoking the image of Hee-jin’s tears that she might have shed on her 
last day. The enigmatic scene of the raindrops, unnecessarily long and beautiful at first 
sight, led some Korean film critics to argue that it reveals the moment of Lee’s inevitable 
fascination with the aesthetic disinterestedness of beauty despite his conscious faith in 
art’s inseparableness from life and its further responsibility to be engaged. Si-hwan Ahn, 
for instance, in “Aesthetic Desire and Moral Obligation in Chang-dong Lee’s Poetry” in 
Cine 21, discusses the rupture between the film’s moral content and its form’s occasional 
betrayal, taking the raindrop scene as the most vivid example of showing Lee’s 
unconscious attraction to the beauty of objects itself. His argument leads to the following 
conclusion:  
This rupture seems to have happened because Lee is a director, that is, a 
human being who, from the first, cannot help being attracted to the beauty 
of objects. By which I am arguing that Lee is unconsciously attracted to 
the disinterred beauty, and Lee’s attempt to turn his back towards the 
morality of art can be understood as his conscious act of resistance to his 
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unconscious desire. We don’t know how persistent it would be, but it is 
clear that he is fighting to death at least in Poetry. (my translation)  
Ahn’s argument disregards the core fact that no scene in Lee’s films is unintentional; as 
Lee himself is aware of the audience’s complaint that his films are “so tightly knit 
together and intentional,” he is notorious for allowing little room for contingency in his 
work. In a sense, one can almost say that Lee is close to a Lukácsian artist, since he 
organizes his films so that they consistently resist what Lukács calls in “The Ideology of 
Modernism” that “perpetually oscillating patterns of sense- and memory-data, their 
powerfully charged, but aimless and directionless, fields of force” that represents “the 
non-dialectical view of form and intention” (18). Lee is not shy about maintaining faith in 
the potential of what Lukács calls “perspective,” a sense of direction, without which art 
cannot formulate the question of totality and get to the core of reality. It is more plausible 
to see the scene of raindrops, in this regard, as one that symbolizes Mi-ja’s failure to 
write due to the intrusion of the brutal real, not as the moment of Lee’s transient 
intoxication with the transcendent beauty of nature; before she could even write a letter, 
the sudden raindrops resembling Hee-jin’s tears write poetry on Mi-ja’s white, canvas-
like notebook. The picturesque poetry written with the raindrops comes almost as an 
imperative that poetry can only be written, and should be written, with Hee-jin’s bloody 
tears; the association of the image of Hee-jin and the “red” color is everywhere in the 
film. It starts as Mi-ja’s color that she says symbolizes “pain,” and it soon becomes Hee-
jin’s as Mi-ja’s becoming Hee-jin gets clearer as the story progresses. It corresponds to 
the scene in the beginning of the film, in which the title “시” (poetry), handwritten by the 
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director himself, appears next to the corpse of the dead girl, as if trying to say “poetry 
should be lain right next to the dead” (my translation), as Myung-ho Lee rightly points 
out. The moment prompts Mi-ja to experience the tragedy of Hee-jin by becoming her, 
and Mi-ja, fully soaked in the shower, heads from the bridge to the place of the elderly 
man of whom she has taken care to accept his sexual demand. Her face does not show 
any hint of emotion during the act, as if Hee-jin’s face might have looked the same on 
one of the days when she was repetitively raped by the boys in the science lab.  
As Mi-ja’s own world of beauty is slowly violated by the interfering moments of 
the real, her understanding of poetry begins to be altered as well. She feels insulted by a 
member of the weekly poetry reading group, Sang-tae Park, who always follows his 
reading of beautiful poetry with cheesy sexual jokes, but hears from an amateur poet in 
the group that he is a policemen with a good heart who was recently assigned from Seoul 
for being a whistle-blower, who fought against injustice within the police force. Mi-ja, 
experiencing the gap between Park’s ugly form of language and his pure heart, realizes 
for the first time that “to love poetry,” which she has equated with “to seek the purest 
form of the beautiful,” has more meanings, and beauty is not a matter of securing a 
spotless form, forged out of Mi-ja’s life full of pollution. By making Park, a person of 
tough comportment, the only character with enough sympathy to notice the crying Mi-ja 
crouched at a secluded spot outside the poetry group’s after-party and then an important 
participant in Mi-ja’s accusation against Wook, the director insists on the co-existence of 
justice with beauty. It is significant that Park, who seems to be the most distant person 
from what poetry could ever signify, is one of the regulars in the weekly poetry reading. 
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When the ignorant Park consoles Mi-ja, who is crying alone after encountering Hee-jin’s 
mother, and asks her, “Why are you crying, big sister? Is something wrong? Is it because 
of poetry? Since you can’t write any?” his absurd question, unintentionally positing Mi-
ja’s inability to write poetry in parallel with her sense of guiltiness in the minds of the 
audience, affirms the very truth that Mi-ja has just realized. It is not until Mi-ja is forced 
by the other parents of the boys to meet Hee-jin’s mother to ask her to accept the 
settlement and to come across her working in the field that Mi-ja is finally awakened in 
the film to realize that only the dead Hee-jin can complete her poetry assignment. The 
framed photo of Hee-jin’s face together with red flowers—the object of Mi-ja’s life-time 
adoration—which she discovers at the empty house of Hee-jin’s mother, is seen in a full 
shot when the camera stops at it for a few seconds, as if saying her face with flowers 
deserves to meet our serious gaze. Koreans might find it disturbing to look at Hee-jin’s 
face that resembles the beauty of the red flowers due to its evocation of the title of Chi-
hwan Ahn’s Minjung-Gayo—revolutionary songs of Minjung, resounded during South 
Korea’s democracy movement in the 1980s and 1990s—“People are more beautiful than 
flowers.” Her moment of awakening occurs later, though, when Mi-ja, walking out to the 
field searching for Hee-jin’s mother, ends up raving about the beauty of the nature 
surrounding her—the weather, flowers, trees, and apricots—not realizing that the woman 
she is talking to is actually Hee-jin’s mother. The film is ambiguous about whether her 
forgetting about the task of meeting Hee-jin’s mother is due to the ongoing progress of 
her Alzheimer’s disease or just to her enchantment with the romantic feelings aroused 
while walking in the country and the excitement for the truth about apricots that she has 
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just discovered. When she jots down her poetic impression about the apricot fallen to the 
ground, “the apricot throws itself to the ground. It is crushed and trampled for its next 
life,” she is still in the world of oblivion, but is slowly driven down by the words of Hee-
jin’s mother, who is standing firmly with her feet on the ground:  
Mi-ja: Hello. Isn’t the weather nice?  
Hee-jin’s mom: Yes, the weather is being helpful. 
Mi-ja: This place is quite nice. The scenery is so beautiful. It makes me 
want to live here.  
Hee-jin’s mom: It’s not an easy place to live, though. 
Mi-ja: I found an apricot on my way here. Many have fallen to the ground. 
           I took a bite, and it tasted quite good.  
Hee-jin’s mom: Fallen apricots taste better. The ones still on trees are too 
tart to eat.  
Mi-ja: Yes, you’re right. It tasted good. When I saw the apricots on the 
ground, I thought they were full of yearning. Throwing themselves 
to the ground, being crushed and trampled on, they prepare for their 
next life. For the first time I realized this about apricots. There were 
also garden zinnias, growing near the apricot trees. And how pretty 
they fall to the ground. I felt so blessed to walk in such beauty. I 
love flowers so much, I get happy just to see them. Gazing flowers 
makes me feel full. So I don’t even need to eat.  
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Hee-jin’s mom: (smiling) You must like flowers ’cause you’re a pretty 
person.  
To Mi-ja, who falls into raptures over the scenery where she has just joined, Hee-jin’s 
mom says that the weather is “helpful,” and the seemingly peaceful country is actually 
not an “easy” place to live. To Mi-ja’s excitement at discovering tasty fallen apricots, she 
responds by providing practical knowledge about apricots out of her experience as a life-
time farmer that “fallen apricots taste better. The ones still on trees are too tart to eat,” 
she says, in a kind but nonchalant manner at the same time. Although the language of 
Hee-jin’s mom is simple and dry, when she speaks of “fallen apricots tast[ing] better,” 
one feels that the expression means much more than the mere fact about fallen apricots; 
Hee-jin’s mom does not mean it metaphorically, but one already begins to feel the poetic 
potential of the down-to-earth but truthful expression. She does not have time and energy 
to mean it metaphorically when the taste of crops and fruits is, for her, as a farmer, an 
issue of whether she would be able to survive another year. When she asserts the 
empirical truth based on what her robust and intense life has taught her, contrasted with 
Mi-ja’s affective romanticism, however, it invites us to figure out the various levels of 
mediation that the empirical truth of the apricots has gone through. It becomes a poet’s 
task now, Mi-ja’s responsibility that she has not yet realized, to disentangle the ways in 
which things at our sight get complicated as they have gone through the multiple levels of 
mediation, to discover the truth. Like the tasty fallen apricots, Mi-ja also needs to touch 
the human ground. Mi-ja is still at the surface level, however, and their conversation 
keeps hovering around a point that they feel they are discussing, while they talk about the 
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same topic, namely, the truth of the fallen apricot. But Mi-ja is soon driven by the 
language of Hee-jin’s mom to pull her down to earth from Mi-ja’s high world of 
transcendent beauty, and realize that she is too wrapped up in her own way of viewing 
the apricots. After a brief talk about the challenge of farming, Mi-ja says good bye to her 
but soon shudders at the thought that the woman was actually Hee-jin’s mother. She 
hurriedly escapes from the place, enthralled by the feelings of embarrassment and 
guiltiness.  
The crucial moment of her awkward encounter with Hee-jin’s mother serves as a 
catalyst for Mi-ja to realize the necessity to resist her desire to “drink a glass of oblivion,” 
like the lyrics of the song that she sang waiting for Ki-bum’s father at the karaoke that he 
owns. The hospital scene implies that Mi-ja, who is currently oblivious to nouns, will be 
close to death when she starts forgetting verbs, implying that her oblivion corresponds to 
her non-being. Likewise, her official meeting with Hee-jin’s mother prepared by the other 
parents of the boys to reach a settlement in one of the parents’ real estate office functions 
as a push to lead Mi-ja to move from the level of mere realization to the one of 
actualization. Mi-ja finds herself barely able to face the gaze of Hee-jin’s mother, full of 
dismay and resentment, when she discovers that the woman she had the light 
conversation with in the field was actually one of the family members involved. She 
hurriedly gets out of the meeting, but when the eyes of Mi-ja keep tracing the face of 
Hee-jin’s mom beyond the window of the real estate office, one senses that Mi-ja must 
change in order to be true to the description of Hee-jin’s mother of her as a “pretty” 
person, and thereby to be faithful to what her name means. In the ensuing scenes of the 
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film, it is implied that Mi-ja, at the last moment when the case is about to be closed with 
the other parents’ deal with Hee-jin’s mother along with the school and the press, 
officially accuses her grandson, exposing the crime of the boys to the world. She has 
already prepared five million won, the settlement money on her part to give Hee-jin’s 
mother as well, as if she realized that the parent of the victim deserved to have more than 
apologies and compassion; Mi-ja almost threatens the elderly man to give the money in 
return for her keeping the secret of their sexual encounter from his family. When the 
policeman who came along with Sang-tae Park takes Wook with him to his car while Mi-
ja tries to take the shuttlecock hung on the tree down to the ground to continue to play 
badminton with Wook, the audience finds the director’s portrayal of the crucial scene 
significantly composed.  
As if the event belonged to the ordinary, Mi-ja is not flappable about Wook’s 
leaving, and Park replaces Wook to continue the game. The possible dramatic effect that 
the scene might have brought out is restrained to the extreme as the director tries to lead 
the audience to concentrate on the power of the narrative, intensified by Mi-ja’s 
determined act of changing the course of how the incident is concluded. No background 
music is used throughout the film for the same reason; as seen in Lee’s confession in an 
interview with the film critic, Dong-jin Lee, “Chang-dong Lee’s Poetry: On Beauty,” that 
he thought the sound of the river that Hee-jin jumped into should suffice, and made a 
final decision to remove all the background music used in the film, he is vigilant against 
the superfluous arousal of emotion that might misdirect the audience from focusing 
directly on Mi-ja’s conscious act itself. 
   123 
 
It is significant that Mi-ja is only able to write a poem, “Agnes’s Song,” after she 
finally gets to understand that the two tasks, taking Hee-jin’s death as her own 
responsibility and completing the assignment for the poetry class, are inseparable. When 
the poet-instructor finds Mi-ja’s poem lain on his desk with a bouquet of flowers and 
responds to the other participants who did not complete the assignment, “It is not difficult 
to write a poem. It is difficult to have the heart to write one,” one realizes that Mi-ja, 
though gone, left her heart in the poem, letting the poem eternally materialize her mind. 
Her mourning is completed as “Agnes’s Song,” and when it begins to be read by the 
instructor to the class and then through Mi-ja’s voice, the camera that has now become 
Mi-ja’s eyes, records Mi-ja’s final day; from the trees and children playing in the 
neighborhood where Mi-ja used to enjoy watching, it moves to the bus stop, and to the 
ground of Hee-jin’s school. When the eyes and voice of Hee-jin take over from here and 
trace the science lab where she was raped, to the bus, and to the bridge where she ended 
her life, it is willfully ambiguous about whether what we witnesses is the last day of Hee-
jin’s life or Mi-ja’s. We realize soon, however, the question becomes unimportant, when 
we, ruminating over the difference between the poem as recited though the voice of Mi-ja 
and then that of Hee-jin, find ourselves dismayed by the only irrealistic moment of the 
film: Hee-jin approaches the tip of the bridge, turns around to see us, smiling. As if 
daring us to endure her smiling face, the director thrusts the disruptive moment into the 
film, with no anxiety about its possibility to dismantle the coherence of the genre. Rather, 
the power of the narrative of the film almost deprives us of the confidence to argue that it 
is unreal, as the seemingly heterogeneous scene of the film completes Lee’s realism; his 
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fidelity to the truth of reality requires him to resummon dead Hee-jin. It becomes clearer 
at this point that the real, for Lee, is not just what it looks like before us—it is not waiting 
for us to be mimicked—but something that must be sought for laboriously, and 
“discovered,” using Jameson’s word—it is already present there, but it is not present in 
its truthful sense until it is re-presented. That is, Lee’s practice of realism is close to an 
act of discovering the hidden real below the empirical surface; it is also a manifesto that 
the act does not require a heroic behavior, but starts with a good sense of the relation of 
the ordinary to the eventful, the individual to the collective, and the poetic to the political. 
Timothy Brennan, in his speech “Homiletic Realism,” has defined realism as “an act of 
recognizing one’s own being.” The cinematic realism of Poetry, then, shows how the act 
of recognizing one’s own being can be accomplished through its mediation by an act of 
recognizing the being of others as a requirement; only at the moment when Hee-jin is 
summoned in Mi-ja’s poetry can Mi-ja finally recognize herself and be truthful to the 
meaning of her name. It is the moment when her name, language, truly comprises her 
being—the moment when its content and form become finally identical.  
For Lee, cinema is an aesthetic medium through which the audience re-
experiences their ordinary lives, the space to which the truth belongs, as he elucidates in 
the interview “On Beauty”: “it is a story of everyone, not of a particular person with a 
particular background.” He makes clear that the seemingly unique conflicts that Mi-ja 
faces in the film are derived from the complicatedly intertwined social problems of 
Korean society, in general—the logic of capital that infiltrates the everyday lives of the 
people, the unequal benefit of the modernization of Korean cities and its resultant 
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alienation of suburban areas, and among others, dark pessimism that has slowly swamped 
the society in the meantime. Cautiously designed realistic references in the film might 
only serve the Korean audience—that the film is based on a true gang rape incident by 
reckless teenagers in a small town of the country; that the person who acts the instructor 
of the poetry class at the local community center, Yong-tak Kim, is actually a famous 
South Korean poet, Yong-taek Kim; that the unjust vice-president of Hee-jin’s school 
was performed by Moon-soon Choi, the governor of Gangwon Province from the 
Democratic Party; that the actress who leads the film, Jeong-hee Yun’s real first name, 
Mi-ja Son, is identical with the name of the character (although the director says that it 
was a total coincidence); and finally, the fact that Agnes’s song, written by the director 
himself, was included in a collection of essays dedicated to the deceased former president 
Moo-Hyun Roh, almost the only democratic president in the history of Korean politics 
cherished in the heart of people, widely loved across different economic and social 
classes for his humanistic political philosophy. These references, particular to Korean 
social reality, are fun to find, but the director aligns them throughout the film so that 
whether the audience could recognize them or not does not matter much (those are hard 
to catch even for Koreans, unless they are of careful mind) in approaching the ideas of 
the film; the way Poetry obtains universality is by showing how the particulars of the 
social reality of South Korea already participate in the constitution of the universal 
question about the relation between the beautiful and the ethical as an essential element, 
and the director cautiously designs the film in a way that the universal does not oppress 
the particular. To the question of “why do we keep trying to write poetry when it seems 
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to be impossible to write one anymore?” with its Adornian overtone of writing poetry 
after Auschwitz, Lee provides a simple answer in Poetry that beauty can finally mean 
something when things do not look beautiful any more (“On Beauty”). His sensitivity to 
the social reality of South Korea in Poetry leads the film in a way that assists us to 
discover the significance of the question of what art is, attesting to the peripheral form’s 
capability of communicating universal ideas without sacrificing the peripheral 
particularity.  
Poetry is not optimistic at all, but close to a tragedy. However, the film is hopeful, 
in Eagleton’s sense in Hope Without Optimism (2015): true hope is irrefutably tragic, but 
it has a radical implication for permanent revolution arising from the rigorous 
understanding of the condition of the present, while optimism is a form of nihilism, 
uninterested in a call for change. The film does not just posit Mi-ja’s absence in the final 
scene as a sort of sublime sacrifice of one ethical individual with a great cause against the 
moral corruption of the social community, as Ahn argues, among others, in the 
aforementioned review of the film. Based on Karatani Kojin’s distinction between moral 
participation and ethical intervention in Rinri 21 (倫理21 [Ethics 21], 2000), Ahn replays 
the incurable separation between individuality and community, and interprets Mi-ja’s 
deed as unimaginable if she has not transcended her community. When Ahn makes this 
argument, he is very much immersed in the corruption of the communities of the parents 
and school, and leaves the local poetry reading group unconsidered. The director is, of 
course, not naïve to suggest it as an ultimate alternative to the immoral community; the 
poetry community is similarly pathetic—the participants sometimes do not seem to know 
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what they are doing or reading, and their talks in many cases end up falling in unintended 
ambiguity. A young and rising poet who happens to join the after-party of the group 
shouts out in drunkenness that “it is a total bullshit to write poetry,” and Sang-tae Park is 
always busy making people laugh with his dirty jokes. In other words, the poetry 
community is not portrayed as ideal as we want—it would be unrealistic—but there is 
something heartwarming in their regular gatherings to read and learn poetry; in their own 
toughest moments of life, they have unstoppable enthusiasm for the truthfulness of poetry 
and do not stop meeting together to pursue it. It resembles a society of failures but it does 
influence Mi-ja to move forward. Sang-tae Park, whom she hated at first for his vulgarity, 
ends up becoming her comrade to help actualize her cautiously planned resistance to the 
parents’ burial of the crime. Community in Lee’s film is not treated like a homogeneous 
concept, as Ahn seems to think; individuals and communities actively affect each other, 
leaving his audience in the belief that the parents’ community will also change as a result 
of Mi-ja’s final action. Lee does not give up on the community for its repeated mistakes; 
there will be no messianic moment at which an ideally ethical community would emerge 
out of nothing. Poetry suggests that the moment can only be forged out of our collective, 
laborious work for change; it does not just appear, but should be made.   
Mi-ja’s death, in this sense, should be thought of not as an attempt to pay for Hee-
jin’s tragic death with her own life, but her conscious resistance to what prevents her 
from remembering, and thereby, stops her from coming back to reason. To Mi-ja, whose 
incipient Alzheimer disease accelerates her forgetfulness, staying still means the embrace 
of her oblivion. The only way not to forget, ironically, is to end her current life destined 
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to work toward oblivion. Mi-ja thereby decides to follow the lesson that she learned from 
the apricots discovered on her way to meeting Hee-jin’s mother; like the apricots 
“throwing themselves to the ground, being crushed and tramped on to prepare for their 
next life,” she decides to have her one and only poem, “Agnes’s Song,” take over the task 
of remembering in eternity. To Mi-ja, whose fatigue with the nothingness of being 
justifies her evasion into the beauty of nature out of her tedious human affairs, poetry 
gives her an order to resist the forgetfulness, and thereby resist the meaninglessness of 
life, as the director bluntly says in “On Beauty” that “all poetry is itself a resistance to 
meaninglessness.” Poetry suggests that the identification of Mi-ja and Hee-jin at the last 
moment of the film is beautiful since Mi-ja’s action has gained a meaning. Her journey to 
seek for true beauty finally means something when she moves out of her status of 
avoidance and actively begs for the truth about Hee-jin’s death, and at the end of the 
journey, she discovers the true beauty by being the beautiful herself. As the instructor of 
the poetry class has expressed, Mi-ja is able to “free” her poetry “trapped inside her” by 
giving it “wings to take flight.” When she actively asks Hee-jin to put the wings on her 
heart, Mi-ja finally becomes a poet. And the ethics of Lee’s realism ultimately gets 
substantial when the camera turns toward the place of viewers outside of the screen, in 
the final scene, from the place of Mi-ja’s absence, and asks us to embrace the place as 
ours, as if it were our place from the first, with an uncomfortable request to respond to 
Hee-jin’s final line: “And I hope to meet you, standing beside me.”  
Poetry is not just an idiosyncratic and lonely work of brilliance among Korean 
neo-realist cinema but resonates with a larger pattern in contemporary Korean film. As if 
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trying to understand the intolerable present thorough their journeys to the past, Korean 
directors have started revisiting the dark chapters of Korean history, including the 
Japanese colonial era (as in Assassination [2015], Dong-ju: The Portrait of a Poet 
[2016], Spirits’ Homecoming [2016], The Age of Shadows [2016], and Battleship Island 
[2017]), the Kwangju Massacre (as in A Taxi Driver [2017]), and the June Democratic 
Uprising (as in 1987 [2017]). At the same time, Poetry is also a harbinger of what has not 
yet been taken up but should have been. As Mi-ja has passed the moment of sympathy to 
the painful other, the director wants his audience to go beyond compassion, and witness 
the world of ours where a human act still means something. Lee, in another interview 
with Hye-ri Lee, “Repetition of the Persistent Storyteller, Chang-dong Lee,” affirms this: 
“Salvation needs to be sought for here, not because our reality is beautiful or meaningful, 
but because a reason for living might arise from the seemingly lacking and shabby 
reality. . . . As Jong-chan says in Secret Sunshine (Miryang), ‘here is the same as other 
places’” (my translation, emphasis added). If there is one premise for such a world, South 
Korean neo-realism suggests, it is that one should be fully prepared to progress from 
responsible thought to action. And through the cinematic figuration of this emerging 
ethical program’s shared tenet, Lee once again evokes the truth that it is still possible to 
change the course of an event to affect the world, and that it can occur in the present 
world, here and now, not in some heavenly world of our imagined utopia.  
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V. Deleuze, Affect Theory, and the Future of Realism 
 
Rethinking realism after Roland Barthes’ “The Death of the Author” (1967) 
requires a special kind of labor—allegedly, the anachronistic task of recuperating 
representation as a concept meaningful and even “possible.” Noticing the new literary 
practices of modernist masters such as Mallarmé, Valéry and Proust, Barthes made a 
declarative argument in his essay that a text “could have no other origin than language 
itself,” thus turning the autonomy of the art object into the autonomy of the text and 
extending aesthetic autonomy to all of language (146). His idea that searching for an 
ultimate, single meaning in a text means to impose a limit on that text has provided an 
exemplary discussion of the proliferating poststructuralist tenet of the arbitrary nature of 
the sign. And at least in the literary field, it has now become almost commonsensical to 
discuss the indeterminacy of meaning and interpretation and, further, the ultimate 
impossibility of language itself, beyond just “the death of the author.”   
A central line of modernist thought born out of this sort of suspicion about 
linguistic transparency and the possibility of meaning has revolved around a possibility to 
ponder an alternative way of capturing modern reality, which seemed to require more 
vivid and immediate expression. And one notices that what is taking the place of 
meaning, instead, is affect—a privileged alternative to overcome representation and 
mediate art and reality in a more direct way (although, technically speaking, it is not even 
a mediation at all, but functions more like presentation). The affective turn has been 
advocated by a series of theorists such as Patricia T. Clough, Brian Massumi, and Rei 
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Terada, whose thought heavily depends upon the liberating nature of affect, as well as the 
Marxist thinker, Fredric Jameson who has recently engaged with affect in The Antinomies 
of Realism (2013), along with a tremendous number of research papers utilizing the 
theories of affect in the academy today. These trends towards affect demonstrate that, 
with an increasing need to establish a more immediate relation between the subject’s 
lived experience and its meaning in our modern world, affect at least has been affirmed as 
an important and influential concept to explore.  
Affect theories open thought to the distinctively non-linguistic, anti-essentialist, 
impersonal, and “contingent” traits that inhere in bodily feelings prior to cognition, 
beyond “the sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an experience which is from that point 
onward defined as personal” (Gregg and Seigworth 28). Distinguished from emotions, 
which still operate within interpretive systems, affects are considered truly autonomous in 
their capacity to be freed from conscious perception and language, and radically social 
for their relational—but non-mediational—nature.28 Indeed, affect’s revolutionary forces 
derive from its fundamental “in-between-ness” (Gregg and Seigworth 1), a body’s 
capacity to affect and to be affected without relying on a pre-established cognitive order, 
and its indeterminacy opens up a truly new and liberating relationship between the 
feeling subject and the world. In this sense, affects go beyond aesthetico-philosophical 
immanence; they engage the social and political field with a (non-)mission to create a 
new “life.” Certain issues arise, however, when affect theory claims political efficacy. 
Specifically, what I want to explore in this chapter is how the current idea of affect is 
                                                 
28 See, in particular, Rei Terada, Feeling in Theory: Emotion after the Death of the Subject (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2003), 110.  
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based on a monolithic conception of representation and meaning that leads to a certain 
degree of self-contradiction in its promotion as a political theory; For affect theory’s 
potential can only be achieved on the premise of either a voluntary abandonment of the 
supposedly regulative category of agency or of a partial salvation of the already dead 
subject only by reviving “the subject of sensation.”  
Affect, Deleuze and the Problem of Representation 
If there is a converging point upon which seemingly diverse and sometimes 
disparate (though not fundamentally) perspectives on affect can meet, it would be 
undoubtedly the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. Along with Spinoza and Bergson, 
Deleuze’s aesthetic and political philosophy provides a theoretical buttress for many 
affect theorists to formalize a unique quality of affect—namely, affect as potential. In 
many cases, it is not even possible to understand the qualities of affect as they are 
generally expressed in so-called Deleuzian terms that were created or reinvigorated in 
Deleuze’s philosophy—potentiality,  intensity, the molecular, affect, the in-compossible, 
the imperceptible, the rhizome, transcendental immanence, and so on. Deleuze is 
definitely not the first philosopher who discovered the aesthetic and political powers of 
affect in the history of philosophy, but he is notably the very one that strengthened the 
current theoretical movement of the turn to affect, with his unique analysis and 
appropriation of the Spinozan notion of adfectus—which actually means a condition or 
disposition of the “mind”—and his great investment in modernist aesthetics that affect 
theorists tend to privilege. 
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This sort of close philosophical and aesthetic alliance between Deleuze and affect 
theory or affect theory’s repetition and re-appropriation of Deleuzian philosophy makes it 
necessary to investigate Deleuze’s theory of potentiality in examining the political force 
of affect. As is well-known, Deleuze is a philosopher of dualities, i.e. rhizome/tree, 
nomadic/sedentary, deterritorial/territorial—and I suggest we include another set of 
parings to his list: that is, affect/representation, or body/language; actually, if there is one 
set of binary opposition which keeps operating throughout the whole philosophy of 
Deleuze, it would be the dualistic set of the unrepresentable versus the representable. And 
it is not oversimplifying to say that a significant part of the Deleuzian project is to 
illuminate the oppressive nature of representation, which is maintained, in general, 
throughout his whole theory and instead look for ways to find what he calls a new “life” 
as representation can never get us to go beyond what has been already created; the central 
aim of Deleuze’s philosophical masterpiece Difference and Repetition (1968) is, 
arguably, to explain the genesis of representation. Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
(1981) and Essays Critical and Clinical (1993) integrate his aesthetic and literary theory 
respectively, and can be considered an extension of his aesthetico-political project of 
what he calls the “creation of new life.”   
A strict investigation into these works of Deleuze reveals that there is a tenet of 
what Todd Cronan calls “more like an object, less like a sign” (20) working in Deleuze’s 
dualism of representation and so-called “life.” In Against Affective Formalism: Matisse, 
Bergson, and Modernism, Cronan tracks the modernist origin of affect theory and shows 
how a dominant mode of postmodern theory, including some strains of the currently 
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popular posthumanist theory, is derived from “a set of failed modernist beliefs” (4). 
Notably, Deleuze himself reveals in the beginning of Francis Bacon: The Logic of 
Sensation his commitment to Valéry’s inspiration that “literature is the art of playing the 
soul of others” (32) which led him to argue that great works of art can create unmediated 
affective experiences that directly act on the nerves of the receiver. Part of what this 
statement implies is a continuously and strangely held belief against human 
consciousness. Despite some of affect theorists’ recognition that affect and cognition are 
never fully separable (Gregg and Seigworth), and Jameson’s innocent belief that “the 
literary representation of affect . . . has as its function to replace the opposition of mind 
and body” (Antinomies 73) there is an ongoing contradiction to affect theory’s defense of 
the unity of the inevitably interrelated mind and body and simultaneous expulsion of the 
mind. As Danielle Follet rightly points out in her review of Jameson’s engagement with 
affect theory in The Antinomies of Realism, the dualism ultimately returns to the body, as 
is shown in Patricia Clough and Brain Massumi’s banishment of consciousness below for 
its constraining, and “limitative” nature.29  
Consciousness is “subtractive” because it reduces a complexity. It is 
“limitative,” a derived function in a virtual field where any actualization 
becomes, at that same moment of actualization, the limit of that field, 
which otherwise has no pre-given empirical limit. Affect and 
                                                 
29 See Danielle Follet, “Is the Cheese Meaningless? The Distension of Dialectics in Jameson’s The 
Antinomies of Realism,” review of The Antinomies of Realism, by Fredric Jameson, Nonsite.org, March 14, 
2014, http://nonsite.org/the-tank/jamesons-the-antinomies-of-realism.  
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consciousness are in a virtual-actual circuit, which defines affect as 
potential and emergent. (Clough 209)  
Clough’s quote above, written for the purpose of providing a clearer understanding of 
Massumi’s characterization of consciousness as “subtractive” and inhibitive, actually 
joins with Pierre Klossowski’s opposition between what he calls “the wakefulness of 
consciousness,” and the “corporealizing thought” (31) of the body in Nietzsche and the 
Vicious Circle (1998) that Deleuze actually relies on. Here, Klossowski describes the 
body as a field with “fluctuations with intensities,” of which we are rarely conscious 
since everyday language “never allows us to speak of our unintelligible depth except by 
ascribing to what is neither thought, nor said, nor willed a meaning and an aim that we 
think according to language” (252).  
Deleuze’s consistent hatred of representation, dialectics, and his opposition to 
thought almost represents the current academic trends that help to perpetuate the idea that 
representation per se is “lifeless and senseless” (Bacon 146). Although Deleuze tries to 
distinguish “living usage” of representation from “dead” usage of it in The Logic of 
Sense, pointing out that the former is tied to the conditions of its emergence, he seems to 
allow no room for representation to be thought otherwise—hence the emphasis on the 
wise “use” of representation, which can only make it legitimate (146). As Barthes refers 
to the writer’s hands as the cause of the text, Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of language 
refers to the bodies as the cause of language, thereby proclaiming that the text emerges 
from the body and not mind. How does the affective body become the political subject of 
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resistance in Deleuze, then? To answer this question, one needs to delve into Deleuze’s 
aesthetic take on Francis Bacon, first of all.   
The Precarious Logic of Pure Affect and Secular Self 
In Francis Bacon, Deleuze tries to delineate sensation within the broader question 
of the relationship between art and reality, which keeps appearing as one of his main 
concerns until he gets to provide an answer in What is Philosophy? (1991). His 
conclusion may be worth looking at first, as it is foregrounded in his earlier works as 
well: “Art preserves, and it is the only thing in the world that is preserved” (167). If art 
holds a special place in Deleuze, it is probably relevant to this statement that art preserves 
and is preserved. A lot of questions arise, but first of all, what does art preserve? A few 
pages ahead, he bluntly answers:  
If art preserves it does not do so like industry, by adding a substance to 
make the thing last. The thing became independent of its “model” from the 
start, but it is also independent of other possible personae who are 
themselves artists-things, personae of painting breathing this air of 
painting. And it is no less independent of the viewer or hearer, who only 
experiences it after, if they have the strength for it. What about the 
creator? It is independent of the creator through the self-positing of the 
created, which is preserved in itself. What is preserved—the thing or the 
work of art—is a bloc of sensations. (163-64) 
Here, he states very clearly that the aim of art is to extract a bloc of sensations, “a pure 
being of sensations” (167) independent of the creator or the viewer, who is a perceiving 
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subject before or after the work of art is created. For Deleuze, “the work of art is a being 
of sensation and nothing else”; “it exits itself,” and it must “stand up on its own” (164).  
Deleuze repeats his main idea that the very autonomy imposed upon art is most 
functional. Regarding painting, in particular, Deleuze attempts to explain the nature of 
this “bloc of sensations,” and how it “acts” in Francis Bacon, in terms of its relation to 
force and figure, two of the most important concepts in his art theory. In short, force is a 
condition of the possibility of sensation, he explains, and the biggest challenge for good 
painters is not to reproduce or invent forms, but to capture the invisible forces that are not 
themselves visible. Impressionists well responded to this issue, Deleuze says, as shown in 
Millet’s attempt to paint “weight common to the two objects not the offertory or the sack 
of potatoes,” Cézanne’s effort to render “the folding forces of mountains, the germinative 
force of a seed, the thermic force of a landscape,” and Van Gogh’s creation of unknown 
forces, “unheard-of forces of a sunflower seed” (49). But among those “force painters,” 
the one whom Deleuze is most attracted to is obviously Francis Bacon, who tries not to 
paint the visible horrors of the world before which one screams, but the intensive forces 
that produce the scream. “It’s a very close and difficult thing to know why some paint 
comes across directly onto the nervous system and other paint tells you the story in a long 
diatribe through the brain” (qtd. in Sylvester 18). “I wanted to paint the scream more than 
the horror” (48) said Bacon in an interview with David Sylvester, declaring that he is 
cerebrally pessimistic, but nervously optimistic. That is, Deleuze finds in Bacon’s 
paintings his strong aspiration for the “violence” of pure sensation.   
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Pure sensation is violent as it interrupts the already given clichés on a white 
canvas. Deleuze thinks that painters are already bombarded with all kinds of the 
figurative givens or “clichés” on the canvas before they even begin to work, so the real 
issue for good painters is to remove all the clichés for something totally new—“chaos” in 
Klee’s word, or a “catastrophe,” in Cezanne’s word—to emerge on it. In Cinema 1: 
Movement Image, Deleuze defines clichés as anonymous and floating images “which 
circulate in the external world, but which also penetrate each of us and constitute our 
internal world, so that everyone possesses only psychic clichés by which we think and 
feel, are thought and felt, being ourselves one cliché among the others in the world that 
surrounds us” (208-209). To put it another way, it is exactly what hinders the production 
of something new, what frustrates the capture of the non-visible forces, something that 
obviously should be eliminated for art’s great mission of “creation.” And Deleuze goes 
on to identify the cliché’s limitative and restrictive power as the very violence of the 
represented: “The former [the violence of pure sensation] is inseparable from its direct 
action on the nervous system, the levels through which it passes, the domains it traverses: 
being itself a Figure, it must have nothing of the nature of a represented object” (Bacon 
34-35).  
Modern painters are said to have sympathized with this great mission of art, and 
to escape the clichés of figuration and narration and reach the direct sensation, according 
to Deleuze, they usually took two general routes: abstraction and abstract expressionism. 
But neither of these is satisfactory for Deleuze. In case of abstract painting like that of 
Mondrian or Kandinsky, instead of rejecting classical figuration, it relies too much on a 
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symbolic code by trying to draw abstract forms. On the other hand, at the opposite 
extreme of abstraction, abstract expressionism, like that of Pollock, it depends too much 
on chaos by dissolving all forms in a fluid and chaotic texture of manual lines and colors, 
and “this time the abyss or chaos is deployed to the maximum” (85).  
Deleuze’s admiration for Bacon derives from the fact that he is not involved in 
either of the two preceding paths. Bacon is not attracted to the abstract painting’s way of 
liberating the form in an optical code; because it is abstract, the code can easily become a 
simple symbolic coding of the figurative which Bacon thinks is inevitably cerebral and 
thus cannot act upon the nervous system directly. On the other hand, he is not drawn to 
abstract expressionism’s way of liberating matter in a manual chaos either. To be sure, 
sensation is achieved unlike the abstract painting this time, but it remains in an 
irrevocably confused state as the matter covers the whole painting without contour, 
making the sensation unable to be “clear” and “precise” (89). Bacon’s middle path is, 
then, simply put, to make use of the “figures.” The figure, which is different form 
“figuration” in that the latter refers to a form related to an object it is supposed to 
represent, could convey the violence of the sensation directly to our nervous system while 
making invisible forces visible, Bacon thought. 
Deleuze categorizes the invisible forces that Bacon detects and captures through 
the deformed figures into three different kinds of sensations—the vibration, resonance, 
and the forced moment—and explains they correspond to Bacon’s three distinctive uses 
of figures, respectively.30 The first one, “vibration” characterizes the simple sensation 
that one finds in his paintings of an isolated figure. In those paintings, the figure itself is 
                                                 
30 See Deleuze, Francis Bacon, 53, 60-61, and Deleuze and Guattari, What is Philosophy?, 168.  
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isolated by the round area, fighting against the figurative, illustrative and narrative, but 
through the medium of the same contour, it also has a correlation with the background. 
The second is the “resonance” in the paintings of a coupled figure. In this case, Bacon 
puts two bodies in a single painting which are rendered indiscernible, and lets the two 
figures confront each other, thus two sensations being made to embrace each other and 
resonate. The third one is what Deleuze calls, a “forced movement” which culminates in 
Bacon’s triptychs, in which the figures are set apart in separated panels. With the 
triptych, the separated figures achieve “an extraordinary amplitude in a forced movement 
that gives it an autonomy” (61), and the limits of sensation are broken. Now, sensation is 
no longer dependent on a figure itself as it is at the first level of an isolated figure, but the 
intensive rhythm of force itself becomes the figure of the triptych according to its own 
separated directions. And this constitutes a reason Deleuze gives a privileged position to 
the triptychs among Bacon’s works.   
What attracts our attention here is the fact that, in Bacon’s painting, what plays 
the role of the Figure is the human body, which, according to Deleuze, “functions as the 
material supports or framework that sustains a precise sensation” (xiii), without which the 
sensation would lack clarity and duration, and remain ephemeral. It is noteworthy that in 
clarifying this relation between sensation and the body of the figure, he illustrates the 
nature of sensation as being-in-the world in the phenomenologists’ term.  
At one and the same time I become in the sensation and something 
happens through the sensation, one through the other, one in the other. 
And at the limit, it is the same body that, being both subject and object, 
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gives and receives the sensation. As a spectator, I experience the sensation 
only by entering the painting, by reaching the unity of the sensing and the 
sensed. This was Cezanne’s lesson against the impressionists: sensation is 
not in the “free” or “disembodied play of light and color (like the 
impressionists think); on the contrary, it is in the body, even the body of 
an apple. Color is in the body, sensation is in the body, and not in the air. 
Sensation is what is painted. What is painted on the canvas is the body, not 
insofar as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as 
sustaining this sensation. (31-31)  
The body or the body of the figure is the material support for sustaining and preserving 
sensation in Bacon’s paintings, and this rhetoric oftentimes serves as a clue for affect 
theorists to argue how affect is integral to a body’s perpetual becoming, constituting 
proof of a body’s immersion or resistance in the world—according to them, it refuses as 
much as it invites.31  
What is this body, then? And how does the body’s immersion in the world itself 
constitutes resistance in the world? Deleuze argues that what he means by this “body” is 
always more than just the phenomenological body “which merely invokes the lived 
body” (Bacon 39). Instead, he is indicating “a more profound and almost unlivable 
Power,” namely, the famous “body without organs,” which Artaud discovered at the limit 
of the lived body beyond the organism (“The body is the body / it stands alone / it has no 
need of organs / the body is never an organism / organisms are the enemies of bodies” 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Seigworth and Gregg, “The Inventory of Shimmers,” 1.  
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[39]). As is well known by affect theorists and currently popular so-called posthumanists, 
the body without organs is said to be completely living, and yet not organic. Rather, it is 
an intense and intensive body, which doesn’t have organs but thresholds or levels. Or it 
doesn’t lack organs but it simply lacks the organism, the particular organization of 
organs, which is why Deleuze argues that it is defined not solely by the absence of 
organs, but by the existence of an indeterminate organ, or “the temporary and provisional 
presence of determinate organs” (42). Deleuze finds an exemplary figure in Bacon’s 
painting—the body without organs which is nothing other than “flesh and nerve”:  
Bacon and Artaud meet on many points: the Figure is the body without 
organs (dismantle the organism in favor of the body, the face in favor of 
the head); the body without organs is flesh and nerve; a wave flows 
through it and traces levels upon it; a sensation is produced when the wave 
encounters the Forces acting on the body, an “affective athleticism,” a 
scream-breath. (40)32 
This “curious Fleshism” reappears in What Is Philosophy? when he makes clear that it is 
the flesh that is “freed from the lived body, the perceived world and the intentionality of 
one toward the other,” giving us “the being of sensation” (178). The flesh, or the figure is 
a sort of minimal material framework needed to support the sensational forces so that 
they don’t dissolve into chaotic abstraction, to meaningless fragments, but on the other 
hand, it also needs to be as feeble as possible so that the forces do not become 
                                                 
32 Deleuze says this is why Bacon’s figures are usually deformed. For Deleuze, it is also important to 
understand that they are not tortured bodies, but “ordinary bodies in ordinary situations of discomfort”—
“the most natural postures of a body that has been recognized by the simple force being exerted upon it” 
(50). 
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“territorialized,” to use his term. When sensation is linked to the body in this way, 
Deleuze argues that it “ceases to be representative and becomes real,” achieving the aim 
of art to “create the finite that restores the infinite” (Bacon 40; What Is Philosophy? 197). 
From this statement, it becomes clear that Deleuze’s conception of the real revolves 
around his attempted harmonization of the finite with the potential of the infinite in his 
so-called transcendental materialism. His logic of pure sensation, in this sense, 
exemplifies one of the ways he tries to take immanence and transcendence at the same 
time and un-dialectically mediate them (if we can call it mediation)—as I will show 
further below—which he believes can be productive in thinking the emergence of new 
forms of individual and collective life, where the feeling of subjects, demoted to the 
bodies, or the mere flesh, constitutes itself an act of resistance; affect acts without being 
involved in an actual action.  
Deleuzian Lyrical Dialectics? 
As is implied in his transcendental materialism, in his refusal to set up some kind 
of foundation outside immanence—hence his diction of “transcendental” not 
“transcendent”—and his desire to free from the restrictions of human experience by 
looking toward the future at the same time, Deleuze is a philosopher who believes in the 
power of “synthesis,” which explains why so many kinds of dualism proliferate in his 
theory. Deleuzian “synthesis,” however, does not operate in the same way as, for 
instance, the synthesis in Hegelian dialectics as is obvious from Deleuze’s own rejection 
of Hegelian “mediation.” Rather, in Deluze, repetition takes the place of “mediation,” 
which, for Deleuze, is too abstract and logical. Influenced by Gabriel Tarde’s idea that 
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“repetition is a more powerful and less tiring stylistic procedure than antithesis, and 
moreover better suited to renew a subject,” Deleuze focused on the possibility of giving 
rise to “a dialectic quite different to that of Hegel” (Difference and Repetition 308 [note 
15]). Joe Hughes, in his guidebook to Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition calls this kind 
of Deleuzian dialectic a “lyrical dialectic” borrowing Kierkegaard’s words. Hughes 
argues that the main difference of Deleuzian movement in his anti-Hegelian lyrical 
dialectic is that it is “asymmetrical,” and does not unfold by “negation” and 
“sublimation” (34). Deleuze’s own statement of what constitutes a real movement as 
opposed to the Hegelian “false movement” can be helpful to look at:  
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche are among those who bring to philosophy a 
new means of expression. Furthermore, in all their work, movement is at 
issue. Their objection to Hegel is that he does not go beyond false 
movement—in other words, the abstract logical movement of “mediation.” 
They want to put metaphysics in motion, in action. They want to make it 
act, and make it carry out immediate acts. It is not enough, therefore, for 
them to propose a new representation of movement; representation is 
already mediation. Rather, it is question of producing with the work a 
movement capable of affecting the mind outside of all representation; it is 
a question of making movement itself a work, without interposition; of 
substituting direct signs for mediate representations; of inventing 
vibrations, rotations, whirlings, gravitations, dances or leaps which 
directly touch the mind. (8, original emphasis) 
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In short, Deleuze’s complaint about the movement of the Hegelian dialectic comes from 
his belief that Hegel “represents” becoming, rather than creating it; mediation is a false 
movement as long as it is mediate, incapable of producing pure immediacy.   
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze theorizes the genesis of the object, a 
“thing” composed of a quality and an extensity, and defines representation as the object 
considered from the point of view of its two distinctive traits: quality and extensity, an 
individual object of perception belonging to the realm of appearance. Appearing things in 
Deleuze are embedded in a system of determinable indeterminacy, which can be also 
called “potentialities,” or “virtualities.” Here, Deleuze’s goal is, in a way, to bring us 
back to lower strata of consciousness, from consciousness of the object back to the Idea, 
and from the Idea to an evanescent materiality which is given to our sensibility. He 
makes clear that matter, idea, and representation—which he calls “primary order,” 
“secondary organization,” and “tertiary order” (239-49), respectively, in The Logic of 
Sense—are part of one and the same object, but he does not hide his regretful tone when 
dealing with the development of the three orders, as if the development meant the 
object’s being gradually tainted in its worldly surroundings. And his ongoing argument 
that the lower strata persists in representation eventually operates as an urge to grasp 
matter, or movement, regardless of everything that it will later become—determinate 
bodies, qualities, and actions, always returning back to the pre-individual object of 
abstraction.  
To create a new movement of representation is not enough since, in Deleuze, all 
representations are equated with already dead signs which lack potential to create 
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“newness,” not just the new, but something radically new and original. Deleuze assumes 
representation to constitute a natural step of the movement of what he calls “active 
synthesis,” which is directed toward the “real object,” the object as a synthesis of quality 
and quantity. Also, he emphasizes that any representation can be true and legitimate as 
long as it remembers the conditions of its emergence and keeps participating in the virtual 
life from which it is derived—when representations are not tied to their origin, on the 
other hand, they become clichés and lose their ability to transform. Even his affirmation 
of “living representations,” however, does not provide enough room for rethinking the 
possibility of representation per se—it is already a fixed and static entity as long as it 
remains representative—but rather, they are affirmed only to provide the represented with 
a capability to think back of its genesis, and to realize they are still governed by the 
virtual Idea. Representation can be meaningful only when it remembers its original purity 
at birth and when it keeps looking back with its impotence to create “newness” at its own 
level.  
The fact that representation connects the self with the world is maintained in 
Deleuze, but he does not seem to fully answer the question of how something meaningful 
can be created at the level of representation by being connected to the “originary” truth of 
the Idea that the “derived” truth of representation relates to. As some Deleuzians like Joe 
Hughes even admit—although he is trying to defend the missing explanation—it is not 
clear in Deleuze, at least in his major works including Difference and Repetition, how the 
movement from the virtual to the actual unfolds without having the ideal qualities 
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transformed;33 in other words, how does the Idea determine the movement of what 
Deleuze calls “actualization?”—which is a word taken directly from Hegel, by the way, 
however much Deleuze wishes to turn against it. This question is pivotal for one to be 
able to think about how the so-called virtual qualities of affect can meaningfully affect 
the actualized field of reality. The affect theorists’ common response is that, since affects 
are not intended consciously, one cannot guarantee the influence of affect generated; it 
holds infinite autonomy in its impact as well; as affect does not have a goal, they just 
assume that it can yield “an actualized next or new that is somehow better than ‘now’” 
due to its thoroughly immanent neutrality which “outplay[s] the paradigm of oppositions 
and negations by referring to “intense, strong, unprecedented states” that elude easy 
polarities and contradictions” (Gregg and Seigworth 10). That is, affect’s progressive 
accumulations of intensities, its incessant proceeding without taking a position is asserted 
as its main source of power to interrupt the flow of the field of reality, imposing an 
unbiased force of changibility upon reality.    
What is missing in this logic, however, is the explanation of how the potentiality 
of affect that is aroused will be kept and developed into an actual force for the better 
“now.” Since there is no room for agency in affect theory—as soon as the concept of 
agency is involved, affect loses the radical source of its potentiality—they cannot answer 
the question as to how to congeal the momentary contingency of affect into non-volatile 
force, meaningful enough to be able to act upon reality for the change. The future 
temporality of affect, affect theorists argue, makes it possible for the immanence of the 
future to act upon the present in advance “in a state of the fusion of the ideal with the 
                                                 
33 See Hughes, Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition, 176.  
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actual” (Massumi 66). Without an explanation of the specific modes of co-existence of 
the virtual and the actual—in what ways can the disparate mode of the actual still be 
governed by the Idea of the virtual?—however, the theory remains incomplete, with itself 
being just another postmodern account of the emergence of a sublime moment.  
The fact that affect theorists lack a valid explanation of “duration” can be thought 
of as, in a way, a natural consequence of their unjustifiable denunciation of consciousness 
as an agency of mere codification, causing the state of stasis to be fixed and 
representational; consciousness is always considered something to be “cancelled out” in 
their “asymmetrical” synthesis, rather than dialectically “negated”; if two terms are 
“asymmetrical” in the “lyric dialectic,” the weight of the tension between the terms that 
each term should suffer cannot be equal either. This is why Jameson’s designation of 
Deleuze as a new dialectical thinker cannot be considered valid.34 What Jameson misses 
is the fact that in Deleuze’s dualism, the tension between two terms works toward 
strengthening the validity of one term, which needs to be ultimately affirmed against 
another term. In this sense, Kevin Chua’s review of Jameson’s The Antinomies of 
Realism seems to be right that “Jameson mistakes the autonomy of affect for the 
autonomy of the Marxist dialectic.”35 Affect theory’s rigid recognition of consciousness 
as a teleological agency does not leave any possibility for consciousness to be rethought 
as a meaningful faculty to reflect upon the relation between what has been already 
                                                 
34 See the chapter “Deleuze and Dualism” in his Valences of the Dialectics (London ∙ New York: Verso, 
2009).  
35 See Kevin Chua, “Jamesonian Affect, or the Lower Depths,” review of The Antinomies of Realism, by 
Fredric Jameson, Nonsite.org, March 14, 2014, http://nonsite.org/the-tank/jamesons-the-antinomies-of-
realism.  
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produced and what needs to be produced, in order to create more effective ways for the 
self to engage in the world. And this is where the positive virtual nature of affect 
becomes its own limit due to its paradoxical loss of power when proceeding to conscious 
emotion; it needs to keep remaining virtual, as a transcendental category “capable of 
bringing narrative into non-narrative, subjects into pure abstract form,” borrowing Chua’s 
words, without ever being actualized.  
Against the Ontologization of Politics 
That affect cannot drive its potentiality toward the enduring power for actual 
changeability is not irrelevant to the fact that Deleuzian “becoming revolutionary” cannot 
seem to find a way to succeed in imagining revolution on a communal level. Deleuze’s 
own analysis of Melville’s short story “Bartleby, the Scrivener,” in Essays Critical and 
Clinical, in particular, shows this difficulty well. As one who recognizes the essential 
connection between pure events and the forms of their linguistic expression, what attracts 
Deleuze in this story is the strange effects of the words “I would prefer not to” repeated 
by Bartleby, a pallid and forlorn scrivener newly employed by an elderly lawyer on Wall 
Street. Deleuze takes notice of the effect of “agrammaticality” of these words, pointing 
out that the anaphoric character of the final “to” that ends the phrase makes this formula 
lose all its reference and mean nothing any more, allowing it to be the potentiality of 
enunciation itself. Bartleby’s formula, which is neither affirmative nor negative, and 
neither consent nor refusal, according to Deleuze, opens a zone of indiscernibility 
between yes and no, the preferable and the nonpreferable; it goes beyond the logic of 
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reason, being resistant to domestication by the already established order of the social 
system.  
Not only is Bartleby’s formula impossible to capture by the social codes of the so-
called symbolic order, his language is also contagious, Deleuze emphasizes. The queer 
phrase “I would prefer” “burgeons and proliferates” (70) in the story, and flows into the 
language of the clerks and the attorney as well; it contaminates the language of people 
around Bartleby little by little and drives them crazy. The clerks who are angry with 
Bartleby who prefers not to do what he has to do, murmur with Bartleby’s language when 
insisting that he should be driven out of the office. Also, the attorney, who played all his 
cards to remove Bartleby, ends up escaping himself from Bartleby by removing his 
office. As “a man without references,” Bartleby severs all his language from its reference 
and frustrates the attorney’s attempts to bring him back to the social order, remaining 
persistently a pure outsider behind the screen. Bartleby’s words are truly affective, in the 
Deleuzian sense, interrupting the pre-established order of things to generate a 
revolutionary rupture.  
Although Bartleby taps into revolutionary potential as the bearer of a minor and 
collective enunciation, Deleuze does not regard Bartleby’s act as successful enough. 
Curiously, he even finishes his essay by describing Bartleby as something of a failure. 
That is, if we can say that Bartleby’s revolution is just half done, or ended in failure in the 
lonely prison where he died, it is because he couldn’t go one step further: he failed to find 
his brothers and sisters, his comrades. Deleuze implies in Kafka: Toward A Minor 
Literature several times as well that the real bachelor machine is one that plugs itself into 
   151 
 
a social field with multiple connections in a world, but without paternal function. He 
definitely recognizes the insufficiency of becoming revolutionary on an individual level 
as shown in his argument that Bartleby should “find the place where he can take his 
walks” beyond the private screen and constitute “a society of brothers” (85) where 
“alliance replaces filiation and the blood pact replaces consanguinity” (84). As often 
shown in the attitudes of modernists, however, Deleuze’s fascination with Bartleby’s 
sublime sacrifice is too romantic, and he does not even seem regretful about Bartleby’s 
failure and death. He very much resembles Jameson, in this sense, who insists on an 
aesthetics of failure for his utopian project; death and failure as the heart of Being are the 
precondition for the imagination of utopia, and the experience of suffering and violence 
are elevated as if it were the only route to the “impossible” utopia in Jameson. 
Paul Patton has named Deleuze’s political project of constructing this kind of 
“community of celibates” (Critical and Clinical 84) as “immanent utopianism.” Deleuze 
makes sure, however, that revolution as utopia of immanence does not mean that it is just 
a dream, something that is not realized or that is only realized by betraying itself. Nor 
does he posit a well-established blueprint for an ideal future. Rather, he argues it is to see 
revolution as “infinite movement and absolute survey, but to the extent that these figures 
connect up with what is real here and now” (What Is Philosophy? 100) in the struggle 
against the present. Obviously, this means that the possibilities of revolution should be 
imagined in terms of the virtual, rather than the actual, so that they can encompass the 
conditions under which absolute deterritorialization is manifest in positive form. In the 
Deleuzian community of celibates, Deleuze dreams that the bachelor machine draws its 
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members into an unlimited becoming, where “a burning passion deeper than love traces a 
zone of indiscernibility in which it passes through all intensities in every direction” 
(Critical and Clinical 84). In fact, Deleuze bases this kind of understanding of revolution 
as the pure event on Kant, in particular, on his remark in The Contest of Faculties that 
“the concept of revolution exists not in the way in which revolution is under taken in a 
necessarily relative social field but in the ‘enthusiasm’ with which it is thought on an 
absolute plane of immanence, like a presentation of the infinite in the here and now, 
which includes nothing rational or even reasonable” (What Is Philosophy? 100). From 
this statement, Deleuze draws the necessity to distinguish “the way revolutions turn out 
historically and people’s revolutionary becoming,” and asserts that “men’s only hope lies 
in a revolutionary becoming: the only way of casting off their shame or responding to 
what is intolerable” (Negotiations 171). Even, in What is Philosophy?, Deleuze goes on 
to point out that revolution is itself a philosophical concept par excellence in so far as the 
concept is “the contour, the configuration or constellation of an event to come” (32-33). 
But again, Deleuze’s political project cannot explain the question as to “how.” The 
inevitable correlation between the virtual and the actual—how a synthetic subject 
becomes active through the power of the virtual whose ideas guide the passive synthesis 
transforming them into properly active syntheses—is just not enough to explain how 
agents are possible in this theory. In Deleuze, individuation occurs as a pre-personal 
process, and beings are just effects of an aleatory event that drives the process. Deleuze 
seems to maintain a certain illusion of subjectivity in his political project, but his theory 
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provides no real account of how even the minimum degree of self-directedness, which is 
required for any explanation of political agency, can be possible.36 
Todd Cronan’s crucial point on the impossibility of human agency in affect theory 
resonates with my argument above as well: “No matter how the self is described, 
humanist or posthumanist, singular or multiple, integral or institutional, centered or 
decentered, whole or fragmented, the problem of agency remains. Even if the idea of the 
self is a fiction, we are still called upon to act and make choices. To say that the self is 
constructed does not say anything about what that self is supposed to do” (Cronan 16). In 
the theories of affect and Deleuze that affect theorists always return to as a point of 
reference, an act of an individual cannot be explained without relying on a sort of 
aleatory determination by a pre-personal field. Affect theorists are seized with the 
poststructural anxiety about what Deleuze calls the “paternal function” (Critical and 
Clinical 76) of consciousness, and their fear of its despotic power made them choose to 
give up the category of consciousness completely rather than rethinking its limitations 
and possibilities—why should the functions of consciousness, representation, and agency 
always be explained in terms of rigid codification, despotic power, and authoritative 
unity?  
Affect theorists’ insistence on the political dimension of affect is based on the 
versatility of affect, in particular. They argue that the neutrality of affect can be more 
                                                 
36 One might argue that Hardt and Negri’s politics of “the multitude” can possibly show one way of 
appropriating Deleuze’s ontology in imagining a new form of political subject. It can be answered well, 
though, by pointing out Christian Thorne’s argument that the multitude “does not fight,” but just “flees”: 
“the multitude remains the agent of history, to be sure, but only in its capacity for flight.” Thorn provides 
an intriguing interpretation of how Hardt and Negri’s imagined communist society resummons forms of 
feudalism as well. For a detailed explanation about how Hardt and Negri’s theory of the multitude as a 
“politics of escape” cannot constitute itself as an effective political theory, see Christian Thorne’s “Against 
Joy; or, Deleuze’s Empire” on his blog, Christian Thorne ∙ Commonplace Book. 
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“sensitive to the ‘manner’ of a world,” constituting it as a sort of “ethico-aesthetics,” 
“without collapsing back to humanism” (Gregg and Seigworth 15). Facing the so-called 
crisis of humanism, their solution is to drop “the human” completely and flee to the 
purified impersonal realm outside this secular world while arguing at the same time that 
there is no outside and everything is immanent. Furthermore, there is a certain kind of 
romanticism working in this logic, in their fear of reason, mind and language, as Follet 
argues, that “they will dissect/murder, reduce or reify,” and in their perspective that 
“seeks a return to nature in the form of namelessness, pure existence, and the ‘perpetual 
present.’”   
Ultimately, the current fascination with the idea of affect is a symptom of how the 
ontologization of politics has become a new academic trend in the humanities and social 
sciences. Most of all, the autonomy of affect speaks to the role of art after Barthes’s 
“death of the author” as it affirms art as non-representational and interpretation-
independent.  Restricting the concepts of representation and meaning to monolithic 
entities as opposed to “lived experience,” a deadening form of expression, however, leads 
to a certain myopia with respect to how forms of representation can suggest possible and 
meaningful ways to mediate our connection with the world. As long as we live in a world 
where we communicate using signs, how to make those signs meaningful and reanimated 
can be a more responsible option than the paradoxically obscene pursuit of a path of the 
divine purification and immediacy of language, which carries a certain kind of arrogance 
toward our reality. The task of imagining a new realism after modernism can begin only 
after our re-appropriation of representation as an affirmative procedure to make one 
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closer to the world again. It is a call for us to encounter our passion to change, and fight 
with it rather than “flee.”    
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